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Abstract 
Use of payments for ecosystem services (PES) has grown around the world in recent 
years. Although there has been extensive discussion of how best to define PES and what 
is PES or ‘PES-like’, at the core of all definitions and all PES programmes is the 
delivery of a positive incentive to induce socially preferred environmental behaviour. 
Despite this, research on PES design has to date focused more on broader policy design 
than on incentive choice and design. In the developing world, PES are broadly 
perceived as a useful tool for environmental policy, but it is here that a continuing 
proliferation of programmes is occurring in many varied contexts. That has motivated a 
variety of approaches to be taken to PES, and prompted revisionists to call PES 
‘incentives’, ‘rewards’, ‘compensation’, or something else besides ‘payments’.  
 
There are two primary academic objectives of this Ph.D. The first is to conceptualise 
PES as a broad category of positive incentives and explore the variation within that 
category. That is done through a) a conceptual review of PES; b) a review of empirical 
research on incentive design for PES; and c) an empirical study creating a typology of 
PES. 
 
The literature review also highlights a few key considerations for incentive design 
relevant to developing country contexts that have not yet been adequately addressed. 
The second objective of the Ph.D. is to contribute, albeit in a small way, to addressing 
those key considerations through three empirical studies. 
 
The contribution of this work to academic knowledge is twofold: 1) Through literature 
reviews and empirical methods, this paper offers an overarching synthesis of 
conceptualising and researching PES as incentives, and 2) it explores a few specific, 
novel ideas in incentive design to help adapt PES to the contexts in which it is applied. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Overview 
 
1.1. Background 
In 2002, Landell-Mills & Porras (2002) reviewed 287 market mechanisms for forest 
environmental services in developed and developing countries. It was the first attempt 
to catalogue such mechanisms on that scale, and remains one of the most cited 
documents on the topic.1 As such, it provides a benchmark against which to identify 
how the discourse and experience with such mechanisms has evolved. In the past 
decade, three key aspects at the foundation of that study have changed. 
 
First, there has been a move away from discussing market mechanisms as a broad 
category of environmental policy instruments and towards discussing payments for 
ecosystem/environmental services (PES). Programmes that use PES were originally 
defined as a market or market-based mechanism, but have more recently been defined 
as a broad category of policies that include markets for ecosystem services (MES) (e.g., 
Sommerville et al. 2009), or in other words, that PES programmes can be market-based 
or non-market-based (Farley & Costanza 2010). 
 
The shift is evident in the fact that while market mechanisms are often conceptualised 
as important to internalise environmental externalities that arise from traditional market 
failures, Farley & Costanza (2010) call it paradoxical that market mechanisms based in 
more traditional economic thinking are proposed to fix market failures. They instead 
suggest that a PES programme can only address the key market failures that lead to an 
undersupply of ecosystem services (ES) “to the extent that it differs from conventional 
markets, not to the extent that it mimics them” (pg. 2064). That appears to manifest in 
implementation of PES. For example, prominent examples of PES originally intended to 
follow the idea of a market mechanism do not (at least yet) look much like a market 
mechanism (McAfee & Shapiro 2010; McElwee 2012; Fletcher & Breitling 2012).  
 
                                                
1 842 citations in Google Scholar as of 29 December 2013, compared to a maximum of 939 for papers 
defining or conceptualising PES (Wunder 2005) and a second place of 758 (Engel et al. 2008). 
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That shift in perception of market mechanisms and PES has occurred as part of a 
broader evolving conceptualisation of what PES actually are. That is the second aspect 
that has changed. Still the most cited definition of PES, Wunder (2005) defines them as: 
1. A voluntary transaction; where 
2. A well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service); is being 
3. ‘Bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer; from 
4. A (minimum one) ES provider;  
5. If and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality). 
 
From about 2009, numerous studies have offered different definitions. Some claim to be 
refinements of Wunder’s definition (e.g. Sommerville et al. 2009; Swallow et al. 2009), 
while others are more critical of that definition (e.g., Muradian et al. 2010; van 
Noordwijk & Leimona 2010), and some try to provide a synthesis of the different 
definitions and approaches (Tacconi 2012). 
 
The evolving definition has itself also occurred within a larger change. The third aspect 
that has shifted is that experience with PES around the world has notably increased in 
the past decade, with an important increase in developing countries. For example, 
Landell-Mills & Porras (2002) identified 4 mechanisms that they classified as 
biodiversity credit/offset programmes, 75 as forest carbon offset programmes, and 41 as 
proposed and ongoing payments for watershed services (PWS). In 2010, Madsen et al. 
(2010) identified 39 active biodiversity credit/offset programmes and 25 in 
development. Similarly, Peters-Stanley et al. (2013) indentified 162 active forest carbon 
programmes in 2012.Finally, Bennett et al. (2013) identified 205 active incentive-based 
watershed programmes in 2011, and 76 in development. At least 120 of those active and 
38 in development are PWS (see Chapter 4), and depending on one’s definition of PES, 
it could be more.  
 
The shift in thinking leads to questions of what PES actually are and based on that, how 
they should be designed if not as a ‘market’ mechanism. As elaborated further in 
Chapters 2 and 3, there is one important consistency across all definitions of PES and 
that has remained at the centre of PES discourse: incentives are at the core of all PES 
programmes. In fact, the discourse has evolved to not define PES as a mechanism, but 
as a class of incentives (Muradian et al. 2010; Tacconi 2012; Sommerville et al. 2009). 
They are a class of incentives that link conservation and land-use outcomes to market-
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based mechanisms (Fisher et al. 2010) or to non-market-based programmes and 
policies. 
 
As PES are defined as incentives, there should be a greater focus on incentive choice 
and design in relation to PES. As elaborated further in Chapter 4, previous 
characterisations of PES have often focused on institutional aspects and relation to 
markets (Swallow et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2006; Scherr et al. 2006), or the broader 
paradigm framing a PES transaction (Muradian et al. 2010; van Noordwijk & Leimona 
2010). Although these are both helpful approaches to understanding policy design, 
much less attention has been paid to the incentives that are broadly agreed to be at the 
heart of such policies. A literature relevant for incentive design of PES exists, but there 
is only a small, emerging literature specifically focused on the topic. 
 
In addition, the discourse on PES has always been largely defined by experience in 
developing countries. That includes the shift in this discourse. For example, many of the 
refinements and critiques of the original definition of PES have been motivated, at least 
in part, by the variety of PES programmes observed in developing countries, many of 
which do not fit the original definition (Muradian et al. 2010; van Noordwijk & 
Leimona 2010; Sommerville et al. 2009). That poses many areas of research that need 
to be addressed. In particular, with such a variety and prevalence of PES in developing 
countries, the question arises of how best to design such incentives in a developing 
country context. Some insight can come from more thorough analysis of what currently 
exists, which is becoming possible as PES become better researched and reported, and 
more information is available. Some insight might also come from other places. Lessons 
on incentive design, particularly in a developing country context, can be drawn from 
related areas of economics. As Fisher et al. (2010, pg. 1260) state, “care must be taken 
to make sure that the lessons we learn while heading down the PES path were not 
already learned in other contexts, with other literatures, and other buzzwords.” As such, 
this Ph.D. draws from multiple economic sub-disciplines, particularly environmental/ 
ecological economics and development economics. 
 
The research presented in the following chapters contributes to the small, emerging 
literature focussed specifically on incentive design for PES. The remainder of this 
introduction clarifies choices of terminology used throughout this Ph.D. and gives 
additional explanation for the focus on developing countries. Following the 
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introduction, the second section elaborates three key research questions. The third 
section then clearly outlines each chapter of this Ph.D., their specific aims, and which 
research questions they address. 
 
1.1.1. Terminology 
In relation to terminology, the PES literature is diverse in a number of ways, including 
working definitions of PES; context of specific case studies; and intellectual or 
ideological views of the researcher. As such, the terminology used in this Ph.D. tries to 
be broad and inclusive, but also as precise and easy to use as possible. The choice of 
terminology is not intended to support any particular viewpoint.  
 
First, the focus of this Ph.D. is on the positive incentives (i.e. ‘payments’) provided to 
the ES provider, with an agnostic stance to the various mechanisms through which that 
incentive can be channelled. The definitions and conceptualisations of these 
programmes and policies continue to undergo dynamic debate. There are many 
similarities between them, however, and so they are addressed collectively here. The 
term PES is used to describe the general class of positive incentives used to induce a 
socially preferred behaviour, with the aim of increasing the supply of ES, irrespective of 
whether the programme through which that incentive is provided is called AES, PES, a 
market for ES, or something else.  
 
Second, the recipients of the incentive are in many cases owners of farms of forests, but 
in some cases are also users of common pool resources. As such, they will at times be 
referred to as ‘resource users’, a term that encompasses all owners or users of land, 
water, timber, fish, etc. More often, and in the context of PES specifically, they are 
referred to as the ‘providers’ of ES. In terms of contract and incentive research, they 
would be considered the agent, while the ES buyers would be considered the principal. 
 
Third, the term ‘ecosystem services’ is used because it indicates changes in land use and 
natural capital. All of the literature reviewed and analysis conducted is based on 
incentives that are intended to induce a greater provision of the benefits that people 
receive from nature, which is how ES are often defined (Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 2005). Swallow et al. (2009) describe the difference between environmental 
services and ecosystem services is that the former does not include provisioning 
services, such as water and food. The literature cited here and in the following chapters 
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does not focus on ecosystem goods that arise through provisioning services (e.g. 
timber), but some do focus on the provision of water. 
 
Additionally, the use of the term ‘ecosystem services’ is not intended to imply that the 
studies focussed on programmes that provided incentives based on a strict measure of 
ecosystem service output. A few did, but the vast majority of studies look at incentives 
used to induce a change in actions by resource users, which in turn is believed to 
provide increased levels of ecosystem services. 
 
Finally, in some parts of the world, ‘environmental services’ can refer to services 
provided using grey infrastructure. That is a particular risk for the water sector. The 
research presented here, however, is all focused on land- or ecosystem-based behaviours 
and so the term ‘ecosystem services’ helps to reinforce that. 
 
1.1.2. Focus on developing countries 
Payments for ecosystem services are used across the world, but this Ph.D. will focus on 
the design of PES in developing countries, specifically low- or middle-income countries 
as classified by the World Bank.2 Although developed countries have a longer and 
deeper history with PES, the difference is slight. Further, evidence suggests that the 
majority of active programmes now occur in developing countries. Of the 205 
incentive-based watershed programmes identified by Bennett et al. (2013), 113 (55%) 
of the active programmes and 53 (72%) of the programmes under development are 
located in low- and middle-income countries.3 The data from Bennett et al. (2013) was 
filtered for relevance to this Ph.D., and 120 programmes4 more strictly defined as those 
that use PES—payments for watershed services (PWS) programmes—were analysed in 
Chapter 3. The picture is similar for this reduced sample. An approximately equal 
                                                
2 See World Bank country classifications at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/country-and-lending-groups. 
3 Based on GNI/capita in 2011. That is the latest year for which World Bank data is available for all 
countries represented in this database, and is the focus year of Bennett et al. (2013) 
4 The estimate is also very conservative in relation to China’s Forest Ecological Compensation Funds 
(FECFs). One large national programme exists, complemented by multiple provincial efforts. Here they 
have conservatively been considered a single programme implemented in multiple provinces. They could 
arguably be considered all individual programmes. In that case 10s more programmes would be added to 
the developing country total and, due to China, they would noticeably outnumber those in developed 
countries. 
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number of PWS programmes were identified in developed and developing countries 
around 2012. Of the PWS programmes under development in that database, many more 
occur in developing countries, indicating that that the number of PES programmes for 
watershed services either currently, or will very soon, outnumber those in developed 
countries (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative number of programmes that use PES to protect watershed services, in developed 
and developing countries, based on year programme was established. The future estimate is based on the 
programmes identified as in development around 2012, and from that group only include the ones far 
enough developed to identify that they plan to use PES. Source: Bennett et al. 2013. 
 
In addition to PWS programmes, many more programmes use PES to incentivise 
biodiversity conservation, environmentally friendly agricultural practices, and provision 
of land-based carbon services throughout the developing world. The use of PES in 
developing countries is likely to continue to increase, driven by various international 
agenda and dynamics related to environment and development. These include efforts by 
parties to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity, REDD+ under the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, related concepts and initiatives such as 
green growth, and general increased demand from citizens for a healthy environment as 
countries become wealthier. 
 
In addition to the prevalent use of PES in developing countries, the discourse on PES 
has been largely shaped by experience in developing countries. Arguably the most cited 
and researched PES programme is that of Costa Rica (Porras et al. 2013), originally 
developed through a World Bank project. The earliest conceptualisations and definitions 
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were based on experience from World Bank projects (Pagiola & Platais 2002) along 
with experience from the Center for International Forestry Research (Wunder 2005). 
Later re-definitions and re-conceptualisations of PES, critiquing the originally proposed 
defining characteristics of PES, were also based on experience in developing countries: 
what could be considered the basis of the ecological economics approach to PES was 
explicitly grounded in experience in developing countries (Muradian et al. 2010); 
experiences in Latin America have led to an approach framing the incentive exchange 
as a reciprocal exchange (Asquith 2011; Rare 2010); and experience in Asia inspired a 
paradigm-based categorisation of PES (van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010). Specific 
projects have even claimed their own unique approach to PES in developing countries, 
often with a focus on equity in the provision of PES, including WWF’s Equitable 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (e.g. Kwayu et al. 2013) and the World Agroforestry 
Centre’s Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services (e.g. Leimona et al. 2009) 
projects. 
 
In short, not only are PES more and increasingly numerous in developing countries, but 
it is also PES experience in developing countries that has inspired so many variations on 
how PES are defined. A focus on PES in developing countries is not only more relevant 
for these reasons, but the variety of PES makes for more interesting and fruitful research 
on the choice and design of incentives. 
 
1.2. Research Questions and Novelty 
In light of that background and focus, the overarching objective of the research 
presented here is to contribute to the growing body of knowledge on designing PES. 
Although many researchers and practitioners are interested in different facets of 
designing PES programmes, this Ph.D. is novel in its focus on PES as incentives. 
Significant research and literature is devoted to the design of policies and instruments, 
through which PES are provided, but that on incentive design for PES is much smaller. 
 
After this overview, the following five chapters each make a contribution to this 
literature that, taken together, help to advance knowledge on the design of PES 
generally. Three broad research questions are elaborated below through an introduction 
to the chapters that address them. Although three questions are presented, the Ph.D. 
gives slightly more focus to the third. These questions are: 
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1. What is the state of knowledge on PES as incentives? 
2. What types of incentives are used as PES? 
3. How can PES be designed to overcome some of the issues related to incentives 
highlighted in the literature? 
 
 
1.2.1. PES as incentives 
What is the state of knowledge on PES as incentives? 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the definitions and conceptualisations of PES. It finds that the 
definition of PES has evolved away from a focus on institutions and mechanism design. 
Instead, all definitions converge on PES as a class of incentives provided through 
different types of policies and mechanisms that align with varying types of framing and 
paradigms (e.g., Wunder 2005; Engel et al. 2008; Muradian et al. 2010; Tacconi 2012). 
Sommerville et al. (2009) aptly describe ‘PES’ as an umbrella term, recognising the 
variety of PES observed in implementation. The chapter goes on to describe a 
conceptualisation of PES as a class of incentives that can link to a variety of actors and 
policy instruments and institutions. The conceptualisation is closest to that presented by 
Sommerville et al. (2009). 
 
Chapter 3 then illustrates that, although there is convergence on PES as incentives, 
researchers are only just beginning to specifically focus on understanding how best to 
design such incentives. There is a large body of literature on land-use technology 
adoption or participation in incentive-based programmes, but it generally treats any 
incentive for a change in behaviour as a generic, homogenous incentive. A smaller 
literature has emerged that analyses incentive choice and design in a PES context. The 
core of this literature is nearly 20 studies that use discrete choice analysis (DCA) to 
explore the preferences of potential ES provider for different incentive attributes. 
Additionally, across the PES literature some specific issues related to incentive design 
have emerged that are particularly relevant to PES in developing countries, but with 
limited empirical evidence of their effect on optimal choice and design of PES. 
 
Both chapters are novel in their approach. Little conceptual or review research has taken 
the approach of focusing on PES as incentives, rather than as a policy instrument or 
other institutional arrangement for resource management. These two chapters establish 
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the concept and knowledge base of PES as a class of incentives linking land-use 
decisions with a broader institutional framework. 
 
1.2.2. Types and attributes of PES 
What types of incentives are used as PES? 
 
Previous categorisations and typologies of PES programmes focussed on the 
institutional aspects of policies or their relation to markets (e.g. Scherr et al. 2006; 
Swallow et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2006), or on the framing or paradigm of the 
arrangement through which PES are provided (e.g. van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010). 
No effort has yet been made to characterise the types of incentives that comprise the 
class of incentives called PES. 
 
Chapter 4 does this using data on PES in the context of watershed conservation. Using 
latent class analysis (LCA), a typology of payments for watershed services (PWS) is 
defined based on incentive attributes identified in Chapter 3 (literature review) as 
potentially affecting ES providers’ willingness to accept PES.  
 
The chapter is novel as no other study has yet characterized types of PES as incentives, 
and no study, irrespective of conceptual approach, has yet used a model-based method 
for developing a typology. All previous efforts have been qualitative and somewhat 
opaque in how defining variables where chosen and/or applied. Further, through this 
approach, observations can be made on the contexts in which different types of PES are 
used. In particular, the chapter explores how the prevalence of different types of PES 
changes with a country’s development. 
 
In addition to providing input to Chapter 4, Chapter 3 also helps answer this research 
question directly. Types of PES are defined by the attributes that comprise them. 
Understanding both the types of PES and all actual or potential incentive attributes, 
provides a common language, and more importantly, a critical knowledge base to 
inform PES design and research. 
 
1.2.3. PES design elements 
How can PES be designed to overcome some of the issues related to incentives 
highlighted in the literature? 
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As noted above, Chapter 3 includes two parts: a systematic review of studies that use 
DCA to assess ES providers’ preferences for incentive attributes, and a review of three 
broad issues related to incentive design that have emerged from the PES literature. 
These three issues are the existence of market constraints, information asymmetries, and 
behavioural (i.e. ‘non-rational’) considerations. Chapters 5 and 6 are two case studies 
that follow the emerging practice in the literature of using DCA to study incentive 
attributes, but study specific incentive types and attributes in relation to overcoming the 
three identified issues. 
 
Chapter 5 studies preferences for a novel incentive called credit-based PES. The study 
highlights interesting conclusions related to this form of PES. It also addresses the issue 
of indirect incentives, a possible solution to overcoming market constraints, and how 
such incentives are perceived, which relates to behavioural considerations. 
 
Chapter 6 studies a long-standing question of whether to use cash or in-kind incentives 
and provides insight into specific reasons both ES provider and buyer may prefer in-
kind incentives. These reasons relate to market constraints, information asymmetries 
and behavioural considerations. In addition, Chapter 6 also researches the novel PES 
attribute of group liability, an innovation borrowed from microfinance economics, to 
address the issue of information asymmetries.  
 
Together, these two chapters draw not only from environmental/ecological economics, 
but also learn from development and behavioural economics to explore a number of 
novel or important attributes of PES. They also advance knowledge of PES design in 
respect to the three highlighted issues. Other studies on PES that use similar methods as 
in Chapters 5 and 6 tend to focus on preferences for the incentive attributes and do not 
go much further. The case studies here are designed to ensure that understanding of 
preferences in these cases will be helpful, albeit in a small way, to informing incentive 
design for PES more broadly. 
 
1.3. Methodological Approach 
1.3.1. Literature review 
Two primary analytical methods are used for the research comprising the following 
chapters. The first is literature review, which is used as the primary method in Chapters 
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2 and 3, and as a component of Chapters 4-6. In Chapters 2 and 3, extensive review of 
many aspects of literature related to PES was carried out, with a portion of that review 
carried out systematically. The focus of Chapter 2 was to review papers that defined or 
conceptualised PES. Previous academic and grey literature papers that do so and are 
also prevalently cited were compared across various themes, with the most interesting 
and relevant highlighted in that chapter. In Chapter 3, two types of review are carried 
out. The first is a systematic review of papers that use similar methods to study potential 
ES providers’ preferences for incentive attributes of PES. Following similar reviews of 
related topics, a vote-count methodology was carried out to compare across the studies 
(Delacote et al. 2012; Knowler & Bradshaw 2007; Prokopy et al. 2008). The second 
part of the chapter is less systematic and more discussion-based. Drawing from PES 
literature as well as other economic sub-disciplines, key issues related to incentive 
design for PES that are not yet resolved are discussed. 
 
1.3.2. Discrete choices 
The consumer choice can be divided into a discrete choice about what to consume and a 
continuous choice about how much to consume (Hanemann 1984). Discrete choice 
analysis (DCA) isolates the first part to determine what goods a consumer demands 
(Hoyos 2010). A fundamental component of DCA is to follow Lancastrian theory of 
consumer demand that the goods can be considered a bundle of attributes (Lancaster 
1966).  
 
The approach was originally developed to predict market demand by consumers, and 
early applications were made in the fields of transportation, energy, housing and 
marketing (Train 2009), but its use to assess design of environmental policies is 
increasing. It became popular among environmental economists as a tool for 
understanding individuals’ preferences for environmental attributes through stated 
preference (SP) studies (Hoyos 2010), and has been used to evaluate preferences for 
forests (Brey et al. 2007), wetlands (Carlsson et al. 2003), beaches (Beharry-Borg & 
Scarpa 2010), landscape beauty (Dachary-Bernard & Rambonilaza 2012), fish (Agimass 
& Mekonnen 2011), and cultural heritage (Choi et al. 2010), amongst many other 
environs and ES.  
 
Whatever the context, most applications of DCA are to understand preferences related 
to demand for ES, but DCA can also be used to understand preferences related to the 
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supply of ES. It has begun to be used to ex-ante assess land or resource users’ 
preferences for the attributes of incentive and incentive-based policies, such as agri-
environmental schemes in Europe (Christensen et al. 2011; Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; 
Ruto & Garrod 2009), reforestation incentives in China (Grosjean & Kontoleon 2009; 
Qin et al. 2011), and marine PES in Tanzania (Barr & Mourato 2012). Studies that 
follow a discrete choice approach to studying PES are the ones systematically reviewed 
in Chapter 3, and these set a precedent for the methods used in the case studies in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Both Chapters 5 and 6 study local ES providers’ stated preferences for incentive choice 
and design using a discrete choice experiment (CE). The CEs are designed and 
implemented using good and common practice for environmental economics (Hoyos 
2010) and analysed using advanced simulation-based methods (Train 2009). Detailed 
description of the experimental design and specification of econometric models for 
analysis are provided in each chapter. 
 
Another method used for Chapter 4 is latent class analysis (LCA) combined with a 
multinomial logistic (MNL) regression model. Although the approach to Chapter 4 is 
founded more in cluster analysis, LCA and MNL both form an integral part of the DCA 
toolbox. Additionally, as with the CEs in Chapters 5 and 6, the approach taken in 
Chapter 4 views PES as a bundle of incentive attributes, and categorises types of PES 
based on different combinations of attributes. As such, although it is not specifically 
DCA that is used in Chapter 4, the methods can be considered an extension of the DCA 
approach. As with Chapters 5 and 6, a detailed description is provided in Chapter 4. 
 
Finally, the data used is mostly primary, but some secondary data. Chapter 4 uses data 
obtained from a different study that used a combination of primary and secondary data. 
It was founded on a survey of PES programme managers, but additional coding was 
required, much of which is based on publicly available information. Chapters 5 and 6 
use solely primary data collected specifically for those two case studies. 
 
1.4. Outline of Ph.D. 
To achieve the overarching objective of advancing knowledge on the design of PES, 
this Ph.D. works to address the research questions put forward above. It does so through 
 25 
five analytical chapters, plus a final chapter that summarises and draws conclusions. To 
summarise this first overview chapter, an outline of all chapters is presented. 
 
1.4.1. Overview (Chapter 1) 
The aim of the current chapter is to provide an introduction and overview of the entire 
Ph.D. It does not include any true academic discussion or research, but explains the 
overarching objective of the Ph.D., broad research questions to be addressed, and clear 
outline and aims of each of the following chapters. 
 
1.4.2. Conceptual basis (Chapter 2) 
The primary aim of Chapter 2 is to present the definition and conceptualization of PES 
that is used throughout the Ph.D. It does this by reviewing the literature that defines and 
conceptualises PES, and finding what they all have in common and how, in other ways, 
the thinking on PES has evolved. It contributes most to Research Question 1. 
 
1.4.3. Literature review (Chapter 3) 
Chapter 3 presents a more traditional review of empirical literature. It does this in two 
parts. The first part focuses on specific attributes of PES incentives and is based around 
a systematic review of 19 identified studies that use DCA to analyse multiple attributes 
of PES in a single case study. The first half heavily informs Chapter 4, and both halves 
contribute to Research Questions 1 and 2. The second part of the literature review then 
identifies and discusses three key issues emerging in the PES literature for which little 
empirical research has been carried out. It informs the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, 
and the most heavily weighted Research Question 3. 
 
1.4.4. Categorising PES (Chapter 4) 
The aim of Chapter 4 is to explore the types of incentives that could be considered PES, 
and increase the understanding of the contexts in which different types are used, 
particularly in relation to the level of development within a country. Payments for 
watershed services (PWS) are seemingly the most prevalent form of PES (Bennett et al. 
2013; Madsen et al. 2011; Madsen et al. 2010; Peters-Stanley et al. 2013), and can most 
easily fit the original model of downstream ES beneficiaries paying upstream ES 
providers of ES. The typology is thus based on PWS specifically. Latent-class analysis 
is simultaneously estimated with a MNL model and both are interpreted in light of 
additional descriptive statistics. The results 1) define a typology of PWS based on 
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important attributes identified in the first part of the Literature Review (Chapter 3), and 
2) illuminate the contexts in which different types of PWS are used currently around the 
world. 
 
1.4.5. Case study (Chapter 5) 
Chapter 5 presents a case study of a developing PES programme in Ecuador. The study 
had two aims: 1) to explore the dynamics of a novel type of PES, credit-based PES (CB-
PES), and 2) to analyse how what many would consider an indirect incentive can help 
overcome market constraints and align with lessons from cognitive studies on 
improving incentive design. Both are issues highlighted in the second part of the 
Literature Review (Chapter 3). To achieve these aims, a CE was carried out with 
households in the Intag River Region of the Northern Ecuadorian highlands. It was 
analysed using a mixed logit (MXL) model, the new standard in DCA. 
 
1.4.6. Case study (Chapter 6) 
Chapter 6 presents a case study of a developing PES programme in Colombia. The 
study had two aims, both of which relate directly to issues highlighted in the second part 
of the Literature Review (Chapter 3). First, it aimed to better understand the reasons for 
preferring cash or non-cash incentives. Second, it aimed to understand potential ES 
providers’ perceptions of group liability in PES contracts. To achieve these aims, a CE 
was carried out with households living around the Chingaza National Park near Bogota, 
Colombia. Again, a MXL model was used to analyse the results. 
 
1.4.7. Conclusions (Chapter 7) 
The final chapter aims to synthesise the most interesting results across the analytical 
chapters (2-6) and draw conclusions. It discusses those results and conclusions in 
relation to the three key research questions outlined in Chapter 1 (above), and briefly 
notes areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL BASIS 
 
Payments for Ecosystem Services as Incentives 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As payments for ecosystem services (PES) have proliferated globally, in particular to 
induce the provision of regulating and cultural ecosystem services (ES), various 
definitions and conceptualisations of PES have emerged. The dominant earlier 
conceptualisation of PES programmes was that they are market-based mechanisms 
(Pagiola & Platais 2002) that could be conceptualised as a Coaseian transaction (Engel 
et al. 2008). PES programmes have most often been described as market-based or 
market-like mechanisms ever since (Farley & Costanza 2010; Fletcher & Breitling 
2012). 
 
Defining PES as a market-based mechanism, however, does not accurately reflect the 
various types of PES programmes that have been implemented (Muradian et al. 2010; 
Tacconi 2012). The definitions and conceptualisations of PES over the past decade have 
all presented slightly different ideas of how PES relate to markets. In particular, later 
conceptualisations clarify that not all PES are market-based, define market-based PES 
as a subset of all PES (Muradian et al. 2010), and posit that market-based PES are only 
appropriate in certain contexts to provide certain ES (Farley & Costanza 2010; Kemkes 
et al. 2010).  
 
In addition to debate about whether or not being market-based is a defining 
characteristic of PES, the defining quality of other characteristics has been questioned 
due to variation observed across PES programmes. Those characteristics include, 
among others, how important economic incentives are to PES programmes (Muradian et 
al. 2010), how strict conditionality is (Farley & Costanza 2010; van Noordwijk & 
Leimona 2010), and the voluntary basis of PES (Vatn 2010). Different opinions on the 
connection of PES with markets and these other characteristics have led some to outline 
two broad approaches to PES: the environmental economics approach and the 
ecological economics approach (Farley & Costanza 2010; Tacconi 2012). 
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Yet, there are significant overlaps between these approaches (Tacconi 2012). The most 
basic and consistent overlap has so far failed to be widely acknowledged, or at least has 
been lost in a more ideological discourse. Fundamentally, all of the most prolific papers 
defining and conceptualizing PES agree that incentives are the core of all PES 
programmes (see Section 2.3). Losing this focus on incentives is detrimental to ensuring 
that PES are optimally designed and implemented, however and wherever in the world 
they are used. 
 
Only a few papers have explicitly explored PES programmes as incentive-based 
mechanisms. Notably, Jack et al. (2008) were the first to describe PES programmes as 
‘incentive-based mechanisms’ in the academic literature, but used the term ‘incentive-
based mechanism’ synonymously with ‘market-based instrument’ (MBI). As implied 
above, the current PES discourse would argue that market-based instruments should be 
considered a different, but perhaps overlapping, concept to incentive-based mechanisms 
(Muradian et al. 2010; Farley & Costanza 2010). 
 
This chapter attempts to define and conceptualise PES as incentives and PES 
programmes as incentive-based mechanisms, recognising the many varied contexts in 
which PES are used. That chapter provides the conceptual basis for the rest of this Ph.D. 
Following this introduction, Section 2.2. presents three key trends in PES 
conceptualisations. Aligning with those trends, Section 2.3. presents the definition and 
conceptualisation of PES as a broad class of positive incentives. Section 2.4. 
summarises. 
 
2.2. Refocusing on PES as Incentives 
From reviewing the literature that defines, conceptualises, and/or categorises PES, three 
key concepts emerge that support a conceptualisation of PES as incentives. The 
direction of discourse on PES has recognised that 1) PES programmes are a broad 
heterogeneous class of interventions, that 2) is only partly comprised of MBIs, but 3) 
there is little recognition that across all definitions, conceptualisations, and 
categorisations, there is agreement that incentives are the core of all PES programmes. 
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2.2.1. PES are heterogeneous 
In a review of MBIs for biodiversity (BD) and ecosystem services (ES), Broughton & 
Pirard (2011, pg. 1) claim, “MBIs for [BD and ES] constitute an extremely 
heterogeneous group that makes little sense from an economic theory perspective as it 
mixes apples and oranges.” They continue, emotively noting that, “MBIs as a category 
look more like an asylum country for all tools with a price component.” 
 
The situation is analogous for PES. Pirard (2012, pg. 61) describes that PES “may be 
understood as a principle—paying for the provision of a service—or as a specific type 
of instrument.” It is in attempting to define PES as a particular type of instrument that 
the PES discourse has mixed apples and oranges. In their review of PES literature, 
(Schomers & Matzdorf in press, pg. e1) write, “PES remains a multi-facetted term with 
many diverse definitions coexisting”. That is manifest, for example, in the persistent 
discussion of PES versus PES-like mechanisms (Wunder 2005; Muradian et al. 2010). 
 
The cause of so many diverse definitions appears to be that many types of interventions 
follow PES in principle as described by Pirard (2012), but are heterogeneous in aspects 
of implementation. The discourse on PES has evolved to recognise that PES are a 
heterogeneous class of interventions. Wunder's (2005) original definition of PES is still 
the most cited, but as described by the author himself, it was narrow and intended to be 
a theoretical ideal used to help understand PES. Authors involved in the early 
conceptualisation of PES recognised that the theoretical ideal of PES was adjusted in 
practice to meet the “messiness of the real world” (Engel et al. 2008; pg. 672). Other 
academics, building in large part on experience in developing countries, went a step 
further and specifically sought to expand and revise the conceptualisation of PES to 
match theory with on-the-ground practice and the variety of programmes called PES 
(Muradian et al. 2010). 
 
Evidence of the diversity of PES comes from the many different attempts to characterise 
or categorise PES. Wunder (2005) offers three binary characteristics by which to 
understand the variety of PES: area- or product-based, public or private, and use 
restricting or asset-building programmes. In their revised conceptualisation of PES, 
Muradian et al. (2010) offers a three-dimensional spectrum of PES based on directness 
of transfer, importance of the economic incentive, and level of commoditisation. 
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Other authors provide specific categories. Engel et al. (2008) adapts Wunder's (2005) 
characterisation of public and private programmes, to introduce a now prevalently cited 
divide of user-financed and government-financed PES. The former generally aligns with 
what Schomers & Matzdorf (in press) categorise as programmes that follow the 
Coaseian conceptualisation of PES and the latter with those that follow the Pigouvian 
conceptualisation. Other types of PES also exist, which Schomers & Matzdorf (in press) 
place in a third category of PES that align with conceptualisations beyond Coase and 
Pigou. Various other categorisations and characterisations of the heterogeneous 
universe of PES have also been offered as discussed more in Chapter 4 (e.g., Swallow et 
al. 2009; van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010; Lockie 2013).  
 
2.2.2. Non-market PES are most prevalent 
As noted above, PES have most often been described as market-based or market-like 
mechanisms (Farley & Costanza 2010; Fletcher & Breitling 2012), but it is unclear why 
this is the case. Table 1 presents how different conceptualisations of PES have defined 
the relationship of PES to markets. Pagiola & Platais (2002) indirectly describe PES as 
markets in multiple ways (e.g., there is a need to establish market infrastructure, pg. 4), 
yet that concept quickly evolved. Wunder & Vargas (2006, pg. 29) state, “Instead of 
true markets, what we mostly find in the real world—both in developed but especially 
in developing countries—are bilateral, mutually-negotiated agreements between 
ecosystem service users and providers.” Wunder (2005) describes that the term markets 
for ES (MES) implies the use of economic incentives, as well as "multiple actors, 
choices, and competition to some degree" (pg. 5), implying they are related to PES, but 
not equivalent to them. 
 
One resulting interpretation is that MES are a subset or type of PES. Scherr et al. (2006, 
pg. 5) describe their use of ‘PES’: 
 
“as an umbrella term to include both programmes that rely on one-off deals 
with rural landowners who agree to steward ecosystem services, as well as more 
complex ‘markets’ mechanisms involving offset credits traded among many 
buyers and sellers.” 
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Sommerville et al. (2009) agree with the dichotomy of market-based versus one-
off/project-based, framing it in terms of negotiations, and broadly refer to MES as a 
subcategory of PES. 
 
What has been described as the ecological economics approach to PES describes market 
and non-market PES (Muradian et al. 2010; Farley & Costanza 2010), and contests that 
market payment mechanisms are rarely appropriate based on the fundamental 
characteristics of ES and the contexts in which PES are implemented (Farley & 
Costanza 2010). Taking a slightly different approach, others simply state that market 
PES are rarely observed. Tacconi (2012) explains that PES usually rely on state, 
community and/or NGO engagement, and prices are negotiated, and do not represent 
the price that would be reached in a true market. A series of papers diving deeply into 
PES experiences in a few developing countries find that broadly, even when the original 
view or conceptualisation of PES in the policy design process was as a market 
mechanism, in implementation, the programmes do not have much resemblance to a 
market in Costa Rica (Fletcher & Breitling 2012), Mexico (Shapiro-Garza 2013) and 
Vietnam (McAfee & Shapiro 2010; Fletcher & Breitling 2012; McElwee 2012). 
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Table 1: Definitions and conceptualisations of payments for ecosystem services, with Google Scholar citation counts as of 29 December 2013. 
Reference 
(Citations) Definition Relation to Markets Relation to Incentives 
Pagiola & 
Platais (2002) 
(263) 
Does not define PES directly, but states, "The 
central principles of PES are that those who 
provide environmental services should be 
compensated for doing so and that those who 
receive the services should pay for their 
provision." (pg.2) 
Implies that PES are a form of market for ES, 
describing that market infrastructure is 
necessary (pg.4) and that market participants 
need information about the ES being 
exchanged (pg.3). 
States that the PES approach is an example of 
"systems in which land users are paid for the 
environmental services they generate, thus 
aligning their incentives with those of society 
as a whole." (pg.2)  
Wunder 
(2005) 
(939) 
"A PES is a voluntary transaction where a 
well-defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure 
that service) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum 
one) ES buyer from a (minimum one) ES 
provider if and only if the ES provider secures 
ES provision (conditionality)." (pg.3) 
States that the term 'markets for ES' implies 
economic incentives, as well as "multiple 
actors, choices, and competition to some 
degree" (pg. 5), implying they are related to 
PES, but not equivalent to them. Also notes 
that markets have some desirable and some 
undesirable qualities depending on the context. 
States, "…incentives are at the very core of 
PES." (pg.7) 
Engel et al. 
(2008) 
(758) 
 
Follows Wunder, 2005 Describes PES as a market-based mechanism 
used to overcome a market failure, and notes 
that not all markets for ES are PES. 
Explains that PES are mechanisms “to 
translate external, non-market values of the 
environment into real financial incentives for 
local actors to provide such environmental 
services." (pg.664) 
Jack et al. 
(2008) (240) 
Follows Wunder, 2005 Describes PES as “incentive-based 
mechanisms,” which the authors say is 
synonymous with “market-based instruments.”  
Explains that “PES programmes rely on 
incentives to induce behavioral change…” (pg. 
6465) 
Swallow et al. 
(2009) (90) 
Define ‘Rewards for Environmental Services' 
(RES) as "inducements provided to ecosystem 
stewards to give them incentive to enhance or 
maintain environmental services." (pg.7) 
Defines market-based instruments narrowly 
and akin to a tradable financial instrument: as a 
certificate or credit of ES provision (pg. 8). 
Implies that PES/RES are “market-oriented”. 
Describes that the type of "incentives" 
provided as rewards are a key variable of 
different RES (pg.7). 
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Table 1 (cont.): Definitions and conceptualisations of payments for ecosystem services, with Google Scholar citation counts as of 29 December 2013. 
Reference 
(Citations) Definition Relation to Markets Relation to Incentives 
Sommerville 
et al. (2009) 
(62) 
PES are "approaches that aim to transfer 
positive incentives to environmental service 
providers that are conditional on the provision 
of the service, where successful 
implementation is based on a consideration of 
additionality and varying institutional 
contexts" (pg.2) 
Separates markets for environmental services 
and PES. States, "Many markets for 
environmental services… would not be 
classified as PES interventions" (pg.6). 
Defines PES based on "positive incentives" 
(pg.2) 
Muradian et 
al. (2010) 
(271)a 
PES is "a transfer of resources between social 
actors, which aims to create incentives to align 
individual and/or collective land use decisions 
with the social interest in the management of 
natural resources." (pg.1205) 
Rejects PES as "only a market-driven tool", 
linking it to the literature on common-pool 
resource management and representing a 
broader range of situations and institutional 
arrangements in which PES can be 
implemented. (pg.1207) 
States that "the main goal of PES ought to be 
the creation of incentives" for the provision of 
ecosystem services that are public goods 
(pg.1205). 
Tacconi 
(2012) 
(32) 
“A PES scheme is a transparent system for the 
additional provision of environmental services 
through conditional payments to voluntary 
providers." (pg.35) 
Describes that PES are not market-based 
transactions and are minimally "market-like", 
because PES usually rely on state, community 
and/or NGO engagement (pg. 30); and prices 
are negotiated, and do not represent the price 
that would be reached in a true market (pg.31). 
States that "PES programmes are essentially 
instruments to maintain or recreate the supply 
of ES through the provision of incentives." 
(pg.35) 
a Farley & Costanza (2010) could arguably be included in this table, but in relation to defining or conceptualising PES, they effectively agree with and re-iterate Muradian et al. 
(2010)
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2.2.3. PES are supply-side incentives 
Although there are different conceptualisations of PES, there are many similarities 
among them. For example, Tacconi (2012) describes the environmental economics and 
ecological economics approaches as the two broadest and most directly competing 
approaches to PES, but also explains there is notable overlap between the two. The one 
crucial consistency across all points of view, including these two approaches, is that 
incentives are the core of all PES programmes (Table 1). 
 
The environmental and ecological approaches have strong agreement on this point. 
From papers characterised as promoting the environmental economics approach, 
Wunder (2005, pg. 7) states, “incentives are at the very core of PES.” Similarly, Engel 
et al. (2008, pg. 664) explain, PES are “a mechanism to translate external, non-market 
values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide such 
[environmental] services.” The ecological economics approach agrees significantly. 
Muradian et al. (2010), who critiqued other aspects of the environmental economics 
approach, state, “the main goal of PES ought to be the creation of incentives” for the 
provision of ES that are public goods (pg. 1205). In an attempt to reconcile the two 
approaches, Tacconi (2012, pg. 35) states, “PES programmes are essentially instruments 
to maintain or recreate the supply of ES through the provision of incentives.” 
 
Through the evolving discourse and experience with PES, it has emerged that not only 
are PES incentives, but specifically they are most commonly viewed as supply-side 
incentives, and PES programmes are a supply-side innovation. Wunder (2008) explains 
two arguments for why PES are innovative. The first is that it is a supply-side 
innovation where conservation (or ES) is being directly ‘bought’. The second is that 
PES programmes internalise environmental externalities: they link buyers and sellers, 
such that the user pays and the provider gets, leading to socially preferred resource 
allocation. These two arguments broadly equate with the Pigouvian and Coaseian 
categories of PES, respectively. In the Pigouvian category, the ES beneficiaries (i.e., 
users) can provide funding, but that is in no way assured. In line with a Pigouvian 
conceptualisation, Engel et al. (2008, pg. 665) note, “PES programs can also be seen as 
an environmental subsidy (to ES providers) combined, in some cases, with a user fee 
(on ES users)” (emphasis added). In fact, other payers also provide funding, such as 
government, civil society, or private sector for reasons other than the direct benefit of 
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receiving the ES being provided, such as offsetting their own negative influence on the 
level of ES. The key consistency on incentives across the Coaseian, Pigouvian, and all 
other approaches, is that positive incentives are given to the provider of ES. Simply, the 
heart of PES is not that the user pays; it is that the provider gets. That is borne out in 
practice, where the Pigouvian approach, which is focussed on the supply-side, is the 
most prevalent, followed by programmes that are neither Pigouvian nor Coaseian. 
Coaseian-type programmes, which have the largest correlation to the user pays concept, 
represent the smallest category of PES programmes (Schomers & Matzdorf, in press). 
 
To clarify, users are still the most prevalent financiers of PES programmes, but they do 
not provide funding to all PES programmes, and so a definition of PES aiming to be 
inclusive of the majority of programmes in existence cannot be defined as user pays. 
Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) reviewed 40 payments for watershed services (PWS) 
programmes in Latin America and found that around 60% of them included financing 
from water users. Similarly, in the study of 120 PWS programmes presented in Chapter 
4, 65% of programmes received funding from direct beneficiaries of the ES, but only 
42% received user financing exclusively. At the same time, 56% received funds from a 
public entity’s general budget. 
 
Sommerville et al. (2009, pg. 3) recognise that the provider-gets aspect is the defining 
characteristic of PES and explain, “The use of positive incentives [to the ES provider], 
including (but not limited to) payments, is the core ideology of PES.” Fisher et al. 
(2010, pg. 1253) also implicitly recognise this, stating, PES are “an important 
mechanism for linking conservation outcomes to market-based incentive approaches” 
(emphasis added). Further evidence is found in the fact that while the term ‘payments’ 
can indicate a link between a user and provider, suggested alternate terms for PES are 
rewards, compensation, benefits, or (positive) incentives, all terms that are more supply-
side orientated. 
 
2.3. Defining PES as Positive Incentives 
2.3.1. Definition and conceptualisation 
Building on the literature that has defined and conceptualised PES (e.g., Pagiola and 
Platais, 2002; Wunder, 2005; Swallow et al, 2007; Engel et al, 2008; Jack et al, 2008; 
Sommerville et al, 2009; Muradian et al, 2010; Farley and Costanza, 2010; Fisher et al, 
2010; Tacconi, 2012; Fletcher and Breitling, 2012) a working definition and 
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conceptualisation of PES as positive incentives for ES is presented here that is used 
throughout the remainder of this Ph.D.. The definition put forward most closely 
resembles that from Sommerville et al. (2009), which has a strong focus on positive 
incentives, but here it is streamlined and followed by a slightly different 
conceptualisation. 
 
For the purposes of this Ph.D., PES are defined as: 
1. Positive, and 
2. (at least somewhat) conditional, 
3. incentives intended to motivate 
4. socially preferred behaviour related to the environment. 
 
The term ‘incentive’ in this case is used as a broad term that includes payments, 
subsidies, rewards, compensation, remuneration or any other transfer of resources that 
would induce a land user to provide ES (see Wunder 2005 and Swallow 2009 for 
descriptions of payments, rewards and compensation). The definition does not go so far 
as to rename PES as positive incentives for ecosystem services—PIES—although an 
argument could be made to do so. Although there are connotations associated with the 
term ‘payment’ that may make it more restrictive than the term ‘incentive’, it is also a 
fairly generic term for a positive and conditional incentive and is the most widely used 
in the literature. For these reasons, the term PES will continue to be used, but defined as 
a class of positive incentives broader than just financial incentives, and so the term 
‘incentivising’ will be preferred over ‘paying’ ES providers. Further, PES are 
specifically positive incentives, which is in contrast to negative incentives such as fees 
or charges that may also be used to induce socially preferred behaviour related to the 
environment. 
 
Muradian et al. (2010) and Tacconi (2012) explicitly reserve the term ‘PES’ for the 
incentive, using the term ‘PES programme’ to describe the broader policy and 
institutional structure through which that incentive is provided. The same will be done 
here, meaning a ‘PES’ is an incentive and a ‘PES programme’ could be referred to as an 
incentive-based mechanism. 
 
Following the above definition, PES are a broad class of incentives, which fits with the 
ongoing discourse that continues to highlight the heterogeneity of PES programmes 
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around the world. Additionally, although beneficiaries of ES can provide funding, PES 
are not defined by the user paying. Incentives may be funded voluntary and transferred 
directly from an ES beneficiary to provider, they may be funded through taxation and be 
paid by the government to land-users, or they may be funded through a number of other 
mechanisms and transferred through a variety of institutional arrangements. The key is 
that PES are the incentives delivered to ES providers, which can occur through many 
different types of mechanism or institutional structure, and so PES are defined as 
provider gets (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: PES in the policy framework. Based on Parker et al. (2012). Public and civil organisations are 
grouped together as public-good providers.  
 
The visual representation of this conceptualisation (Figure 2) has actors and institutions 
in boxes, and transfers of resources represented by arrows. The transfer from ES buyers 
to the central institutional arrangements can occur through a number of different 
fundraising mechanisms, such as voluntary payments, pollution charges, resources 
taxes, budget appropriations, and more. The figure then represents the observation that 
the majority of PES are provided through an intermediary institution, such as an 
organisation, trust, bank, or market. That creates a degree of separation between the 
payer and the ES provider. In some cases, although the minority of what is observed 
globally, the payer may bypass the intermediary institution and directly incentivise the 
provider (which is why the intermediary institution is represented with a dashed box). In 
other cases there may be multiple intermediaries, for example, a farmer receives 
incentives from a NGO that in turn sells environmental credits on to a market. Finally, 
the PES is specifically the incentive received by the ES providers. 
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That also clarifies the relationship of PES to markets. As described by Fisher et al. 
(2010), PES can link a MBI to an environmental outcome. For example, forest users 
may sell land-based carbon credits onto voluntary carbon markets (potentially via 
another intermediary aggregating farmers’ carbon credits), or water quality trading 
between point-source polluters may permit those polluters to purchase credits generated 
by farmers reducing their own pollution. At present, however, very few true markets for 
ES exist. 
 
The conceptualisation of PES as incentives is important because not recognising the 
agreement that PES are incentives permits the policy discourse to be driven by more 
ideological stances on the role of markets and inaccurate or inappropriate comparisons 
between different policy tools. Losing this focus on incentives is also detrimental to 
ensuring that PES are optimally designed and implemented, however and wherever in 
the world they are used. These two issues are now addressed in turn. 
 
2.3.2. Considering PES in policy design 
The shift from defining PES programmes as market-based mechanisms to incentive-
based mechanisms may appear a semantic discussion on the surface, but that delineation 
is tangibly important for the policy discourse in two ways. 
 
First, the delineation mitigates an ideological conflict. Based on the prolific early 
framing of PES as a market-based mechanism by practitioners and academics, policy 
makers also viewed PES programmes as market-based mechanisms. That placed PES 
distinctly in the realm of neoliberal policies and means that there is an ideological 
conflict about the use of PES, just as there is an ideological conflict about neoliberal 
policies generally, particularly in many developing countries. 
 
A clear example of this phenomenon is in the text of the United Nations (UN) 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). At the start of the 10th Conference of the 
Parties to the CBD in 2010, PES were included in the draft text related to resource 
mobilization as one of six innovative financial mechanisms (Cranford & Parker 2010). 
Reference of innovative financial mechanisms was drastically reduced in the final text,5 
and the list of specific mechanisms that included PES was dropped, in part due to a push 
                                                
5 CBD COP Decision X/3 
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back from developing countries about the use of market-based and so-called innovative 
mechanisms. At the following 11th COP in 2012 the term ‘innovative’ was reduced even 
further, and the only mention of ‘markets’ was in relation to the exploration and use of 
non-market-based mechanisms.6  
 
Many references and significant language devoted to positive incentives were, however, 
retained in the text on incentive mechanisms.7 That text is much less polarising as 
almost all parties agree that ES providers should be rewarded or compensated. The core 
difference between the two strands of negotiations were that in the former, on resource 
mobilisation, the concept of PES was conflated with concepts of market-based and 
innovative mechanisms, and that PES was presented as a policy mechanism cutting 
across fundraising, institutional arrangements, and delivery of finance. In the latter, on 
incentives, PES were clearly defined as positive incentives and recognised as a mode of 
delivering finance to reward or compensate ES providers. 
 
That relates directly to the second point, that without recognizing PES as positive 
incentives, policy makers face a more opaque policy design process that conflates three 
key components of financing ecosystems and biodiversity (Figure 2; Parker et al. 2012): 
1) raising funds, 2) transferring funds, and 3) delivering finance to achieve 
environmental outcomes.  
 
The original conceptualisation of PES covered all three components, defining PES as 
paid directly from the ES beneficiary, via a private negotiation and transaction, to the 
ES provider (Pagiola & Platais 2002). Such a mechanism, however, is actually 
comprised of two major policy objectives: 1) motivating beneficiaries to pay for the ES 
they use, and 2) paying land users to provide ES. That is perhaps why Engel et al. 
(2008) stated that PES can be viewed as an environmental subsidy (i.e. delivering 
finance as PES) combined at times with a user fee (i.e. a fundraising mechanism). That 
is also why PES has sometimes been defined as both a beneficiary-pays and provider-
gets mechanism. As already described, however, PES programmes are most accurately 
defined only as provider-gets mechanisms. As such, they relate directly to the third 
                                                
6 CBD COP Decision XI/4 
7 CBD COP Decisions X/44 and XI/30 
 40 
component of the policy design process: delivery of an incentive to induce socially 
preferred environmental behaviour.  
 
An opaque policy design process conflating the three key components of policy choice 
and design is not unique to PES. For example, the original conceptualisation of 
biodiversity offsetting covered all three components of the policy design process, but 
this conflated the different policies needed to raise, transfer/manage and deliver finance. 
Madsen et al. (2010, 2011) focused on the first component and used the term 
‘compensatory mitigation’. The key policy tool here is making polluters liable for their 
biodiversity impact, and they can offset that liability either by paying for a bespoke like-
for-like offset, purchasing a more generic biodiversity credit through a market or 
clearing house, or paying into a conservation fund. In contrast, Bull et al. (2013) focus 
on the other end of the chain: delivery of finance. They claim that biodiversity offsets 
are not market-based instruments. That is because the authors define ‘offset’ as the act 
of receiving payment for habitat restoration or protection. Such a focus means that 
payment can be made from many sources and so could arise through a market-based or 
non-market-based mechanism. Following Bull et al. (2013) an offset could be viewed as 
a form of PES, and in this case the ES to be provided is biodiversity habitat restored to a 
very precise specification. 
 
2.2.3. Incentive design for PES 
As noted in Chapter 1, despite a sometimes-confused policy discourse, PES for 
regulating and cultural services have proliferated across the globe. In 2011, there were 
more than 200 active incentive-based programmes for securing watershed services in 
around 30 countries (Bennett et al. 2013), at least 120 of which can be considered PES 
(see Chapter 4). In 2012, over 162 forest carbon projects were active in over 50 
countries (Peters-Stanley et al. 2013), and many of these programmes provide PES to 
households or communities living in and around forests. There are also agri-
environmental schemes, and similar programmes called PES or eco-compensation 
programmes, through which national and sub-national governments offer USD billions 
to incentivise farmers to use their land in a way that provides ES valuable to those 
farmers and their fellow citizens. Examples are found in the US (Monke & Johnson 
2010), Europe (Cooper et al. 2009), China (Bennett 2009), Mexico !"#ñ$%&'(ñ)*+,*)-.*/001)2, Ecuador (Fehse 2012), and more. 
 
 41 
Yet with all of these programmes and the large amount of funds being spent, there is 
still a lack of well-formulated, empirical research on the environmental effectiveness of 
PES (Pattanayak et al. 2010). Some of the large national programmes have been 
analysed, in particular Costa Rica’s PSA, one of the most prominent national 
programmes in developing countries (e.g., Robalino & Pfaff 2013; Arriagada et al. 
2012; Arriagada et al. 2009). The vast majority of PES programmes, however, have 
never been evaluated, despite recurring calls for better programme evaluation in policies 
for BD and ES generally, and PES specifically (Ferraro et al. 2012; Ferraro & 
Pattanayak 2006a) 
 
One major barrier is that such evaluation requires a lot of time and money, will often 
only come after a few years of programme implementation, and the best evaluations 
(i.e. experimental or quasi-experimental methods) must be built in to a programme 
during its design phase.8 Yet, despite any lack of quantitative evidence, PES are 
popular, perhaps because of the intuitive logic of paying someone who provides public 
goods, the hope of coordinating environmental and development benefits, and prolific 
qualitative evidence of their success. Use of PES is likely to further increase in the 
coming years through, for example, REDD+, incentive-based mechanisms of the CBD, 
and programmes for green growth or sustainable development. With ex-post evaluation 
costing a lot of time and money, and providing results at earliest 2-3 years after 
programme implementation, yet PES continuing (and perhaps increasingly) being used, 
it is crucial to ensure that incentives are ex-ante designed as well as possible. 
 
Additionally, well designed evaluation will not be able to assess all the possible 
different type of incentive arrangements implemented in all the varied contexts PES 
occur in. As described at various other points throughout this Ph.D., and as would be 
expected, local context appears to heavily influence incentive design. So, again, it is 
critical to design incentives as well as possible prior to implementing a PES 
programme. 
                                                
8 Notably, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) as a major financier of environmental projects 
(including implementation of incentive-based programmes) is beginning to incorporate experimental 
designs in project implementation following advice from its Scientific and Technical Advisory Panel 
(STAP) (Ferraro 2011)  
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2.4. Summary 
Following a review of multiple papers that define, conceptualise, and/or categorise PES, 
this chapter presents a definition and conceptualisation that refocuses on PES as 
positive incentives, and as a supply-side innovation in the toolbox of environmental 
policies. Despite numerous attempts to define and conceptualise PES, the agreement 
that incentives are at the core of all PES programmes has received little attention. 
Refocusing on PES as incentives should have positive implications for both the policy 
decision process and, more specifically, incentive design. 
 
In relation to the former, it realigns discussion away from the area of market-based 
instruments, which can be politically contentious particularly in developing countries, 
and towards the area of incentives for the provision of ES, which is more widely 
accepted. It also clarifies which policy objective is actually being addressed with PES. 
Previous conceptualisations have conflated objectives that raise funds, and potentially 
negatively incentivise over-use or degradation of resources, with those that positively 
incentivise improved environmental behaviour. 
 
In relation to the latter, it can permit better incentive design in policies or programmes 
that use PES. In the first instance, this is taken up in Chapter 3, where a literature 
review of incentive design for PES presents relevant research to date. Additionally, 
previous work has tended to focus more on institutional aspects of PES programmes, or 
their relation to markets, by which to characterise and categorise PES programmes. The 
purpose of such work is primarily to develop groups within which experience and 
lessons can be shared. Chapter 4 develops a typology of PES based on incentive and 
contract attributes. It demonstrates that the conceptualisation of PES as incentives 
provides unique and useful insights for research and policy learning, both in isolation 
and when considered in conjunction with institutional aspects of the programmes using 
PES. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Incentive Design for Payments for Ecosystem Services 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Agri-environmental schemes (AES), payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
programmes, water rights transfers (WRTs), and water quality trading (WQT) all use 
positive incentives to induce the provision of ecosystem services (ES); they all provide 
PES. Such policy instruments that provide PES are prevalent throughout the world. 
There are large AES programmes paying out USD billions in incentives each year in the 
EU (Cooper et al. 2009) and US (Monke & Johnson 2010), while in developing 
countries national PES programmes are paying out USD hundreds of millions if not 
billions annually in China (Bennett 2008), Costa Rica !')3($-)*/0014*'$55)6*+,*)-.*/07/2, Mexico !"#ñ$%&'(ñ)*+,*)-.*/00182, and Ecuador (Fehse 2012), among others. 
Bennett et al. (2013) researched incentive-based programmes for the provision of 
watershed services and identified 205 active programmes in 29 countries in 2011, with 
76 more in development. The authors also found that the annual value of incentives 
transacted through these programmes was steadily increasing in 2008-2011. 
 
The aim of these programmes is to incentivise resource users to change their behaviour 
in order to maintain, restore, or augment those resources. The majority of those resource 
users are farmers or forest users. In addition to AES, forest conservation programmes, 
and PES programmes, that holds true for WRTs, where rights are often sold or leased 
from large landowners, and WQT, where programme managers often find that 
emissions into waterways can be reduced more cost-effectively from non-point sources 
(e.g. farmers) than point sources (e.g. factories). 
 
There has been ample research characterising which resource users are most likely to 
adopt environmentally-friendly practices (see Section 3.2.1), and a second related 
literature characterising which are most likely to join a programme that provides a 
positive incentive to induce such practices (e.g. enter into AES or forest conservation 
contracts; see Section 3.2.2). 
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Reviews find that some form of subsidy or payment has a mixed or insignificant 
influence on adoption of conservation agriculture (Knowler & Bradshaw 2007) or 
agricultural best management practices (BMPs) (Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012). It is 
difficult to conclude much from this result because such reviews treat PES as 
homogenous. Studies characterising programme participants also give little attention to 
programme or incentive attributes. They are often focused on participation in a 
particular programme, so do not observe variation of those attributes. As discussed in 
the body of this current review, however, there are many factors related to design of 
PES that might influence participation. 
 
Similarly, there is little reliable evidence on the effectiveness of PES, because a lack of 
rigorous, statistical and unbiased analyses persists (Ferraro & Pattanayak 2006b; Miteva 
et al. 2012; Kleijn & Sutherland 2003). The evidence that does exist suggests 
heterogeneous effectiveness. For example, Costa Rica’s national PES program is the 
longest standing and most researched PES programme in the tropics. Evaluations 
indicate it had little aggregate impact on increasing forest cover across the nation 
(Robalino & Pfaff 2013), but a moderate positive impact in well-targeted areas 
(Arriagada et al. 2012), implying a heterogeneous effect across the country. 
Heterogeneity in effectiveness can arise from differences in the quality of 
implementation across the country or differences in the responses by recipients of 
incentives (Arriagada et al. 2012). The latter suggests that applying a nationally 
homogenous incentive to heterogeneous households might, as would be expected, 
produce heterogeneous results. 
 
Improving the design and implementation of the programmes that provide PES, through 
for example, spatial targeting (Wünscher et al. 2008), has been given significant 
attention. Improving the design of the incentive itself has received far less attention. 
That is a critical gap in thinking. No matter what conceptualization or definition of PES 
one follows, all agree that the incentive is the core of such an intervention (see Chapter 
2). The aim of this review is to begin to fill that gap and draw attention to what has been 
researched related to designing PES, in a variety of economic disciplines and literatures. 
 
Following this introduction, Section 2 describes the literature on adoption of 
environmentally friendly practices and briefly reviews the literature on participation in 
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programmes intended to incentivise such practices. Section 3 then begins to explore the 
design of PES by reviewing the available literature on ES providers’ preferences for 
incentive attributes.9 Understanding those preferences are a critical first step to inducing 
greater participation in PES programmes and consequent provision of ES. Following the 
discussion of ES supplier preferences, Section 4 then focuses on three key unresolved 
issues in PES design that are particularly relevant for developing countries. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2. Adoption and Participation 
3.2.1. Adopters of conservation practices  
There is a large literature on the adoption of conservation practices, primarily on the 
adoption of environmentally friendly agricultural practice (see reviews such as 
(Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012; Knowler & Bradshaw 2007; Mercer 2004; Pattanayak et al. 
2003; Prokopy et al. 2008). The adoption literature focuses primarily on endogenous 
characteristics of the resource user and the resource, with some consideration of 
exogenous factors. It has identified a large list of characteristics that might help predict 
adoption of environmentally friendly land use practices. 
 
Knowler & Bradshaw (2007) reviewed 31 analyses of adoption of conservation 
agriculture practices. Those analyses included 167 distinct variables, which the authors 
reduced to 46 as most interesting and with more than a few uses among the analyses. 
The most prevalent variables included in empirical studies were education, age, farm 
size, land tenure, and off-farm activities/income. There are, however, mixed 
positive/negative and significant/insignificant results for all of these variables and most 
of the 46, leading the authors to conclude that the literature on adoption of conservation 
agriculture identifies “few if any universally significant independent variables” (pg. 42). 
 
Knowler & Bradshaw (2007) also argue that once contextual factors are accounted for 
(e.g. region), the significance and direction of the effect of some of these variables is a 
little more consistent. Similarly, Prokopy et al. (2008) limited their review to studies of 
the adoption of agricultural BMPs in the USA, and claim that there are some variables 
that seem significant fairly consistently, although none are completely consistent. 
                                                
9 Although the three literatures addressed in Sections 2 and 3 overlap, they align fairly neatly into three 
separate groups based on the focus of the studies comprising each. 
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Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) built on the same studies as Prokopy et al. (2008), but 
carried out a meta-analysis. Doing so highlighted the factors that help predict adoption 
with more confidence. In relation to the most prolifically studied variables, they found 
the following were significant (p-value 9 0.05): 
• Education was insignificant overall, but this result was decomposed and 
specifically formal education had an insignificant effect, but agricultural 
extension training had a positive effect. 
• Age had a negative effect 
• Farm size had a positive effect 
• Ownership of the farm (i.e. strong tenure) had a positive effect 
 
They also find additional variables were significant (p-value 9 0.05), highlighting other 
important factors that can influence adoption, leading to an overarching conclusion on 
the three most important factors related to adoption: 
• Access to and quality of information – Information on BMPs, agricultural 
extension training (which indicates access to extension services), and 
interactions with agricultural agencies all had a positive effect on adoption. 
• Financial capacity – Total income, previous investment into farming, and the 
related variable of proportion of income from farming all had a positive 
relationship with adoption. 
• Networks – In addition to extension training (which indicates connections to 
agricultural experts) and interactions with agricultural agencies, local 
organisations or neighbours and agribusiness all had a positive relationship with 
adoption. 
 
These results were based on studies in one country (USA) and of one form of 
conservation-oriented activity (agricultural BMPs), so should not be considered 
conclusive across other countries or activities. They do, however, illuminate important 
nuances in understanding adoption, for example, the effect of formal compared to 
agricultural extension education, and highlight additional factors to consider outside of 
the most prolifically studied variables, such as access to information related to 
conservation activities and the financial capacity to implement them. 
 
 47 
3.2.2. Participants in conservation programmes  
Alongside the adoption literature is a large body of studies attempting to characterise 
participants of PES programmes. The participation literature analyses a similar set of 
variables as the adoption literature, but is more directly relevant for PES design. Most 
studies in this literature research agri-environmental or forest conservation contracts in 
the USA or Europe, and many state they are motivated by unexpectedly low 
participation in programmes in these regions. That said, there are a number of studies of 
programme participation in developing countries, which is anticipated to increase as the 
use of PES increases in developing regions, particularly with the introduction of large 
national programmes. 
 
Studies in the participation literature can be grouped in two categories: 
1. Revealed participation research comparing participants to a non-participant 
control group. This has the advantage of relying on actual participation data, but 
the sample selection and the econometric strategy rarely accounts for selection 
bias of participants; or 
2. Contingent participation research, which has the advantage of no selection bias 
(and many also include a dummy variable to control for previous participation), 
but is based on hypothetical behaviour. 
 
The discussion in this section follows the five most often studied variables in the 
adoption literature as identified by Knowler & Bradshaw (2007): age and habit, 
education and information, off-farm activity, size of land holding, and land tenure. It 
also includes consideration of the results of Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012), specifically 
considering the effects of information and income. The aim is, through a brief review of 
the participation literature, to clarify if there are any factors that could help determine 
optimal PES design or implementation. The discussion in this section focuses primarily 
on the participation literature, but does include reference to studies focussed on 
adoption or programme attributes where relevant. 
 
3.2.2.1. Age and habit 
A greater age of the decision maker is often cited as a negative influence on the 
probability that they will enter a conservation programme, and various empirical studies 
have demonstrated this relationship (Balana et al. 2011; Cook & Rabotyagov 2012; 
Langpap 2004; Lynch et al. 2002; Mullan & Kontoleon 2012; Vanslembrouck et al. 
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2002; Wynn et al. 2001). Some studies have shown the opposite effect (see Delacote et 
al. 2012) and many report an insignificant effect (Kwayu et al. 2013; Thacher et al. 
1996; Yu & Belcher 2011; Zbinden & Lee 2005). There is some evidence that age 
might not always have a strong relationship with participation because there are other 
correlated land-user characteristics. Pattanayak et al. (2003) go so far as to categorise 
age, and a few other variables, as a ‘preference proxy’ for adoption. 
 
One variable for which age might be a proxy is the strength of habit a resource user has 
with their current land use practices. Langpap (2004) find higher age to be negatively 
(and significantly) related to programme participation, but also found that years owning 
the land had a negative and significant effect, indicating that landowners who acquired 
their land more recently are more willing to participate. The author states, “One possible 
explanation is that landowners who have owned the property for a shorter time may be 
less likely to have developed a particular way of managing their forest, and thus could 
be more willing to accept alternate management plans” (pg. 383). Yu & Belcher (2011) 
support this reasoning as they find age to be insignificant, but that years of experience 
farming had a negative and significant relationship with programme participation. 
Mullan & Kontoleon (2012) also find age to be insignificant across the entire sample, 
but using a latent class model, find it to be insignificant for households with easy 
market access, but a negative predictor for households with constrained market access. 
This final example implies that even exogenous factors could relate to habit formation. 
 
3.2.2.2. Education and information 
Having had more education is often cited as making a land user more likely to 
participate, and various studies empirically demonstrate this positive effect (Balana et 
al. 2011; Cook & Rabotyagov 2012; Lambert et al. 2007; LeVert et al. 2009; Lynch et 
al. 2002; Mullan & Kontoleon 2012; Vanslembrouck et al. 2002; Zbinden & Lee 2005). 
As with age, many studies also report the opposite (see Delacote et al. 2012) or no 
significant effect (Kwayu et al. 2013; Langpap 2004; Mullan & Kontoleon 2012; 
Southgate et al. 2010; Vanslembrouck et al. 2002; Vanslembrouck et al. 2002; Yu & 
Belcher 2011). Education is another variable that (Pattanayak et al. 2003) categorise as 
a preference proxy. 
 
In their review of BMP adoption in the US, (Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012) explicitly 
identify that general education is not the real effecter of programme adoption, but 
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instead that amount and quality of information on the BMP will lead to greater 
adoption. That is evident in the significant effect of both experience with agricultural 
extension services, connections to agricultural agencies or grassroots organisations, and 
exposure to information on the technology to be adopted (Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012). A 
similar effect may exist for programme participation. There appears to be a consistent 
positive effect of exposure to programme information—through access to extension 
services, attending meetings, or having programme proponents visit a household/farm—
on participation (Kwayu et al. 2013; Lambert et al. 2007; Lynch et al. 2002; Thacher et 
al. 1996; Wynn et al. 2001; Zbinden & Lee 2005). Fortunately for programme 
managers, although they cannot provide general schooling, providing information about 
a practice or programme is within their control. 
 
3.2.2.3. Off-farm activity 
Various studies indicate that if a household receives a greater proportion of their total 
income from off-farm activities, they are more likely to participate (Loftus & Kraft 
2003; Lynch et al. 2002; Southgate et al. 2010; Thacher et al. 1996; Zbinden & Lee 
2005). It is logical that if a household is less reliant on farm-based income, it is more 
willing to set aside some of their farm area. A higher dependence on off-farm income 
also implies there is less labour available to work on the farm and generate profit from 
crops or livestock, so less chance for a competing land use opportunity to be fully 
realised. Indeed, studies of Costa Rica’s PSA programme indicate that a greater 
availability of on-farm labour decreases the probability of programme enrolment 
(Thacher et al. 1996; Zbinden & Lee 2005). Households with labour available are more 
likely to prefer to work the land and extract profit from it, rather than set it aside for 
forestry.  
 
3.2.2.4. Size of land holding 
The evidence of the relationship between size of land holding and programme 
participation is mixed. A number of studies demonstrate the expected positive 
relationship, such that if a land user has a larger farm or forest, they are more willing to 
participate in a programme (Kwayu et al. 2013; Langpap 2004; Lynch et al. 2002; 
Southgate et al. 2010; Thacher et al. 1996; Vanslembrouck et al. 2002; Zbinden & Lee 
2005). These results indicate that the marginal value of land is decreasing, such that 
land users with more land have a lower marginal opportunity cost of giving up 
production on that land. As they enrolled more land, however, presumably the marginal 
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opportunity cost of the remaining land would increase to a point when they were no 
longer willing to enrol additional land.  
 
A number of studies find size of land holding was negatively associated with 
programme participation (Balana et al. 2011; Broch & Vedel 2012; Espinosa-Goded et 
al. 2010; Rabotyagov & Lin 2013; Vanslembrouck et al. 2002; Yu & Belcher 2011). 
These studies do not directly challenge the principle of decreasing marginal opportunity 
cost of land, but instead offer explanations of why contextual factors overrule that 
principle and lead to a different relationship between area and participation. For 
example, Yu & Belcher (2011) report farm size to be negatively related to participation 
in a programme requiring reduced usage of riparian areas around wetlands. In this case, 
based on other factors found statistically related to programme participation, the authors 
argue that smaller farms require smaller equipment, which is easier to manoeuvre 
around wetlands, making these farmers more willing to participate. In another example, 
Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) report larger farms less willing to participate in a 
programme to introduce nitrogen fixing crops in dry land area, but also pointed out that 
larger farms in the study areas were specialised in different crops, so would have a 
greater foregone revenue from programme participation.  
 
3.2.2.5. Land tenure 
There appears to be less study of the effect of strong land tenure on programme 
participation compared to its effect on technology adoption. A few studies were 
identified that studied tenure and programme participation, two of which find no 
significant effect (Lambert et al. 2007; Kwayu et al. 2013). Others find a positive 
correlation between strong tenure and participation (Mullan & Kontoleon 2012; 
Thacher et al. 1996; Zbinden & Lee 2005). Mullan & Kontoleon (2012) demonstrate 
heterogeneity in this result, finding strong land tenure is only significant for the class of 
households that did not face significant market constraints. The authors explain this is 
unsurprising because it is households with stronger tenure and better market access that 
can reap the benefits of increased natural capital associated with participation in the 
programme studied. 
 
3.2.2.6. Summary of participation literature 
Overall, the participation literature leads to similar conclusions as the reviews of the 
adoption literature. At first glance, it appears that there are mixed results for the most 
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prolifically studied variables. A deeper look, however, indicates that these mixed results 
could be based on some variables acting as proxies for the true characteristics that have 
a relation to participation, or that contextual factors heavily influence results. That is 
perhaps the strongest conclusion to take from the literature: that more precise and 
context-specific factors must be considered to understand programme participation.  
 
3.3. ES Provider Preferences for PES Attributes 
In addition to needing to pay more attention to contextual factors, the participation 
literature identified that more attention to ES supplier preferences was required. Even 
though the paper was focused on characteristics, Wynn et al. (2001) was the earliest 
study identified that explicitly recognised that the “ ‘fit’ between the farm and the 
scheme” (pg. 77) will affect farmer participation. Similarly, Vanslembrouck et al. 
(2002) claim to depart from previous research by assuming that participation is “not 
only influenced by farmer and farm characteristics, but also by the characteristics of the 
required practices” (pg. 490). 
 
The literature quickly expanded its view to focus on the attributes of the programme 
more broadly: the attributes literature. Thomas, White, Kittredge, & Dennis (2002) 
provide the earliest paper identified that included multiple program attributes beyond 
required management practices. The authors conclude their literature review by stating 
(pg. 172), 
 
“When taken together, the previous literature [characterising programme 
participants] provides valuable insight about landowner decision making, but it 
is not specific with respect to the types, and in particular the levels of 
management program attributes that would or would not attract greater 
participation by [resource] owners.” 
 
Taking off from that departure, a number of studies have now explicitly researched the 
preferences of ES providers for programme attributes, demonstrating that different 
attributes and levels of attributes can affect programme participation. 
 
Nineteen quantitative studies were identified for this review that all take a Lancastrian 
approach (Lancaster 1966), treating a programme as a bundle of attributes. Each study 
implements a survey and uses conjoint analysis (CA) or choice experiments (CEs) to 
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analyse the trade off between attributes (Table 2). Due to their similarity in approach, 
these studies can be systematically compared.  
 
Table 3 summarises the results of those studies following the basic vote-counting 
method of meta-review as done for the adoption literature (Knowler & Bradshaw 2007; 
Pattanayak et al. 2003; Prokopy et al. 2008) and participation literature (Delacote et al. 
2012). The studies analysed a large number of unique programme and incentive 
attributes, but many were specific to the type of management practice being researched. 
Similarity in the fundamental meaning of these tested attributes allows many of them to 
be grouped together, which produces a list of 14 attributes that were analysed in at least 
two studies.10 
 
Two categories of incentive attributes clearly emerge. The first are contractual 
attributes: the attributes of the incentive related to the requirements to be met in order to 
receive the incentive. The second is the form of the incentive itself, such as the value 
and type of incentive. A few other variables were identified that can broadly be 
categorised as institutional attributes of a programme. On the surface, they do not 
specifically relate to the design of PES, but some evidence indicates that preferences for 
institutional attributes can interact with preferences for incentive attributes. As such, 
discussion of the institutional attributes is also included. The remainder of this section 
reviews these three categories of attributes—contract, form of incentive, and 
institutional—in order. 
 
In addition to the quantitative studies, a collection of qualitative studies was also 
identified. These tend to be broader in scope, however, and with less focus on 
measuring the importance of different attributes. They are used to supplement the 
review of quantitative studies and are cited in the text when relevant. Similarly, some 
studies indentified from the adoption or participation literatures include consideration of 
one or two programme attributes, and are cited as appropriate. 
                                                
10 Not many attributes were reported as insignificant. That is likely due to the nature of these studies. Pre-
testing through, for example, focus groups or pilot studies would have been used to limit the number of 
attributes included in a survey to those believed most relevant or interesting. So there is an initial 
screening of attributes prior to survey implementation. Although some insignificant attributes may be 
screened out prior to survey implementation, general best practice is that once an attribute is included, the 
result should be reported irrespective of significance. 
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Researchers cannot simply revert, however, from studying supplier characteristics and 
ignoring programme attributes to studying programme attributes and ignoring supplier 
characteristics. As alluded to by Vanslembrouck et al. (2002) and Wynn et al. (2001), 
participation is ultimately dependent on the interaction of supplier characteristics and 
programme attributes. Most of the Lancastrian studies identified for this review were 
found to recognise this to a degree, and use analytical methods to account for 
heterogeneity in ES providers. Specifically, they do so by using split samples, including 
supplier characteristics in interaction terms in the right hand side of the model, and/or 
choosing an econometric model designed to account for heterogeneity. 
 
In the remainder of this section, results about heterogeneity in the tastes of ES providers 
are discussed as appropriate. One overarching trend is that taste heterogeneity was 
generally manifest in a difference in the strength or consistency of preferences between 
groups of individuals present in the sample.  Often, the sign of the coefficient of a 
program attribute was the same for each group, but the magnitude was different (e.g. 
Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; Grosjean & Kontoleon 2009; Horne 2006; Ruto & Garrod 
2009). In other cases, the coefficient was significant for one group but not the other (e.g. 
Kaczan et al. 2013). There are very few examples where the sign of a coefficient 
changed between groups.  If that did occur, it was for unique and minority groups 
within the sample, that were either very likely to participate in the programme or very 
unlikely to participate (e.g. Beharry-Borg et al. 2013; Putten et al. 2011). That is, these 
groups with opposing preferences tended to represent the tails of the distribution of 
preferences within the population. 
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Table 2: Lancastrian studies focused on ES supplier preferences for the attributes of programmes that offer PES. 
Study Methods 
Reference Type Country Subject Surveya Econometricsb Accounting for 
Heterogeneity !"#"$"%&'%"#(%)*+,,- Journal 
Article 
Kenya Land management contracts 
with small landholders 
CA OLS, Logit, OL No 
Balderas Torres et al. (in press)  Journal 
Article 
Mexico Forest conservation or 
restoration on private or 
communal land 
CE MNL Attribute choice influenced 
by heterogeneity of 
respondents 
Barr & Mourato (2012) Working 
Paper 
Tanzania Reducing fishing pressure on 
coral reef by artisanal 
fishermen 
CE CL, NLM, ASCL Interaction terms  
Beharry-Borg et al. (2013) Journal 
Article 
UK Changing agricultural land 
management practices to 
protect water quality 
CE CL, LCL Model choice 
Broch & Vedel (2012)c Journal 
Article 
Denmark Afforestation contracts with 
farmers 
CE RPL, LCL Model choice 
Christensen et al. (2011) Journal 
Article 
Denmark Incentives for pesticide-free 
buffer zones on farms 
CE RPL Model choice 
Cook & Rabotyagov (2012) Working 
Paper 
USA Purchasing water rights from 
agriculturalists 
Dichotomous 
choice CV; CE 
Interval model; 
MNL, RPL 
Model choice, interaction 
terms 
Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) Journal 
Article 
Spain Introduction of nitrogen 
fixing crops in dry land areas 
of farms 
CE RPL Split sample, model choice, 
interaction terms 
Greiner & Ballweg (2013) Working 
Paper 
Australia Biodiversity incentives for 
land excluding cattle grazing 
CE RPL Model choice 
Grosjean & Kontoleon (2009) Journal 
Article 
China Incentives for farmers to 
reforest sloped, previously 
cultivated land  
Household data 
survey, CE 
Simultaneous 
Probit, RPL 
Model choice, interaction 
terms 
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Table 2 (cont.): Lancastrian studies focused on ES supplier preferences for the attributes of programmes that offer PES. 
Study Methods 
Reference Type Country Subject Surveya Econometricsb Accounting for 
Heterogeneity 
Horne (2006) Journal 
Article 
Finland Biodiversity conservation for 
NIPFs 
CE MNL Split sample 
IIED (2012) Policy Brief Brazil Avoiding deforestation by 
rainforest communities 
CE, CV Not stated Not stated 
Kaczan et al. (2013) Journal 
Article 
Tanzania Incentives for improved 
agroforestry by small 
landholders 
CE MNL, LCL Model choice 
Peterson (2011) Conference 
Paper 
USA Water quality credits 
purchased by PS from NPS 
CE LCL Model choice 
Putten et al. (2011) Journal 
Article 
Australia Generic conservation 
incentive for landowners 
CE LCL Model choice 
Rabotyagov & Lin (2013) Journal 
Article 
USA Working forest conservation 
contract for small forest 
landowners 
CE RPL Model choice, interaction 
terms 
Rolfe et al. (2006) Working 
Paper 
Australia Changing agricultural land 
management practices to 
protect water quality 
CE MNL No 
Ruto & Garrod (2009) Journal 
Article 
EU Generic agri-environmental 
scheme for farmers 
CE MXL, LCL Interaction terms, model 
choice 
Stevens et al. (2002) Journal 
Article 
USA Forest management for non-
industrial private forests 
CA Logit No 
a CA = conjoint analysis; CE = choice experiment, CV = dichotomous choice contingent valuation 
b OLS = ordinary least squares; CL = conditional logit; ASCL = alternative specific constant logit; MNL = multinomial logit; OL = ordered logit; RPL = random parameters logit; 
LCL = latent class logit 
c Based on the same data as Vedel et al. (2010), but that is a conference paper. The included study is in a peer-reviewed publication, so preferred for inclusion here.
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Table 3: Attributes analysed in 19 Lancastrian studies of potential ES providers’ preferences for PES-programme attributes. Ranked by incidence of inclusion in studies. Effects are 
included if they are significant at 90% or greater. For studies that used a latent class model, the effect of an attribute is presented in this table based on the majority (>75%) of the 
population.  
Category Attribute Effect on programme acceptance Total 
  Significant Not Significant  
  + —   
Incentive form Value of incentive 16 0 0 16 
Contract Strength of restrictions 0 13 0 13 
Contract Contract length (e.g. years) 0 7 2 9 
Institutional Actors effecta 4 2 6 
Contract Amount of resource with restricted use 0 5 0 5 
Contract Contract flexibility (cancellation or suspension) 5 0 0 5 
Incentive form Non-financial incentives 3 0 1 4 
Contract Monitoring strength 2 1 1 4 
Institutional Administrative burden 0 3 1 4 
Contract Flexibility in defining restrictions (area or strength) 3 0 0 3 
Incentive form Up-front payments 2 0 0 2 
Incentive form Consistent payments 2 0 0 2 
Incentive form Group payments 1 1 0 2 
a This attribute is not perfectly comparable to the others as it simply reflects whether or not different actors would affect participation rates. As such, there is no negative effect, only 
a positive (yes, different actors affect contingent participation) or insignificant (no such effect was observed) result.  
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3.3.1. Contractual attributes 
 
3.3.1.1. Restrictions on resource use 
In the design of environmental contracts, providers prefer to have less of their resources 
under restricted use agreements. Farmers prefer to commit less land area to management 
restrictions (Balana et al. 2011; Rolfe et al. 2006), forest owners prefer to enrol smaller 
patches to conservation programmes (Horne 2006; Rabotyagov & Lin 2013), fishers 
prefer smaller no-take zones (Barr & Mourato 2012), and farmers supplying water 
rights prefer split-season over full-season leases (Cook & Rabotyagov 2012). Similarly, 
on the area that is enrolled, resource users prefer to have less restrictions or requirement 
imposed on their activity within or around that area (Balana et al. 2011; Barr & Mourato 
2012; Beharry-Borg et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2011; Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; 
Greiner & Ballweg 2013; Grosjean & Kontoleon 2009; Horne 2006; Rolfe et al. 2006). 
 
3.3.1.2. Flexibility in restrictions  
Providers also prefer to engage in contracts requiring a change in practice that they find 
easy to adopt (Kwayu et al. 2013; Wynn et al. 2001). That is why resource users tend to 
prefer contracts that are flexible, both in terms of the area enrolled (Espinosa-Goded et 
al. 2010; Ruto & Garrod 2009), and in the required restrictions or measures 
(Christensen et al. 2011; Ruto & Garrod 2009). Even when flexible or less restrictive 
land uses are permitted, there may be categories of potential participants whose 
willingness-to-accept is still prohibitively high to incentivise their participation 
(Peterson 2011). Additionally, the purpose of a resource user’s tenure can influence 
their utility or disutility of particular practices. Small forestland owners in Washington 
State, USA, had a positive utility for contracts that required biodiversity management 
plans if their purpose for ownership was focused on conservation, but a disutility for 
such requirements if their ownership was focussed on timber production (Rabotyagov & 
Lin 2013).  
 
3.3.1.3. Contract length 
The studies that have included consideration of the length of the contract tend to find 
that shorter contracts are preferred (Balana et al. 2011; Balderas Torres et al. in press; 
Christensen et al. 2011; Greiner & Ballweg 2013; Horne 2006; Rabotyagov & Lin 
2013; Ruto & Garrod 2009). That indicates that land users have a positive option value 
for using the land in other ways in the future. The magnitude of that value though, 
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depends on the context and the type of land-user. In some contexts the disutility of 
longer contract length is measurable for a five year contract (Christensen et al. 2011), 
while in others it only appears measurable for contracts of at least 30 or 40 years in 
length (Balana et al. 2011; Horne 2006). 
 
Heterogeneity in the magnitude of the disutility of contract length appears to not only 
occur between study contexts, but within them too. Ruto & Garrod (2009) studied the 
interaction of farm and farmer characteristics with length of AES contract and find 
characteristics that are generally believed to predict programme participation also 
predict farmers that are willing to accept longer contracts. Specifically, they find 
evidence that age and weak land tenure are negatively associated with contract length, 
while level of education and farm size are positively associated with it. Rabotyagov & 
Lin (2013) find that all forest owners in their study prefer shorter (and non-perpetual) 
contracts, but those that agree that maintaining ecosystem health is a very important 
reason for owning forest had a lower disutility of contract length (and contracts in 
perpetuity). 
 
3.3.1.4. Release clause 
Also indicating the positive future option value, resource users prefer contracts that they 
can temporarily suspend or break (Christensen et al. 2011; Greiner & Ballweg 2013), or 
have the option to completely cancel even though they would be required repay the 
reward they have already received (Broch & Vedel 2012; Horne 2006). As with contract 
length, however, the disutility of strictly permanent contracts is lower for groups of land 
owners characterised as more willing to participate in the programme (Broch & Vedel 
2012). 
 
3.3.2. Incentive form 
3.3.2.1. Incentive value 
All studies focussed on programme attributes that included incentive value in their 
analysis, and even some of the studies from the participation literature, indicate that 
resource users prefer incentives of greater value (e.g. Beharry-Borg et al. 2013; Broch 
& Vedel 2012; Cook & Rabotyagov 2012; Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; Greiner & 
Ballweg 2013; Grosjean & Kontoleon 2009; Horne 2006; Kwayu et al. 2013; LeVert et 
al. 2009; Lynch et al. 2002; Mettepenningen et al. 2013; Peterson 2011; Rabotyagov & 
Lin 2013; Rolfe et al. 2006; Southgate et al. 2010; Stevens et al. 2002; Wossink & 
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Wenum 2003; Yu & Belcher 2011). It is clear that a price effect exists, and a larger 
value of incentive makes any resource user more likely to participate. 
 
3.3.2.2. Up-front payments 
Including an up-front payment along with annual payments can help potential ES 
providers overcome the initial costs of changing practices. As expected, studies that 
have explored the utility of an up-front payment in addition to annual payments show 
that they are liked by farmers in Spain (Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010) or Tanzania 
(Kaczan et al. 2013). Explorations of heterogeneity in these results indicate farmers 
already participating in the studied programme still have a positive, but lower utility of 
an additional up-front payment (Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010). To some degree, 
however, these basic results simply highlight that potential ES providers have a positive 
utility of receiving larger incentives, whether up-front or annual. A deeper comparison 
is needed to understand which is more influential in participation. 
 
Post-estimation analysis of those results reveals that the preference for an up-front 
payment is strong enough that providing one can lower the overall costs of the 
programme for the ES buyer. Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) estimate that, based on the 
current average area enrolled by participants, and using a 4% discount rate, providing a 
fixed premium of EUR 1,000 would lower the overall willingness to accept (WTA) of 
the average farmer over the life of the contract by 23%. Similarly, Kaczan et al. (2013) 
find that providing a fixed premium equivalent to USD 140, intended to purchase inputs 
to agroforestry, would eliminate the need to provide annual payments. The authors 
explain that this could be due to high discount rates of the farmer and/or market 
constraints impeding the transition to agroforestry. A programme participation study of 
the US Conservation Reserve Enhancement Programme did not wait for post-estimation 
analysis, but directly compares an up-front payment to the present value of annual 
payments in the econometric model. The coefficients for both are positive and 
significant, but the former is larger, suggesting that increasing the up-front payment will 
have a greater effect on participation than increasing the present value of annual 
payments by the same amount (Suter et al. 2008).  
 
3.3.2.3. Consistent payments 
It has been suggested that variable annual payments indexed against the price of crops 
produced under alternative land uses could be an effective form of PES (Engel et al. 
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2012). That would make PES more attractive when the value of other land uses, and 
thus opportunity costs, are high, but cheaper when that value is low. Kaczan et al. 
(2013) explored preferences for incentives of constant value compared to varying value 
(indexed against the price of sugar cane, a dominant land use in the study area). They 
find that potential ES providers do not like the uncertainty associated with variable 
payments and have a higher WTA for the annual variable payment than a constant 
annual payment. Grosjean & Kontoleon (2009) tested a different cause of payment 
uncertainty: the ability of the programme to provide incentives in a timely and 
consistent manner. They too find a strong preference for consistency in payments, but 
also explored the difference in this effect between two study regions. Where less off-
farm income sources were available and the average household had more land enrolled 
in the programme, the assurance of receiving full and on time payments is more 
important. 
 
3.3.2.4. Group payments 
Kaczan et al. (2013) also included an attribute in their choice experiment to explore if, 
on top of an annual individual payment, a community payment would be well received. 
Although the individual payment had a strong positive and significant effect on 
contingent participation, the effect of the group payment was also positive, but smaller 
and less significant. Further, the effect was non-existent for the quarter of the sample 
resistant to participation, although the individual payment still had a positive and 
significant effect within this group. Instead of considering them additive, IIED (2012) 
analysed the trade-off between individual and group payments. They found opposing 
results depending on the method used. Under open-ended questions, respondents stated 
they preferred an in increase in community benefits to individual payments. The authors 
suggest, however, that this may be influenced by social preference bias. Through a 
choice experiment, respondents clearly indicated a preference for increasing individual 
payments over community benefits. 
 
Preferences for group- or individual-level incentives are likely influenced by pre-
existing social norms. Narloch et al. (2012) used behavioural experiments with potential 
ES providers and compared household payments and community payments as separate 
options. They find that household-level payments will induce more pro-social behaviour 
in places where self-regarding behaviour is already the norm, while community-level 
incentives will do so where other-regarding behaviour is the norm. 
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3.3.2.5. Non-cash financial incentives 
Aside from cash payments, financial incentives can be delivered through different 
modes. The evidence on how to deliver financial incentives does not indicate that one 
type of financial incentive is preferred over any other. It instead shows that there are a 
variety of different financial incentives, and which is preferred will differ by context 
and type of ES providers. Researching one-off conservation payments in Australia, 
Putten et al. (2011) found that land owners characterised as environmental preferred an 
up-front payment, while those focused on productive uses of land preferred a tax break. 
To engage in land management contracts in Kenya, Balana et al. (2011) find that 
resource users preferred direct cash payments over a reduction in fees for electricity or 
extension services, but saw no significant difference in preferences for cash or reduced 
water fees as the delivery mode. 
 
In a qualitative study, Leimona et al. (2009) carried out focus groups in six communities 
participating in RUPES11 in the Philippines, Indonesia and Nepal. Focus groups in only 
two of the communities mentioned cash incentives as desirable. All six, however, 
described non-cash financial incentives as desirable, with reductions in electricity bills 
and access to credit mentioned most. In another qualitative study of motivations for 
participating in payments for watershed services in the USA, Majanen et al. (2011) 
indicate that cash payments were the primary or a secondary reason for programme 
participation in 60% of programmes, but non-cash financial benefits were also a key 
motivation for participants in 38% of programmes. Although those non-financial 
benefits were not specific incentives by programmes, participation was motivated by 
these co-benefits, such as lower input costs or higher productivity, indicating that non-
cash financial incentives with similar effects are worth considering.  
 
3.3.2.6. Non-financial incentives 
Provision of non-financial benefits can also increase the likelihood of programme 
participation. As such, although they are at times considered co-benefits of or other 
motivations for participation, they can equally be considered part of the incentive 
package. One key non-financial benefit that has received attention is technical 
                                                
11 Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services (RUPES), a regional programme of multiple 
project sites coordinated by the World Agroforesty Center. 
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assistance, which should reduce the costs of entry into a programme. Espinosa-Goded et 
al. (2010) provide evidence that farmers in Spain prefer programmes that include free 
and compulsory technical assistance. Majanen et al. (2011) similarly find that access to 
technical assistance is a primary or secondary motivation for ES providers to participate 
in 37% of PWS programmes they identified in the USA. 
 
A key issue in programme participation in developing countries is security in land 
tenure. A few studies indicate that farmers with strong land tenure are more likely to 
participate in PES programmes (Mullan & Kontoleon 2012; Thacher et al. 1996; 
Zbinden & Lee 2005). Rather than deter households with insecure tenure from 
participating, the programme could be designed to help strengthen tenure and thus 
improve participation and/or decrease the level of annual payment needed. Based on 
designing a PES programme in Bolivia, Asquith et al. (2008) outline various pros and 
cons of cash compared to in-kind incentives. Ultimately, the programme offered 
beehives as the incentive. One of the primary reasons those are preferred is that they 
clearly indicated that a household’s land is in use, and so help secure tenure. In later 
rounds of the programme, some households have explicitly requested to receive barbed 
wire to demarcate their land. Grosjean & Kontoleon (2009) also find that programmes 
that strengthen a household’s land tenure security are preferred.  
 
A variety of other non-financial incentives have received attention, particularly for 
programmes implemented in developing countries. Grosjean & Kontoleon (2009) find 
that the quality of grain and seedlings provided as part of the incentive package is one 
of the greatest determinants of households maintaining reforested farm area. Balderas 
Torres et al. (in press) explored a hypothetical PES programme in Mexico and report 
that farmers were more willing to participate if social benefits were provided by the 
programme, such as health, education, employment and productive projects. The focus 
groups carried out by Leimona et al. (2009) identify multiple non-financial incentives as 
desirable, including road infrastructure, farm inputs, and various public services. 
 
3.3.3. Institutional attributes 
3.3.3.1. Actors 
Two quantitative studies found that a difference in actors participating in the 
programme will not affect the level of participation of potential ES providers in PES 
programmes. It appears that more often, however, differences in actors and their roles 
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do matter. Cook & Rabotyagov (2012) find farmers that could potentially sell water 
rights in Washington State, USA, are indifferent to whether or not the intermediary is a 
public or non-profit entity. Farmers are, however, more willing to sell to irrigation 
districts and less willing to sell to developers, compared to a baseline category of selling 
to the State’s Department of Ecology. Related to actors, Horne (2006) find that forest 
owners are more likely to participate if the initiate a forest conservation contract. They 
have a significantly lower utility for contracts initiated by a forest organisation, 
conservation trust, or environmental NGO. 
 
Just as resource user characteristics and programme attributes can interact to determine 
participation, different programme attributes can also interact. For renewing enrolment 
in an established avoided deforestation programme in Brazil, IIED (2012) report that 
generally, most respondents prefer to increase individual cash incentives over 
community benefits. The strength of that preference is influenced by how respondents 
perceived the ES buyer. If the view the organisation as a government entity, they have a 
stronger preference for cash over community benefits, seemingly because they believe 
the government should provide social benefits regardless of environmental behaviour. 
 
3.3.3.2. Monitoring and conditionality 
Following a rational agent model, it would be expected that all resource users would 
prefer programmes that included less monitoring. Broch & Vedel (2012) provide an 
example of these results, with farmers in Denmark preferring programmes where a 
smaller fraction of enrolled landowners would be monitored. In contrast, Peterson 
(2011) finds that annual verification is preferred over a spot check system where only a 
fraction of enrolled landowners would be checked each year. The context of the study 
area was one where the probability of violation is small and intent to comply exists, so 
the results suggest, “that the perceived fairness and social benefits of stringent 
monitoring outweigh any expected costs” (pg. 13). Similarly, Kaczan et al. (2013) 
included three levels of conditionality and related monitoring for a hypothetical PES 
programme in Tanzania, and the moderate level is the most preferred. The lowest level 
does not include on-site visits, implying that some idea of fairness and avoiding free 
riding makes the moderate level preferable over the low level. For the two levels that 
include on-site visits, the moderate one is conditional on and monitored for reducing 
negative actions, while the high level is conditional on and monitors specific 
environmental outcomes that would require improved land management. That result fits 
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the trend of resource users disutility of increased contractual requirements (see Sections 
3.1 and 3.2 above).  
 
3.3.3.3. Additional institutional attributes 
There are a few additional attributes of interest: 
• Farmers prefer PES programmes that give them a lower level of administrative 
burden generally (Mettepenningen et al. 2013; Ruto & Garrod 2009), and 
specifically during the programme application (Christensen et al. 2011; Peterson 
2011). 
• Kwayu et al. (2013) provide evidence that farmers in Tanzania prefer 
programmes that were participatory in the design phases. 
• Broch & Vedel (2012) find that participation by farmers in Denmark is 
influenced by the purpose of the programme, and farmers have a greater 
preference, in order, for programmes focused on biodiversity, groundwater 
protection and then recreation. 
 
3.4. Unresolved Issues in PES Design 
The relatively new, but expanding literature exploring ES supplier preferences for PES 
design is incredibly valuable. It highlights the importance of a number of key attributes 
related to contract and incentive design that should inform policy decisions. 
Concurrently, it highlights that the optimal design of PES is dependent on who is being 
incentivised and the context within which a change in practices is expected to occur. In 
relation to the former, the existence of heterogeneous preferences both between and 
within studies demonstrates this need for focus on the individual ES provider. 
 
In relation to the latter, digging deeper into individual studies reveals specific factors 
related to market imperfections that are influencing preferences. For example, two 
studies indicate that ES providers do not like the lowest level of monitoring or 
conditionality (Kaczan et al. 2013; Peterson 2011). That implies some sense of fairness 
to avoid free riding under imperfect monitoring and/or enforcement is influencing 
preferences. Another example is that three studies find ES providers have a preference 
for up-front payments (Espinosa-Goded et al. 2010; Kaczan et al. 2013; Suter et al. 
2008). That demonstrates that ES providers have difficulty overcoming initial barriers 
of meeting the programme requirements, indicating market constraints exist, which is 
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not surprising considering the rural and developing country contexts in which PES 
occur. 
 
As PES have become increasingly popular, three particular issues related to imperfect 
markets have been identified that greatly influence optimal PES design. They are 
market constraints, information asymmetries, and behavioural considerations. All three 
are relevant to PES design generally, but are particularly important to consider in 
developing country contexts. The remainder of this section discusses each in turn. 
 
3.4.1. Market constraints 
Payments for ecosystem services were originally conceptualised as direct payments for 
the output of ES or a land use that would generate that output (Wunder 2005) and they 
were believed to be an improvement over previous indirect approaches used in 
community conservation (Cranford & Mourato 2011). These indirect approaches did not 
directly reward environmental outcomes, but attempted to either (McNeely et al. 2005) 
1) redirect labour and capital away from activities that degrade ecosystems (e.g. 
agricultural intensification); 2) encourage commercial activities that supply ES as joint 
outputs (e.g. ecotourism); or 3) raise incomes to reduce dependence on resource 
extraction that degrades the ecosystem. In the context of PES, ‘indirect payments’ are 
often considered the second approach, specifically reducing the cost of inputs to 
activities that jointly produce private and public goods or increasing the price of the 
private good output (Ferraro & Simpson 2002; Groom & Palmer 2010). An example is 
providing the plants needed to establish a shade-grown coffee system, or ensuring there 
is a good price for the shade-grown coffee produced. 
 
Ferraro & Kiss (2002) argue that using direct payments for the public good output is the 
first-best incentive-based policy primarily because it is the most cost-effective. Based 
on an economic model comparing direct payments and the indirect approach of 
reducing the cost of capital to a joint production activity, Ferraro & Simpson (2002) 
conclude the same, and also show that the ES buyer and provider have opposing 
preferences, with the former preferring direct PES and the latter preferring indirect PES. 
In the context of developing countries, that result can be interpreted as a tension 
between environment and development outcomes (Groom & Palmer 2010) because 
direct payments will be more cost-effective for achieving environmental objectives, 
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while indirect PES will be less cost-effective for environmental outcomes, but more 
profitable for the presumably less-well-off ES provider. 
 
A key assumption of Ferraro & Simpson (2002) was unconstrained, and so perfectly 
elastic, markets for the inputs and outputs of the joint production activity. In a series of 
papers, Groom & Palmer (2009; 2010; 2012) remove that assumption and compare 
direct PES to the indirect approach of reducing markets constraints, specifically capital 
constraints, of a joint production activity. Where quantity constraints exist there are 
situations where relaxing them can be more cost-effective than direct PES and preferred 
by both the principal and the agent (Groom & Palmer 2010). The chance of these results 
increases as 1) the return to scale of the productive activity increases towards constant 
(assuming diminishing returns to scale), and 2) there is input complementarity between 
the conservation action and capital used in the production process (Groom & Palmer 
2012). At intermediate levels of returns to scale and complementarity, use of an indirect 
intervention may not be strictly cost-effective for conservation outcomes, but can still 
lead to an overall increase in welfare and so can be overall more efficient (Groom & 
Palmer 2012). Thus, if the ES buyer (i.e. the principal) were concerned with improving 
welfare alongside environmental objectives, there is a greater chance he would prefer 
the indirect approach. 
 
Market constraints can also influence the outcomes of specific policies related to 
resource use. For example, Mexico’s PROCAMPO programme was not directly 
intended to support environmentally beneficial actions, but to support rural farmers. In 
this case, incentives were decoupled from production in order to incentivise 
intensification, with a co-benefit of not increasing pressure on surrounding forests. The 
opposite occurred, however, in areas where market constraints and lack of technical 
assistance existed, such that extensification occurred along with a decrease in forest area 
(Schmook & Vance 2009). 
 
Regarding environmental policy specifically, directly paying for a public good output, 
such as carbon credits, is much less cost-effective when constraints to supply of that 
public good exists (Vivid Economics 2010). Unfortunately, constraints have not 
received much attention in relation to PES programmes. An exception is China’s 
Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP), which requires households to reforest 
previously cultivated land and provides cash, grain and seedlings in return. A key piece 
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of the logic behind SLCP is that by reducing production constraints, households can 
shift their labour effort away from the farm, achieving the dual objectives of reducing 
environmental pressures and improving income through working off-farm. Reducing 
production constraints did have some success in achieving these goals (Uchida et al, 
2009). That result is at risk, however, due to other constraints on the reallocation of 
labour away from farm activities (Groom et al. 2010). Constraints can not only affect 
outcomes for participating households, but can influence a household’s decision to 
participate in the programme in the first place (Mullan & Kontoleon 2012). Moving 
away from SLCP, some research has also focused on liquidity constraints, indicating 
that poor access to credit can lead to reduced participation in PES (Jayachandran 2013). 
 
The theory and available evidence clearly identify that market constraints must be 
considered in PES design. One way to do this is to couple incentives with reducing 
market constraints. For example, a direct cash payment could be coupled with improved 
credit access (Jayachandran 2013). Alternatively, the incentive itself could reduce 
market constraints. That is the argument put forward by Groom & Palmer (2009; 2010; 
2012). In effect though, these two options are one and the same. As already described in 
this paper, the so-called co-benefits of programme participation, such as technical 
assistance or improved tenure security, have been cited as a key motivation for ES 
providers to engage with PES in various cases. A reduction in market constraints is a 
viable form of PES, either as a single incentive or part of an incentive package. 
 
The case studies in Chapter 5 and 6 both provide evidence related to overcoming market 
constraints. The first was designed to research a policy that couples PES with 
overcoming credit constraints, while the second researches preferences for in-kind or 
cash incentives and a result that emerges is that market constraints can influence this 
preference. 
 
3.4.2. Information asymmetries 
In any transfer of incentive, the buyer (or principal) has less information about the 
supplier (or agent) then suppliers have of themselves. That can lead to strategic or lack 
of action by the suppliers, such that the buyer does not achieve the intended outcome of 
increasing supply of the demanded private or public good or service. There are two 
main consequences of information asymmetries. First, adverse selection arises when 
negotiating an agreement. The ES buyer does not know the true cost (including 
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opportunity cost) to the ES supplier of meeting the environmental requirement of a PES 
transfer, meaning that ES buyers could be overpaying and ES providers could be 
extracting informational rents (Ferraro 2008). Second, moral hazard occurs after the 
agreement has been negotiated and can be divided into ex-ante and ex-post moral 
hazard (Armendáriz & Morduch 2005). In the context of PES, the former relates to 
whether the potential ES supplier intends to comply with the agreement, the latter refers 
to once compliance does occur, whether it will be maintained for the length of the 
agreement.  
 
3.4.2.1. Adverse selection and PES 
Adverse selection has been predominantly researched in the context of agri-
environmental schemes (AES) (Chambers 1992; Bourgeon, Jayet, and Picard 1995b; I. 
M. Fraser 1995; Wu and Babcock 1996; Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 
1997; Moxey, White, and Ozanne 1999; Peterson and Boisvert 2004; Canton, De Cara, 
and Jayet 2009). Ferraro (2008) draws on the AES literature and other research focussed 
on PES, and offers three categories of mechanisms for ES buyers to reduce 
informational rents: targeting, screening contracts, and procurement auctions. These 
mechanisms address adverse selection by either collecting information (in the case of 
targeting), or inducing ES providers (i.e. agents) to reveal information, about their true 
costs of ES provision. Although all three are useful and have been used to some extent 
in developing countries, there are also difficulties related to the use of each mechanism. 
First, targeting can increase transaction costs, and the level of improved efficiency 
gained for that extra cost depends largely on the strength of correlation between the 
known attributes of the agent and actual compliance costs the agent faces (Ferraro 
2008), which can be difficult to determine. Second, screening contracts are technically 
complex (Ferraro 2008) and thus difficult to implement in developing countries where 
technical expertise may be limited. It does not mean that either targeting or screening 
contracts should not be used in developing countries, just that their use may be limited. 
 
Third, for PES procurement auctions, standard auction theory does not wholly apply 
due to unusual attributes such as “multiple units, risk-averse bidders, budget-
constrained buyers, and repeated auctions over time” (Ferraro 2008, pg. 814). Latacz-
Lohmann & Van der Hamsvoort (1997) demonstrate that although a discriminative-
price, multiple-unit auction does improve economic efficiency (compared to a posted-
price AES) it is still an imperfect revelation mechanism. The bid not only increases with 
 69 
the potential ES provider’s opportunity costs, but also their expectation of the maximum 
acceptable price. In practice, conservation auctions exist in both developed and 
developing countries, although such auctions are “not necessarily functioning well or 
free from corruption” in developing countries and do require substantial human capital 
to design and implement (Ferraro 2008, pg. 818). 
 
3.4.2.2. Moral hazard and PES 
Lessons on dealing with moral hazard have been provided by theoretical research into 
AES (Choe and Fraser, 1998 and 1999; Ozanne et al., 2001; Fraser, 2004; Hart and 
Latacz-Lohman, 2005), but that body of research is small, it focuses on EU AES, and it 
primarily analyses optimising monitoring and increasing targeting, both costly and 
complex tasks. Further, although theoretical analyses of these mechanisms in the 
context of AES indicate that they could be useful, practical experience with them is 
minimal. 
 
Moral hazard is not just a problem in developed countries, and monitoring compliance 
can constitute a significant portion of the total transaction costs of PES programmes, 
particularly in small-scale and/or user-financed programmes in developing countries 
and rural areas where access is more difficult (Wunder et al. 2008), as such, the 
monitoring is sometimes inadequate (Wunder & Albán 2008) (Table 4), leaving ES 
providers with “an incentive to avoid filling contractual responsibilities” (Ferraro 2008, 
pg. 811). In developing countries, monitoring may be insufficient not simply due to 
direct costs, but also weak governance institutions. 
 
Table 4: The cost and adequacy of monitoring contract compliance in select PES case studies. In the cases 
with lower monitoring costs, the adequacy of monitoring is in question. Where the adequacy of 
monitoring in not in question, monitoring costs are a significant portion of total costs of the programme. 
Monitoring 
Programme Service Provided Country Costs (% of total) Adequacy 
Years Source 
Pimampiro 
Municipality  
Watershed 
protection 
Ecuador 10% In question due to 
budget and 
personnel 
constraints 
2001-
2005 
Wunder & 
Albán 
(2008) 
PROFAFOR Forest 
carbon 
Ecuador 10% Undetermined 2000-
2005 
Wunder & 
Albán 
(2008) 
Birdnest 
Protection 
Programme 
BD habitat Cambodia 26% Seemingly 
adequate 
2005-
2008 
Clements et 
al. (2010) 
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With a lack of monitoring, noncompliance could become a large problem. Looking to 
lessons from AES in developed countries, evidence is sparse, but it suggests that 
noncompliance is a problem. In Europe, noncompliance was estimated to be around 
25% in the UK and 33% in Germany in the early 1990s (Land Use Consultants 1995 
and Hanf 1993 respectively; both as cited by Hart & Latacz-Lohmann 2005). In the US, 
noncompliance appeared lower, at an estimated 5% in 1997 (Giannakas & Kaplan 2001) 
and closer to 2% in the following years (USDA 2009). These estimates, however, are 
based on the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) Compliance Status Review 
(CSR), which is not publicly available and has in the past been criticised for its poor 
methodology, including its sample selection. In a review of compliance monitoring on 
farms with impacts on highly-erodible land and wetlands, the CSR was criticised for 
disproportionately emphasising farm tracts “with little potential for noncompliance” 
leading to “inflated compliance rates” (GAO 2003). 
 
Assuming monitoring is sufficient, reducing moral hazard can be achieved through 
providing incentives only after ES are supplied. In some cases, PES programmes 
provide signing bonuses, cost sharing, or other incentives that are difficult to return if 
the condition is not met. In this case, adverse selection can be mitigated with the threat 
of penalties. There is often, however, a practical or political limit to penalties for non-
compliance with environmental regulation (Heyes 2000) and a similar concern for PES, 
where ES providers are often relatively poor and have limited liability (Jayachandran 
2013). 
 
3.4.2.3. Lessons from microcredit 
Overcoming information asymmetries is a complex issues wherever an agreement is 
made. Typical approaches to dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard, however, 
appear to be costly, complex, and difficult to implement in a rural or developing country 
context. An alternative approach is needed for PES that are small-scale, with a lower 
budget, and/or in contexts where it is particularly difficult to gain information about the 
potential ES supplier. 
 
Microcredit is a well-known case of economic innovation that can overcome 
information asymmetries in a context similar to PES: a financial or economic 
transaction where the beneficiaries are often poorer, rural populations. In better-
developed credit markets, lenders have more information on the borrower, in addition to 
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collateral or other assurance they can use to recoup what is owed if the borrower does 
not repay. Microcredit focuses on lending when information about potential borrowers 
is minimal and borrowers cannot provide security in case of default. To lend in this 
context, three primary economic innovations have emerged (Armendáriz & Morduch 
2005): creative collateral, dynamic incentives, and joint liability.  
 
The first economic innovation is creative collateral. There are microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) that require collateral to secure loans, but they tend to take a non-traditional 
view of what collateral is. Rather than focus on the monetary resale value of collateral, 
the value of creative collateral is based on a judgement of how problematic it would be 
for households to give it up. Thus, the value of collateral is determined by the notional 
value of the asset to the borrower, not the expected market value. The recourse for the 
bank in the case of lending default is not to seize and sell the asset, but to deny access to 
it by the borrower (Armendáriz & Morduch 2005). 
 
To date, there is no experience or theoretical analysis of the use of creative collateral in 
any PES programme. There is a normative argument, however, for its use. A PES 
agreement is designed to ensure that beneficiaries receive the ES they value, which have 
been degraded because society traditionally values that degradation over provision. If 
the ES provider fails to meet the contractual obligations, it is a like-for-like recourse 
that they are denied access to something with notional value; something they value but 
others do not. 
 
The second mechanism, dynamic incentives, involves incorporating implications for 
future lending into current lending conditions (e.g., one can borrow more next time if 
they meet all obligations to pay back the first time). The general form is that dynamic 
incentives offer positive incentives for compliance as opposed to negative incentives 
against non-compliance. There has been some research into the use of a similar 
mechanism in PES programmes. Yano & Blandford (2009) made the first attempt to 
model compliance rewards rather than non-compliance penalties in AES. Where 
dynamic incentives in microcredit offer future lending in return for compliance (of the 
current lending contract), compliance rewards in AES would offer a bonus above the 
original contract payment once compliance with the current contract is established.  
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Yano & Blandford (2009, pg. 543) find that “under certain conditions the use of 
compliance rewards can mitigate the problem of moral hazard in incentive-based agri-
environmental programmes.” The conditions that favour compliance rewards are 1) 
constraints on the size of penalties that can be imposed for non-compliance, and/or 2) 
high per farm/household costs of monitoring and enforcement. Both of these conditions 
are highly relevant for PES programmes in developing country contexts. As noted 
above, imposing penalties may not be feasible or desirable (Jayachandran 2013). 
Additionally, many programmes occur in forests, highlands, fisheries, or other 
landscapes that are more costly to monitor than relatively homogenous and accessible 
industrial agricultural landscapes. As such, the evaluation and piloting use of 
compliance rewards and more advanced dynamic incentives could be considered for 
PES programmes.  
 
The third mechanism, joint liability, involves a group (often of 3-5 people) being jointly 
liable for the repayment of the loan borrowed by a single member of that group. If one 
borrower defaults, the group defaults and no more lending is offered to any member of 
that group. Group liability leverages the fact that group members have better 
information about who would be a good borrower than the lender initially has, and 
relies on self-selected groups to form based on that information. It also leverages the 
social ties between group members because they will work together to ensure that no 
single member defaults, either through social pressure (when the borrower has the 
ability to repay) or developing a side arrangement to finance repayments (when the 
borrower does not have the ability to repay). 
 
There are already examples related to group liability in PES when incentives are 
provided to communities (e.g. Sommerville et al. 2010) or groups of jointly liable 
households (Yang et al. 2013) rather than individual households or farms. The need for 
such group payments is sometimes related to equity concerns (i.e. it is not equitable to 
differentiate payments at the household level), but often makes economic sense due to 
the nature of the natural resources being protected: open-access or common-pool 
resources. As uptake of PES is rapidly increasing, and especially as it is being discussed 
for contractual arrangements to avoid degradation of ecosystems that directly face the 
problem of open-access (e.g. REDD), it is time to empirically analyse jointly liable PES 
(JL-PES). Chapter 6 takes up this challenge and collects both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence of potential ES providers’ preferences related to JL-PES.  
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3.4.3. Behavioural considerations 
3.4.3.1. Incentives and pro-social behaviour 
There is a large literature on incentives and pro-social behaviour that PES research and 
practice can draw on. That literature arose from psychology (Frey & Jegen 2001), and 
since gaining the attention of economists has been the subject of many behavioural 
experiments (Bowles 2008) and has been analysed within extended models of 
rationality (Bénabou & Tirole 2003; Bénabou & Tirole 2006). 
 
The classical approach to incentives assumes that behaviour motivated by explicit 
economic incentives and behaviour motivated by the non-fiscal motivations is 
separable, specifically that a change in the incentive should not alter behaviour 
originally motivated by personal or social preferences (Bowles & Hwang 2008). This 
assumption of separability led to a large body of economic thinking focused on 
designing mechanisms and contracts that would leverage the self-interest of the agent to 
achieve what the principal demanded. 
 
More recently, a large body of research has demonstrated that the effects of incentives 
and pre-existing preferences are not separable, but in fact must be considered together 
to determine the true, total effect of incentives and thus optimal policy design (Ariely et 
al. 2009; Bénabou & Tirole 2002; Bénabou & Tirole 2003; Bénabou & Tirole 2006; 
Bowles & Hwang 2008; Bowles 2008; Brooks 2000; DeVoe & Iyengar 2010; Falk & 
Kosfeld 2006; Frey & Jegen 2001; Gneezy & Rustichini 2000a; Gneezy & Rustichini 
2000b; Heyman & Ariely 2004). That is not to say incentives do not work, but that 
economists were previously too reliant on the relative price effect of incentives (Frey & 
Jegen 2001). As Bowles & Hwang (2008, pg. 1817) explain, “while explicit incentives 
do a tolerably good job in many situations, in others performance would be improved if 
mechanism design took account of the effects of incentives on preferences.” 
 
A major theme in the study of pro-social behaviour is that individuals may already have 
an intrinsic motivation to carry out pro-social behaviour, but that those motivations may 
be negatively affected by the introduction of extrinsic incentives. Multiple reviews have 
been carried out (Bowles & Hwang 2008; Bowles 2008; Frey & Jegen 2001) 
demonstrating there is significant evidence of the psychological mechanisms through 
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which separability fails and explicit incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivations to 
engage in pro-social behaviour. The mechanisms can be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Self-regarding behaviour – The provision of extrinsic incentives indicates that 
self-regarding behaviour is more appropriate than pro-social behaviour. That 
framing can occur within a specific decision context, but incentives can also 
induce a long-term shift in social preferences. 
 
2. Information – Incentives can indicate to the agent that the task to be carried out 
is undesirable to do, and/or that the principal thinks the agent is self-regarding in 
relation to this task so must be paid to do it. Additionally, if incentives are 
known to other individuals in society, the reputational benefit12 of carrying out 
pro-social behaviour is reduced. 
 
3. Over-justification – When provided incentives, the locus of control is external, 
giving the agent a lower sense of autonomy and self-determination, which can 
degrade intrinsic motivations to perform the task. 
 
Incentives also have the ability to crowd-in intrinsic motivations. The mechanisms that 
crowd-out intrinsic motivations arise when the incentive is viewed as coercive: a ‘pay-
off‘. If framed as supportive, however, incentives can crowd-in intrinsic motivation by 
reinforcing, rather than degrading, self-determination, and by conveying positive 
information that the agent’s involvement and competence is appreciated (Frey & Jegen 
2001). 
 
Social mechanisms may also interact with incentives. For example, some tasks are 
carried out in order to improve other individuals’ perceptions of the agent—known as 
image motivation. If the provision is publicly known, the image motivation is damaged 
by receiving an extrinsic incentive, making that incentive less effective (Ariely et al. 
2009). If provision of the public good is not visible, then there is no image motivation to 
damage, and in the absence of any other intrinsic motivations, the extrinsic incentive is 
very likely to increase pro-social behaviour without any dampening of its effect. 
                                                
12 Ariely et al. (2009) call this ‘image motivation’ and describe it as the third type of motivation alongside 
intrinsic and extrinsic.
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That example demonstrates that there are two categories of motivation crowding: 
intrinsic motivations arising from the agent and those arising from the agent’s 
interaction with society. Extrinsic incentives can crowd-out or crowd-in motivations, 
whatever their ultimate source. Figure 3 compares the two outcomes in basic economic 
terms. In both cases the price effect exists such that when an incentive is provided and 
raises the price from P0 to P1, the supply of pro-social behaviour increases from Q0 to 
Q*. If the incentive has a net crowding-out effect, the supply curve will move left, such 
that P1 induces the supply of QOUT. If crowding-in occurs, the supply curve will move 
right and P1 will induce the supply of QIN. 
 
 
Figure 3: The supply of pro-social behaviour under motivation crowding. Adapted from Frey & Jegen 
(2001). 
 
 
3.4.3.2. PES and pro-social behaviour 
Researchers and practitioners, specifically those following an ecological or institutional 
economics approach and building on lessons from developing countries, have clearly 
highlighted the relevance of non-separability for PES design. They note the potential for 
crowding-out (Farley & Costanza 2010; Kosoy & Corbera 2010; Muradian et al. 2010; 
Sommerville et al. 2009; Vatn 2010), risk of entitlement as self-regarding behaviour 
becomes the norm (Farley & Costanza 2010; Sommerville et al. 2009), and potential 
cognitive costs of conditionality and monitoring (Farley & Costanza 2010; Jack 2009). 
These researchers have also noted the possibility of crowding-in intrinsic motivation 
through an arrangement framed as reciprocal (Farley & Costanza 2010; Vatn 2010) or a 
supportive co-investment (van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010). Despite this research, 
motivation crowding remains a largely unresolved issue in PES design (Ferraro et al. 
2012; Pattanayak et al. 2010) 
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The evidence that is available suggests that crowding-in is most likely if PES are 
designed to support pre-existing preferences of the ES supplier. That is not to say that 
PES are best when they align with ES supplier preferences for programme attributes, 
but that the effect of that alignment is to increase enrolment. To reduce the risk of 
crowding-out, and thus increase the effectiveness of PES, they should align more 
broadly with supplier preferences and local norms. 
 
In many cases, we see this phenomenon already occurring. Potential ES providers with 
a stronger pro-environment attitudes are more likely to adopt conservation-oriented 
practices (Baumgart-Getz et al. 2012) and to participate in PES programmes (Langpap 
2004; Rabotyagov & Lin 2013). That does raise the question of selection bias: if those 
with a stronger environmental ethic are more likely to enter the programme, surely they 
are also more likely to carry out the activity in the absence of PES, reducing the 
efficiency of a PES programme. That is difficult to say, because actual participation will 
depend on a number of factors. For example, Ma et al. (2010) find that although the 
decision by Iowa soy farmers to consider enrolling in a PES programme is determined 
by pre-existing farmer characteristics (including environmental attitudes and previous 
experience with incentive programmes), the final decision to enrol is based on farm-
level benefit-cost factors. Similarly, Pagiola et al. (2005) conceptualise the decision to 
participate in three parts: eligibility, desire and ability to participate. 
 
While the effect on efficiency of PES potentially going to resource users that are more 
environmentally concerned remains an empirical question, there is one immediately 
apparent benefit. If a selection bias is occurring, the incentive is also more likely to be 
perceived as supportive rather than coercive, and crowd in rather than crowd out 
intrinsic motivation. Kosoy et al. (2007) report that programme participants in Central 
America were more likely than non-participants to carry out conservation in the absence 
of PES, but also that they viewed the incentive as support for their actions. These types 
of results, of a conservation norm being driven by other types of intervention, indicates 
that in some cases it may be better to consider direct cash payments as a reward for 
reinforcing good environment behaviour rather than as a driver of changing bad 
environmental behaviour (Cranford & Mourato 2011; Kosoy et al. 2007). 
 
The idea of PES aligning with pre-existing preferences, however, goes beyond 
supporting resource users that already have positive environmental attitudes. A key 
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result from common pool resource management is that top-down, imposed—
exogenous—governance structures are less effective than endogenously formed 
resource governance rules (Marshall 2005; Ostrom 2000). That does not mean PES 
must be endogenously generated, but suggests that they should at least align with pre-
existing social norms to increase effectiveness. For example, as already noted above, 
Narloch et al. (2012) find that in a context where pro-social behaviour is more the norm, 
group-based incentives crowd-in motivation to carry out conservation. In contrast, 
where self-regarding behaviour is more the norm, household-based incentives are likely 
to work better.  
 
Building on the principles that incentives can interact with motivations defined by 
personal preferences or social norms, there are some basic rules that can help guide PES 
design to make them less likely to crowd out and more likely to crowd in these 
motivations. Stern (2006) first reminds readers that there may be a subset of potential 
ES providers that do not maintain strong intrinsic motivations to provide ES. As such, 
an ES buyer will first want to determine which potential providers have intrinsic 
motivations. Stern (2006) then suggests two rules for PES design. The first is ensuring 
the size of the incentive is optimised to reduce the crowding-out effect. The second is 
framing the incentive and feedback in order to emphasise achievement and autonomy.  
 
Regarding the first rule, Stern (2006) argues that disproportionately large incentives 
have a greater chance of crowding-out intrinsic motivation, in part because the salience 
of the incentive overrides that of non-financial motivations to act. There is conflicting 
evidence from psychological experiments, however, which suggest that low-level 
financial incentives are less effective than no incentive (Gneezy & Rustichini 2000b) or 
a non-cash reward of equal value (Heyman & Ariely 2004). Irrespective of these 
different results, both experiments highlight that the size of the incentive should be 
considered with respect to the pre-existing motivations of ES providers. These results, 
however, also point to the most prominent criterion of effective incentives: that they are 
supportive, rather than coercive. Field evidence from Mexico already cited indicates 
that low-level cash incentives were well-received because they were supportive 
(although the effect that had on effort was not measured; Kosoy et al. 2007). This tallies 
with Stern's (2006) second recommendation, which is synonymous with framing the 
incentive as supportive. 
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Evidence on motivation crowding can be reduced to three key dimensions, all of which 
can inform PES design (Vollan 2008): 
1. Whether the external intervention is controlling or supporting 
2. The degree of participants’ self-determination 
3. Pre-existing social norms of trust and reciprocity. 
 
The research presented in Chapters 5 and 6 provides multiple results that are relevant 
for including behavioural considerations in PES design. The chapters do not carry out 
behavioural experiments, but instead maintain an environmental economics approach to 
complement the behavioural literature. They provide evidence that particular aspects of 
incentive design can help overcome the potential negative impacts of more traditional 
incentives (i.e. direct cash payments).  
 
3.5. Summary 
Despite the consensus that incentives are the core of all PES programmes (see Chapter 
2), there has paradoxically been no coherent consideration of the optimal design of such 
incentives. The review presented here aims to provide a starting point for that 
discussion. It first briefly reviewed both the adoption and participation literatures as the 
historical and intellectual starting point for such a discussion. It then systematically 
reviewed the evidence that is available on potential ES supplier preferences for contract 
and incentive attributes. Understanding those preferences will allow ES buyers to 
balance supplier preferences with other considerations to design more effective, and 
cost-effective, PES. Finally, the review focuses on three more complex issues that have 
emerged as particularly important for PES in developing countries: market constraints, 
information asymmetries and behavioural considerations. Compiling lessons and 
information across the various strands of literature reviewed indicates that there is 
potential for strong synergies among multiple motivations for specific attributes when 
designing PES. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TYPOLOGY 
 
A Typology of Payments for Ecosystem Services: The case of 
payments for watershed services 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Along with various definitions and conceptualisations of PES, there has been a 
recurring discussion of what is PES or PES-like (Wunder 2005; Muradian et al. 2010). 
Many PES researchers and practitioners, particularly in developing countries, perceived 
a greater prevalence of PES-like programmes than true PES. That was a key motivation 
for multiple re-definitions and re-conceptualisations of PES driven by experience in 
developing countries (Muradian et al. 2010; Sommerville et al. 2009; Swallow et al. 
2009; van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010). So, as PES has been re-defined and re-
conceptualised it is worth now considering what is meant by the term ‘PES’, what 
comprises this broad category of positive incentives, and what types of PES are most 
prevalent in developing countries. 
 
Typologies in the social sciences tend to be derived based on conceptual or theoretical 
validity and are used to label particular observations into different categories (Ahlquist 
& Breunig 2012). The same is true in relation to analysis of economic instruments for 
biodiversity (BD) and ecosystem services (ES), and PES specifically. Two basic 
approaches are observed. 
 
The first aims to understand economic instruments by focussing on a small number of 
key characteristics and visually representing the universe of possible instruments. For 
example, Lockie (2013) described market-based instruments (MBIs) based on a two-by-
two matrix of 1) whether the benefits accrue privately or publicly, and 2) whether the 
desired action was within the ES provider’s normal duty of care. Muradian et al. (2010) 
focussed on PES and conceptualised them based on a three-dimensional spectrum that 
included the importance of the economic incentive, the directness of the transfer of the 
incentive between ES buyer and seller, and the degree of commodification of nature 
implied in the transaction. 
 80 
 
In another approach, what can more rightly be called a typology is defined based on a 
complex, but opaque, set of characteristics evaluated by expert judgement. Pirard 
(2012) classified MBIs for BD and ES based on “…their intrinsic economic 
characteristics and…relations to markets” (pg. 64). He created a typology that included 
direct markets, tradable permits, reverse auctions, Coaseian-type agreements, regulatory 
price signals, and voluntary price signals. 
 
Specifically regarding PES, Scherr et al. (2006) and Smith et al. (2006) both described 
the same four types of programmes: private payment, public payment, cap-and-trade, 
and certification schemes. There is little clarity on how this typology is defined, with 
the authors respectively stating it is based on “basic institutional structure” (pg. 5) or 
“degree of government intervention in administration” and “characteristics of the buyers 
and sellers” (pg. 42). Swallow et al. (2009) depart from the terminology of PES and 
present a typology of what they call compensation and rewards for environmental 
services (CRES). Compensation comprises 1) restitution for damages to the 
environment (a negative incentive) and 2) a tradable permit system (negative for some, 
positive for some), while rewards comprise 3) reward for threat reduction and 4) reward 
for conservation of or investment in an ecosystem. 
 
Following a similar approach, some authors have moved away from describing a 
typology of policy instruments, but instead describe a typology of approaches or 
paradigms for PES. Building on the now-classic binary characterisation of PES as user-
financed or government-financed (Engel et al. 2008), Schomers & Matzdorf (in press) 
described three approaches to PES as the Coaseian approach (akin to user-finance), the 
Pigouvian (or standards and fees; akin to government-finance) approach, and a catchall 
category for all other approaches. Van Noordwijk & Leimona (2010) built on their own 
experience and, with a focus on conditionality, defined three paradigms of PES: 
commoditised environmental services, compensating for opportunities skipped, and co-
investment in stewardship. These authors used more than conditionality in defining their 
typology, but did at least provide a clear discussion of types of conditionality, which is 
the key defining characteristic of their different paradigms. 
 
The conceptualisations and typologies have been highly informative and helpful in 
understanding economic instruments for BD and ES, and specifically, PES programmes. 
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Yet despite agreement that incentives are at the core of all PES programmes, little effort 
has been made to define the different types of incentives used. That is important, 
particularly as the conversation defining and conceptualising PES has questioned the 
relevance of economic incentives. Muradian et al. (2010) introduce the degree of 
importance of the economic incentive as a defining characteristic of PES programmes, 
and various other authors have now accepted their definition and conceptualisation (e.g. 
Farley & Costanza 2010). At the same time, the list of possible motivations for potential 
ES providers to participate in such programmes has expanded. For example, authors are 
suggesting that even if a price effect (i.e. a cash incentive) motivates participation, other 
incentives are also important such as receiving technical assistance or non-cash 
economic benefits (Majanen et al. 2011). 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, there is increasing discussion in the PES literature that 
multiple incentives or benefits are inducing ES providers to participate in PES 
programmes. The aim of this chapter is to better understand those types of incentives by 
developing a typology, and to the degree possible identifying which types are used in 
developing countries. The approach is novel in two ways. First, where other typologies 
of PES categorised them based on institutional or market characteristics, the approach 
here is to define a typology based on incentive attributes. Programmes often offer more 
than one clear incentive, for example, cash incentives plus technical assistance. As such, 
the typology will more precisely define incentives as incentive packages. Second, other 
typologies have been qualitatively developed. Here, a model-based method is used, 
although it is still exploratory in nature so open to some interpretation. 
 
Developing a typology that is transparent regarding variable selection and approach, 
and most importantly, takes an incentive-focused approach, is highly relevant for the 
PES literature. It provides an objective view on defining what PES actually are, helping 
to overcome the PES and PES-like debate. More directly relevant to policy design, it 
provides objectively defined categories that permit programmes that are similar to learn 
from each other. As discussed more in later sections of this chapter, the typology 
highlights that sometimes-similar incentives are at times implemented through very 
different institutional settings, while other times very different incentives are provided 
through programmes that have similar institutional settings. 
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Following this introduction, the second section describes the model-based approach to 
classification implemented here, while the third section presents the raw model results. 
The fourth section discusses those results and presents the typology, followed by the 
fifth section that discusses the typology more broadly. The sixth section concludes. 
 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Data collection 
Bennett et al. (2013) is the second in a series of reports on the state of incentive-based 
programmes for watershed services around the world. The data collected for that report 
is the basis for the data used to develop the typology here. A full description of data 
collection is presented in that report, but the process is briefly described here. 
 
The known set of incentive-based programmes for watershed services were identified 
by 1) gathering the list of programmes previously surveyed in the first report (Stanton et 
al. 2010), 2) carrying out desk-based research, and 3) consulting experts with 
experience and knowledge of such programmes globally or in particular regions. 
 
Managers of the identified programmes were contacted and asked to complete a survey 
that was primarily administered through an online platform. In some cases, the online 
format was not possible for programme managers to complete due to a lack of computer 
or Internet access, or it was culturally deemed not optimal. In these cases, the survey 
was administered over the phone and with the support of regional experts in Latin 
America, China, and the Western United States. Where information on a particular 
programme was still lacking, it was collected through one of two modes. A significant 
amount of the information was reported in publicly available documents, or where it 
was not publicly available, follow-up contact was made with the programme managers.  
 
The variables of data collected for Bennett et al. (2013) focused more on institutional 
characteristics of a programme, so did not fully align with the variables of interest for a 
typology of incentives. As such, significant additional coding was carried out 
specifically for this chapter by reviewing the open-ended survey responses by 
programme managers and publicly available literature. 
 
A number of observed programmes in the initial database were based on negative 
incentives so did not fit the conceptualisation of PES as positive incentives, or were 
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sub-national replications of the same programme.13 These programmes were removed 
from the database, leaving 138 programmes that could potentially be defined as PES. 
Seven were programmes where user fees or other levies (e.g. earmarked sales tax) were 
paid to a public or civil sector organisation dedicated to environmental protection that 
directly carried out this conservation. These programmes were fundamentally economic 
instruments to raise funds, not a supply-side innovation as PES is defined in Chapter 2. 
Additionally, 11 programmes could easily be categorised as programmes that only used 
cash incentives to pay for partial or full property rights. It is unclear if transfers of 
property rights should be considered PES. Some researchers have discussed 
conservation easements as a form of PES (Wunder 2005; Kemkes et al. 2010), but if 
foregoing partial property rights is PES, should outright land purchase for the purpose 
of conservation also be considered PES? The transfer of property rights does not quite 
fit the essence of PES. Additionally, that transfer is only feasible in certain parts of the 
world with strong legal systems, and could receive significant normative resistance in 
developing countries. Due to this ambiguity, but also because property rights 
transactions for cash payments are easily categorised as a separate type of incentive, 
programmes based on property rights were removed from the dataset. They could easily 
be reintroduced as a separate type of incentive if later desired. The final dataset 
comprised 120 payments for watershed services (PWS) programmes. 
 
4.2.2. Latent class analysis 
Cluster analysis is famously defined as the art of finding groups in data (Kaufman & 
Rousseeuw 2005) and is a common approach to classification or typology development. 
The aim of cluster analysis is to take sets of data and identify groups of individuals that 
are similar in many characteristics, but dissimilar from individuals that are in other 
groups. There are three methods: hierarchical, partitioning, and model-based clustering 
(MBC). 
 
When data availability permits it, MBC is the preferred method because it (Ahlquist & 
Breunig 2012) meets three characteristics:  
1) It easily enables understanding of uncertainty of the clustering results (e.g. 
observation x is placed in cluster 1 with 90% certainty); 
                                                
13 This is most relevant for China, where the national forest ecosystem protection fund (FECP) provides 
incentives alongside provincial FECPs.  
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2) It uses statistical tools to aid in model selection, which also helps identify the 
number of clusters in the data; and 
3) It can accommodate a large range of cluster shapes. 
Beyond methodological preferences, there is also evidence that MBC performs better 
than other methods (Magidson & Vermunt 2002). 
 
Latent class analysis (LCA) is a special case of MBC used for categorical data. It 
models a population as a finite mixture of probability distributions of the number of 
clusters specified at the start of analysis.  
 
Equation 1: Latent class model 
 
 
Equation 1 presents the model used in LCA, where: 
• g is a group of observations (i.e. cluster/class), g = 1,…,G and G is the total 
number of groups; 
• i is a variable included as a manifest variable in the analysis, and i = 1,…,k; and 
•  j is a categorical value of variable i, and j = 1,…,di based on the number of 
possible discrete outcomes variable i can take. 
The estimated parameters are pijg and !g, such that: 
• pijg is the probability of the ith variable taking value j in group g, where 1{xj=j} 
is the indicator function that takes value 1 if the variable does take the value j 
and 0 if not; and 
• !g is the proportion of group g in the population, where 0>!g>1 and 
  
 
The analysis uses an expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm to predict the 
parameters of the mixture model. The distribution of each cluster will be defined by the 
combination of estimated values of pij within each group g, with the overall population 
characterised by the mixture of these distributions. 
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The analysis presented here was carried out using the poLCA software package in the R 
statistical computing environment (Linzer & Lewis 2011a; Linzer & Lewis 2011b). 
poLCA was chosen because it is specifically designed to deal with observed data that is 
categorical in nature, it easily extends to include simultaneous estimation of a 
multinomial (MNL) regression of covariates that predict cluster membership, and it 
easily provides visual results for the predicted probabilities derived from that MNL 
regression. 
 
4.2.3. Model specification 
There are two key aspects to model specification in LCA: selecting the number of 
classes and the manifest variables to include as defining the classes. 
 
Determining the number of classes can be based on some theoretical expectation, but 
one reason to choose MBC over other types of clustering analysis is that model 
selection decisions can also be based on statistical measures of model fit. In this case, 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978) was the measure of model fit 
used (Equation 2). The BIC relies on the maximum log-likelihood (!) but penalises an 
increase in the total number of estimated parameters (") in relation to the number of 
observations (n). Comparing models, those with a lower BIC are considered a better fit 
for the data, so the aim in model specification is to minimise the BIC. 
 
Equation 2: Bayesian Information Criterion 
 
 
The BIC was chosen for three reasons. First, it is one of the most, if not the most, 
commonly used measure of model fit in LCA. Second, it has a relatively strong penalty 
for additional parameters, meaning it will penalise additional classes. The data set here 
is small, and so it is prudent to not include additional classes unless there is reasonable 
evidence they provide additional information. Using the BIC pushes the analysis to be 
conservative in this regard.  
 
Third, our data set was too small to use any of the also popular chi-square goodness of 
fit tests.14 That does not mean the LCA is invalidated in any way: the data is simply a 
                                                
14 When data sets are larger, a chi-squared goodness of fit measure is often used that compares observed 
to predicted cell counts. Cells in this case are a category of one particular sequence of categorical 
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small, but highly variable set. It does, however, invalidate the use of any chi-square 
goodness of fit to guide the model choice related to the latent classes. 
 
The second aspect of model specification is selection of the manifest variables. As with 
linear and non-linear regression models, variable selection is ultimately at the discretion 
of the researcher who may base it on theoretical or statistical evidence. Here, selection 
of manifest variables was fundamentally founded in theory. As presented in Chapter 3, a 
number of variables have been indicated as possibly significant factors in determining 
an ES provider’s willingness to participate in a PES programme. That provides an 
empirical basis for the assumption that these attributes are an important characteristic of 
the incentive package a potential ES provider faces. As such, the approach to variable 
selection here was to include as many of those previously identified attributes as data 
availability would allow. Where the exact same variables were not available, a 
conceptually similar one was included. For example, the strength of restriction 
identified in Chapter 3 is approximated in this chapter as the type of action that is 
required: restrictive or building. The incentive variables that were included are 
presented in Table 5, along with a description of each possible categorical outcome. 
 
Although the variables were included based on theory, a statistical validity check was 
carried out. Following the initial steps proposed by Dean & Raftery (2010) the full LCA 
model was defined based on the number of classes with the lowest BIC (4 classes in this 
case). The variance of each variable was then calculated, and the variables were ranked 
by variance. Two variables—restrictive and technical assistance—had a variance less 
than 0.25. From previous research on the same data set (background research to Bennett 
et al. 2013)15, a rule of thumb for this dataset is that variables with variance greater than 
approximately 0.25 tend to substantively affect the classification estimation. As such, 
these variables with a variance lower than 0.25 were tested through an exclusion step 
(see Dean & Raftery 2010), but found worth including in the model.
                                                                                                                                          
outcomes of the variables: a particular sequence of j. The distributional assumptions of using chi-squared 
goodness of fit criteria are not met, however, if too many cells contain too few observations. One rule of 
thumb is that no more than 10-20% of the cells should contain fewer than five observations for the a chi-
square test to be used (Linzer & Lewis 2011b). In our data, nearly all of the cells had an observed count 
lower than 5, the average was 1.56. 
15 Also carried out by the Ph.D. candidate, Matthew Cranford, but focussed on institutional attributes of 
PES programmes that were of interest to the authors of the parent report (Bennett et al. 2013). 
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Table 5: Variables included in LCA of PWS incentive packages. 
Variable 
(i) 
Variable Description Categorical 
Value (j) 
Category Description 
Categorical variables – each programme can only have one categorical outcome 
None No portion of the incentive package is provided upfront 
Cost All or a portion of the incentive package is provided upfront, but for the specific purpose of covering the 
direct costs of ES provision faced by the provider 
Signing Bonus A portion of the incentive package is provided upfront without an explicit purpose (e.g. it could based on area 
enrolled in the programme) U
pf
ro
nt
 
pa
ym
en
t 
Whether all or a portion of the 
incentive is provided at the 
beginning of the agreement 
period. 
All All of the payment is provided upfront, but not related to costs 
One-off The incentive package is received once 
Intermittent All or some of the incentive package is received multiple times, with no clear schedule Ti
m
-
in
g 
The singular or recurring nature 
of the incentive 
Interval The primary incentive is received on a regular basis, typically annually  
Open-ended  
 
The agreement has no defined period 
D
ef
in
ed
 
Le
ng
th
 Whether or not the agreement of 
ES provision has a defined 
duration. Defined The agreement to provide ES has a specific length (usually expressed in years) defined in the contract or other 
signed agreement document 
Practice Incentive is provided based on ES provider carrying out agreed practices or actions  
B
as
is
 
The measure of success by which 
the incentive is provided 
Level of ES The incentive is provided based on a specific measure of ES provided 
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Table 5 (cont.): Variables included in LCA of PWS incentive packages. 
Variable 
(i) 
Variable Description Categorical 
Value (j) 
Category Description 
Binary variables – programmes can have more than one categorical outcome, so each categorical value is coded as binary 
Restrictive Agreement requires provider to reduce or stop their use of a natural resource 
A
ct
io
ns
 The type of actions the agreement 
requires the provider to undertake 
Improving Agreement requires provider to improve or augment a natural resource  
Cash Provider receives cash that is intended to be an incentive and has no specific purpose 
Technical 
Assistance 
Provider receives technical assistance or other training that directly or indirectly facilitates their ability to 
provide ES 
Non-cash Provider receives direct in-kind support to their household and/or is the beneficiary of community benefits 
provided as part of the PES programme In
ce
nt
iv
es
 The types of final benefits received by the ES provider 
Inputs Provider directly or via a cash transfer (e.g. cost-share) receives inputs required to provide ES 
 89 
In addition to the incentive attributes, the database included two further categories of 
information. The first category is basic PWS programme information (Table 6). 
Variables from this category were each separately tested as covariates in the LCA 
regression model. Due to the small sample size, there was a risk of over-fitting the 
model. As such, variables were only retained in the model if their coefficient had a p-
value < 0.05 for at least two of the alternatives in the MNL, but the BIC score for the 
model including them was lower than that without them. Additionally, only this 
category of variables was tested because a clear causal theory can be developed for each 
variable. 
 
Table 6: PWS programme information tested as covariates to the LCA through a simultaneous MNL 
Variable Data Type Possible Values 
Year Established Continuous 1973-2012 
Regional Location Categorical Africa 
Asia 
Europe 
US/Canada 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Oceania 
Country Wealth Continuous  Ln(GNI/Capita) in 2011, current USD 
[6.15-11.24] 
Additional 
Objectives 
Binary for each 
option 
Biodiversity benefits 
Carbon sequestration and/or storage 
Landscape beauty 
Welfare improvements 
 
Year established is included because the experience and discourse on PES has changed 
drastically during the past couple decades. It is reasonable to hypothesise that such 
change in experience and thinking could affect the types of incentive packages that are 
used. Similarly, experience and discourse on PES are often perceived as different 
between geographic regions, and ‘regional location’ is included to account for regional 
and cultural factors that affect incentive use that are not accounted for in other variables. 
Using country for this purpose was considered, but only a single programme, or a small 
group of highly similar programmes, represents some countries. As such, using country 
could lead to spurious results, so region is preferred. Additionally, PES and other 
sustainable development policies are typically discussed by region, so this level is most 
broadly useful. 
 
That also relates to the measure of wealth, which is the gross national income (GNI) per 
capita of the country in which an observed PES programme is located. There would 
have been perfect correlation between country and level of wealth. In contrast, although 
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there is some correlation between region and wealth, there is also diversity that can 
permit interesting results to emerge. Specifically, there is noticeable diversity in wealth 
for countries in Africa, Latin America and particularly in Asia, where the largest range 
of wealth is observed in the data set. This research has a focus on developing countries, 
so it is helpful to include the wealth effect because it is a proxy for level of 
development. As described in Chapters 2 and 3, various factors related to developing 
country contexts could affect the use of incentive type. 
 
It is also worth noting that Ln(GNI/capita16) was chosen as the measure of wealth to 
align with the World Bank country categories defined by GNI/capita: low income, 
lower middle, upper middle, and high income countries. Other measures, including a 
linear approximation based on the country categories (i.e. 0-3) and the absolute value 
(GNI/capita) were considered, but the natural logarithm transformation was chosen 
because it allows a continuous variable to be used, but one that aligns with the reality 
that there are few countries at the top end of the absolute scale of GNI/capita. The 
results are visually represented below, so this characteristic is useful for interpretation. 
The results were also tested with those other measures and found to be effectively the 
same. 
 
Whether or not a programme had environmental objectives in addition to watershed 
improvements was also considered. Data was collected for three secondary 
environmental objectives (biodiversity, carbon services, landscape beauty) and one 
social objective (welfare improvement/poverty reduction). A possible causal link is that 
programmes with specific secondary objectives would prefer different types of 
incentives. For example, those with a biodiversity objective might more often provide 
inputs to ES provision, while one with a welfare objective might more often provide 
non-cash incentives. 
 
In addition to basic information about the programme, the other additional category of 
information is the institutional context through which the incentive is transferred. It 
includes the types of actors paying for or providing ES, the motivation for paying or 
providing, and the exchange arrangement through which the incentive is transferred 
                                                
16 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/. Data from 2011 
is used because it is the latest year with an estimate for all countries represented in the PWS data. 
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(Table 7). These variables are not a priori hypothesised to be significant covariates 
because they are highly context dependent, meaning there is little basis on which to 
expect there is a consistent causal link to incentives used, and they are hard to measure. 
The example previously described of Brazil in Chapter 3, where the perception of the 
payer changed the preference of incentive type is a good example here too (IIED 2012). 
From the data available it is impossible to say how ES providers would perceive the ES 
payer being a civil society organisation compared to a public sector agency, and how 
that would change the type of incentives provided. That would require surveying the ES 
providers in each programme. As such, these variables are not included in the model, 
but are instead used to present descriptive statistics of the classes, which are defined by 
incentive attributes. 
 
4.3. Results 
As described in the previous section, an LCA was estimated where classes were defined 
based on the incentive attributes in Table 5. The LCA was simultaneously estimated 
with an MNL where the programme variables described in Table 6 are used to predict 
the probability of observing each class of incentive in a given context (i.e. with a 
specific combination of programme variables). Additional institutional variables 
described in Table 7 are outside the model, and are the basis of descriptive statistics 
developed to understand the institutional context in which different classes of PES are 
used. Each set of results—LCA; MNL and post-estimation analysis; and descriptive 
statistics of institutional context—are presented in turn. 
 
4.3.1. LCA results 
Models with 1-8 clusters were estimated including all variables over one hundred 
iterations with random starting values for the parameters. The iteration with the 
maximum log-likelihood was the final model taken to represent the population when 
modelled with that number of classes.17 Based on the BIC, the optimal model contained 
four classes (Figure 4). 
                                                
17 To ensure validity of these results, estimation for the model with the optimal number of clusters and 
models with one more or less cluster were all re-run with 500 iterations. They all indicated a best-fitting 
model with the same BIC and log likelihood as those run with only 100 iterations. 
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Table 7: Institutional variables used to develop descriptive statistics 
Variable 
(i) 
Variable 
Description 
Categorical Value 
(j) 
Category Description 
Polluter An entity that directly adversely impacts provision of watershed services 
Beneficiary An entity that has use value of the watershed services provided 
Public sector A government entity that supports the provision of public goods, but does not directly impact or use the watershed 
services being provided Pa
ye
r 
Type of actor that is 
ultimately funding 
the provision of ES 
Civil sector A civil-sector entity that supports the provision of public goods, but does not directly impact or use the watershed 
services being provided 
Mandatory Regulation requires specific actors to pay for ES provision 
Levy An specific tax or charge requires beneficiaries to pay for ES provision 
Compliance The payer has chosen to meet regulatory requirements through an incentive-based intervention Pa
ye
r 
M
ot
iv
e Type of motivation 
the payer has to 
participate 
Voluntary The payer funds the incentive on a wholly voluntary basis 
Individual An individual 
Family unit A household or farm  
Community/ Group A group of households or farms tied by social bonds, e.g. a village or farmer cooperative 
Business A private sector business 
Civil sector A civil society organisation P
ro
vi
de
r 
Type of actor that is 
receiving the 
incentive package  
Public A government agency, including municipal and city governments 
Mandatory Regulation requires specific actors to provide ES, but compensates or supports them in doing so 
Compliance Support Providers have obligations that they have chosen to meet through ES provision 
Regulatory carrot Providers have a regulated baseline, but are rewarded for achieving more 
Voluntary Providers participate on a wholly voluntary basis Pr
ov
id
er
 
M
ot
iv
e 
Type of motivation 
the provider has to 
participate 
Mission Provider has an organisational mission to provide ES (typically civil or public sector) 
Bilateral Direct transfer of resources between payer and provider (possibly with a facilitating intermediary) 
Trust Payer gives funds for provision of ES to a third party that decides how and whom to pay to provide ES 
Bank Actions to provide ES are taken prior to payment to generate a pool or bank of ES benefits or credits E
x-
ch
an
ge
  Arrangement through 
which incentive is 
transferred 
Market An arrangement in which the transaction between payers and providers occurs in a common forum 
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Table 7 (cont.): Institutional variables used to develop descriptive statistics 
Variable 
(i) 
Variable 
Description 
Categorical Value 
(j) 
Category Description 
Water rights The payer acquires water rights through purchase, donation, or both 
Easement The payer purchases conservation easements on private land 
Land purchase The payer purchase land, and all bundled rights, for the purposes of watershed conservation 
Direct invest The payer also directly carries out activities to provide ES O
th
er
 
A
ct
io
ns
 Other interventions 
included to provide 
ES 
PS-PS Point source (PS) to PS water quality trading occurs alongside the PS to non-PS trading coded as PWS 
 94 
Although models with more than four clusters were not statistically optimal, the BICs of 
the 4- and 5-cluster model are 1597.92 and 1606.85, respectively, a difference of 8.93. 
A proposed rule for differences in BIC is that a difference of two is not worth 
mentioning and a difference of >10 is strong evidence for one model being preferred 
over another (Dean & Raftery 2010). As such, the 5-cluster model is not likely to be 
statistically optimal, but cannot be completely rejected. It may contain information 
useful to the exploratory research here, and so both the 4- and 5-class models were 
carried forward. 
 
 
Figure 4: Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; solid line) and maximum log-likelihood for basic LCA 
models (i.e. without covariates; dashed line) with 1-8 clusters. 
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Table 8: Estimated parameters of the four types of incentive packages as determined by LCA, N=120. 
Values in parenthesis are based on the alternative 5-class model and presented for comparison. 
 Class!  1 1a 1b 2 3 4 
Variable "   % of 
population in 
class (!g) !  
0.36 
 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.27) 0.26 
(0.27) 
0.24 
(0.23) 
0.14 
 
None 0.41 
 
 
(1.00) 
 
(0.16) 
0.84 
 
0.89 
(0.93) 
0.00 
 
Cost 0.55 
 
 
(0.00) (0.75) 
0.00 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.00 
 
Signing Bonus 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.03) 
0.16 
 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.00 
 
Upfront 
All 0.02 
 (0.00) (0.06) 
0.00 
 
0.03 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
        
One-off 0.73 
 (1.00) (0.68) 
0.00 
 
0.07 
(0.04) 
0.88 
 
Intermittent 0.09 
 (0.00) (0.12) 
0.00 
 
0.55 
(0.57) 
0.00 
 
Timing 
Interval 0.18 
 (0.00) (0.19) 
1.00 
 
0.38 
(0.39) 
0.12 
 
        
Open-ended 0.53 
 (0.64) (0.47) 
0.65 
(0.66) 
0.83 
(0.85) 
0.00 
 
Length 
Defined 0.47 
 (0.36) (0.53) 
0.35 
(0.34) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
1.00 
 
        
Basis Practice 0.58 
 (0.00) (0.78) 
0.87 
 
1.00 
 
0.06 
 
 Level of ES 0.42 
 (1.00) (0.22) 
0.13 
 
0.00 
 
0.94 
 
        
Restrictive 0.12 
 (0.00) (0.19) 
0.63 
(0.60) 
0.58 
(0.57) 
1.00 
 
Actions* 
Improving 0.95 
 (1.00) (0.94) 
0.64 
(0.66) 
0.79 
(0.78) 
0.00 
 
        
Cash 0.50 
 (1.00) (0.28) 
1.00 
 
0.24 
(0.25) 
1.00 
 
Technical Assistance 0.50 
 (0.27) (0.56) 
0.27 
(0.28) 
0.72 
(0.75) 
0.24 
 
Non-cash 0.05 
 (0.00) (0.10) 
0.19 
 
1.00 
 
0.00 
 
Incentives* 
Inputs 0.66 
 (0.00) (0.90) 
0.00 
 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.00 
 
* For each observation, multiple categorical outcomes were possible for these variables and each category 
was coded as a binary variable. As such, the sum of the probability parameters can be >1.00. 
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With the number of classes of interest defined, all programme information identified as 
a possible significant covariate was tested in a LCA regression model18 after 500 
iterations.19 In this model, both the LCA defining the classes and a MNL regression of 
covariates predicting class membership are simultaneously estimated. Nearly all of the 
covariates were included in the final model. The binary dummy for landscape beauty 
was excluded because it was not significant for any of the MNL alternatives. 
Additionally, the binary dummy for carbon benefits was also excluded. Although it was 
found to be significant for two of the alternatives in a 4-class model, it was highly 
insignificant for the third. A 4-class model excluding it was tested and found to have a 
BIC decreased by seven, so the variable was not reintroduced. 
 
Throughout the model specification process, the LCA parameters remained close to 
stable with, for example, !g  never fluctuating more than 0.02 away from the values in 
the final model. All LCA parameters are presented in Table 8 for both a 4-class model 
(not in parenthesis) and a 5-class model (in parenthesis). The first row gives each class a 
number, simply for identification purposes in the remainder of this chapter. The second 
row presents !g, the estimated proportion of the population in each class. The columns 
under each class present pijg, estimates of the proportion of individual cases in a class 
that have the given attribute (rows 3 to bottom) as described in Table 5. 
 
As indicated by comparing the 4-class and 5-class LCA parameter values, the 5-class 
model identifies three of the same classes as the 4-class model. The largest class in the 
4-class model, however, is not well defined by the LCA parameters. Specifically, there 
are very few pijg over 0.75, and many pairs of pijg around 0.50. That indicates that there 
are no strong defining characteristics of this class; it is still highly heterogeneous. In 
place of that poorly defined class, the 5-class model identifies two well-defined classes 
without substantively affecting the parameters of the other three classes. Further, post-
estimation analysis indicates that the same observations predicted to be in class 1 under 
the 4-class model are predicted to be in class 1 or 2 in the 5-class model. One of the 
                                                
18 Also known as a “latent class model with covariates” or “concomitant-variable latent class analysis” 
(Linzer & Lewis 2011b, pg. 4) 
19 Linzer & Lewis (2011b) state that a model should be repeated a handful of times to ensure that a global 
maximum is found instead of a local maximum and demonstrate that 500 iterations is more than sufficient 
to find the global maximum (note: the authors describe this process of iterations as ‘repetitions’ of model 
estimation, reserving ‘iterations’ for the EM algorithm). 
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additional classes in the 5-class model is the smallest of all classes estimated. The 
reduced statistical power of the 5-class model is likely due to having a small amount of 
data on that particular class. That also explains why it is difficult to identify which 
covariates are significant for this class in the MNL model, which would further reduce 
the BIC measure of fit. 
 
It is believed that if more observations were included, the 5-class model would at least 
not be rejected in favour of the 4-class model and may even be preferred over it. 
Further, the exploratory nature of this work means any additional, well-defined class is 
of interest. As such, the 5-class model will be used to describe the typology of PES 
incentive packages. For post-estimation analysis, however, the 4-class model will be 
used. That is because the predicted probabilities in post-estimation are predictive in 
nature, not exploratory. They are derived from the MNL coefficients, so it is prudent to 
use those from the 4-class model that has a better statistical measure of model fit for the 
observed data. 
 
4.3.2. MNL results and post-estimation analysis 
The MNL coefficients are presented in Table 9. The raw results are mostly informative 
in identifying the programme variables that are significant for predicting different 
classes. The results, however, are all relative. They indicate the significance of any 
given variable on the probability of the base class, in this case class 1, being observed 
compared to any other class. From the MNL coefficients, predicted probabilities of 
class membership can be estimated, which are more informative than relative MNL 
coefficients. This was implemented with the aim of understanding which types of 
incentives are preferred in which regions, specifically with regard to a change in wealth 
within that region. The results for the 4-class model are presented graphically for Asia, 
Latin America and Africa in Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively.  
 
Across all predicted probabilities, the year is input as 2011, to align with the available 
data for wealth from the same year. Additionally, for each region a separate decision 
was made about whether or not to assume the typical PWS programme in that region 
had a biodiversity or welfare objective. If the majority of observed programmes from 
that region did have an additional objective, the predicted probabilities are estimated 
with that objective included. The situation for each region is indicated in the caption for 
the respective figure below. 
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Finally, for each region, the x-axis for wealth, measured as Ln(GNI/capita) in 2011 
(current USD), is constrained to the region-specific range of values observed in the data 
set. That means that Asia provides the most useful overall picture of how predicted 
probabilities for different incentives change as wealth increases. It is helpful to view the 
predicted probabilities of the other two regions, but any discussion of these should be 
more cautious. Although there are a reasonable number of observations in Latin 
America, the range of wealth is narrower than in either other region, and although the 
range of wealth observed in Africa is greater than Latin America, only four African 
PWS programmes were observed in this data set. 
 
As a robustness check, the same post-estimation analysis was done for the 5-class 
model, and although the values were different (as would be expected with different 
MNL coefficients) the figures took the same shape and demonstrated the same relative 
dynamics between the different classes. The small additional class introduced in the 5-
class model is only observed in developed countries (primarily the US) and that line of 
the graph overlapped with the line of Class 4 in all figures of predicted probabilities for 
that model. Additionally, class 1b of the 5-class model mimicked the dynamics of class 
1 in the 4-class model. That is expected since class 1b is not only larger than class 1a, 
but is the largest of all classes. 
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Table 9: Estimated coefficients for MNL of class membership, 4-class (left) and 5-class (right) models  
Variable Coefficient SE P  Coefficient SE p 
Class 2 compared to 1  Class 2 compared to 1a 
(Intercept) -0.006 0.004   -0.003 0.002  
Asia 0.566 0.364   0.313 0.297  
Europe 1.372 0.636 *  1.204 0.271 *** 
Latin America 1.718 0.349 ***  0.031 0.310  
North America -2.580 0.526 ***  -2.033 0.272 *** 
Oceania 0.003 0.019   0.030 0.090  
Ln(GNI/capita) -0.586 0.296 (*)  -1.251 0.250 *** 
Year 0.003 0.002 (*)  0.008 0.001 *** 
Poverty -1.401 0.492 **  0.189 0.312  
Biodiversity 0.653 0.431   -0.575 0.314 (*) 
Class 3 compared to 1  Class 3 compared to 1a 
(Intercept) 0.005 0.005   0.005 0.002 * 
Asia -2.734 0.224 ***  -1.045 0.190 *** 
Europe -0.316 0.002 ***  0.105 0.002 *** 
Latin America 1.673 0.223 ***  0.821 0.174 *** 
North America 0.052 0.002 ***  -0.242 0.001 *** 
Oceania -0.010 0.000 ***  -0.010 0.001 *** 
Ln(GNI/capita) -2.992 0.564 ***  -3.183 0.392 *** 
Year 0.012 0.002 ***  0.014 0.001 *** 
Poverty 1.227 0.304 ***  2.127 0.252 *** 
Biodiversity 0.776 0.344 **  0.218 0.304  
Class 4 compared to 1  Class 4 compared to 1a 
(Intercept) 0.002 0.001   0.008 0.002 *** 
Asia 0.083 0.005 ***  0.871 0.003 *** 
Europe -2.270 0.002 ***  -2.227 0.002 *** 
Latin America -0.615 0.001 ***  0.177 0.004 *** 
North America 3.260 0.005 ***  2.010 0.005 *** 
Oceania -0.142 0.000 ***  -0.085 0.000 *** 
Ln(GNI/capita) 0.869 0.019 ***  0.814 0.019 *** 
Year -0.011 0.000 ***  -0.006 0.000 *** 
Poverty 0.869 0.005 ***  -2.005 0.002 *** 
Biodiversity 4.206 0.033 ***  2.278 0.051 *** 
  Class 1b compared to 1a 
(Intercept)     -0.004 0.003  
Asia     0.370 0.253  
Europe     0.697 0.268 * 
Latin America     -1.218 0.277 ** 
North America     -0.244 0.294  
Oceania     0.104 0.087  
Ln(GNI/capita)     -0.830 0.255 ** 
Year     0.005 0.001 ** 
Poverty     1.500 0.351 ** 
Biodiversity     -1.234 0.387 ** 
BIC 1590.77  1618.849 
LL -599.10  LL -558.0811 
(*) p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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 Class 1 — — —  Class 2 
-------- Class 3 — - — -  Class 4 
Figure 5: Predicted probability of latent class membership (y-axis) in Asia relative to country wealth (x-
axis). The biodiversity and welfare dummy variables were input as 0 and 1 respectively, because 
approximately 33% of PWS programmes observed in Asia have a biodiversity objective and 72% have a 
welfare objective. 
 
 
 Class 1 — — —  Class 2 
-------- Class 3 — - — -  Class 4 
Figure 6: Predicted probability of latent class membership (y-axis) in Latin America relative to country 
wealth (x-axis). The biodiversity and welfare dummy variables were input as 1 and 0 respectively, 
because approximately 91% of PWS programmes observed in Latin America have a biodiversity 
objective and 45% have a welfare objective.  
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 Class 1 — — —  Class 2 
-------- Class 3 — - — -  Class 4 
Figure 7: Predicted probability of latent class membership (y-axis) in Africa relative to country wealth 
(x-axis). The biodiversity and welfare dummy variables were input as 1 and 1 respectively, because 
approximately 75% of PWS programmes observed in Latin America have a biodiversity objective and 
75% have a welfare objective. 
 
4.3.3. Additional characteristics 
To better describe the classes defined via LCA, the prevalence of institutional 
characteristics among the programmes included in each class were observed. As 
described above, these attributes are not included as manifest variables in LCA, but 
instead are used to provide descriptive statistics of the institutional contexts through 
which different types of incentive package are transferred (
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Table 10). 
 
4.4. A Typology of Payments for Watershed Services 
Each class of incentive package is described below, in order of prevalence in the 
database. The description of each class includes: 
1. A characteristation of the class, based on the LCA parameters in Table 8; 
2. A discussion of the institutional context in which that incentive package is 
transferred, based on the descriptive statistics in Table 10; and 
3. A noting of the prevalence of that incentive by region and country wealth, based 
on the predicted probabilities visually presented Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 
7. 
Reference to additional qualitative information is included where relevant, with 
particular reference to how the programmes describe the incentive they provide. 
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Table 10: Proportion of observed programmes predicted to be members of each class that have the stated 
characteristics. Descriptive statistics of the 4-class model presented in columns 3-6, and of the 5-class 
model in columns 7-11. Categories of each institutional variable do not add to 1 because each programme 
can include multiple categories (e.g. multiples types of payer). 
  1 2 3 4  1a 1b 2 3 4 
Polluter 0.35 0.06 0.00 0.06  1.00 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.06 
Beneficiary 0.42 0.58 0.83 0.29  0.00 0.56 0.56 0.86 0.29 
Public sector 0.28 0.39 0.66 0.76  0.00 0.38 0.41 0.64 0.76 Pa
ye
r 
Civil sector 0.09 0.03 0.41 0.41  0.09 0.09 0.03 0.43 0.41 
Mandatory 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.29  0.00 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.29 
Levy 0.09 0.23 0.45 0.00  0.00 0.13 0.22 0.46 0.00 
Compliance 0.37 0.10 0.00 0.12  1.00 0.16 0.09 0.00 0.12 Pa
ye
r 
M
ot
iv
e 
Voluntary 0.51 0.61 0.83 0.65  0.09 0.66 0.63 0.82 0.65 
Individual 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00 
Family unit 0.74 0.68 0.62 0.94  0.91 0.66 0.69 0.64 0.94 
Community/ Group 0.19 0.23 0.41 0.18  0.09 0.25 0.22 0.39 0.18 
Business 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.12  0.36 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.12 
Civil Sector 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.18  0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.18 P
ro
vi
de
r 
Public 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.53  0.09 0.22 0.03 0.00 0.53 
Mandatory 0.00 0.29 0.14 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.28 0.14 0.00 
Compliance 
Support 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Regulatory Carrot 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.00  0.36 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Voluntary 0.77 0.65 0.86 1.00  0.73 0.78 0.66 0.86 1.00 
Pr
ov
id
er
 M
ot
iv
e 
Mission 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.12  0.09 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.12 
Direct 0.53 0.61 0.24 0.59  0.36 0.63 0.59 0.21 0.59 
Trustee 0.33 0.39 0.76 0.24  0.18 0.34 0.41 0.79 0.24 
Bank 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.12  0.18 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.12 E
x-
ch
an
ge
 
Market 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.06  0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Water rights 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82  0.00 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 
Easement 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.06  0.09 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.19 
Land Purchase 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.00  0.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.16 
Direct Invest 0.16 0.10 0.45 0.29  0.09 0.46 0.29 0.09 0.19 O
th
er
 
A
ct
io
ns
 
PS-PS 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
 
4.4.1. Cost-share 
The majority of observations predicted to be in the first class of the 4-class model are 
also predicted to be in class 1b of the 5-class model. In class 1b, ES providers directly 
or indirectly (via an earmarked cash transfer) receive the inputs (pijg = 0.90) they need 
to carry out improving actions (pijg = 0.94). The class is seemingly the least well 
defined, but still has some dominant characteristics. Most programmes: provide 
payment upfront, to cover costs (pijg = 0.75); pay based on practice (pijg = 0.78); and 
make one-off payments (pijg = 0.68). 
 
The slightly increased heterogeneity is also demonstrated in the descriptive statistics, 
where not many clear characteristics emerge to describe the context in which these 
types of incentives are used. Yet despite this slightly increased heterogeneity indicated 
by the LCA parameters and descriptive statistics, the programmes predicted to be in this 
class are all clearly similar in that they are focused on providing the inputs to or 
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offsetting the costs of ES provision. Most call the incentives they provide grants or cost-
share. Some call the incentive ‘rewards’, but that reward is competitively allocated to a 
proposed conservation or sustainable development project. One notable descriptive 
characteristic is that although most providers provide ES voluntarily, this class has the 
highest percentage of programmes with providers doing so because it is their mission to 
improve natural resources. That is a further indication of the grant or cost-share nature 
of this type of incentive package. 
 
Cost-share incentives are primarily observed in use in developed countries. Some have 
been observed in developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and particularly Asia,  
but not in low-income countries. The predicted probabilities for Asia illustrate how the 
expected prevalence of cost-share incentives increases with a country’s wealth. 
 
4.4.2. Regular payments 
Class 2 is best defined by the fact that all members of this class include cash incentives 
(pijg = 1.00) received on an interval basis (pijg = 1.00). Most incentive packages in this 
class do not include an upfront payment (pijg = 0.84), but if they do, it is as a 
standardised signing bonus (pijg = 0.16), for example, a small upfront payment based 
on the area the ES provider enrols in the PWS programme. Additionally, the majority of 
payments are made for a change in practice (pijg = 0.87) believed to provide ES, only a 
few are based on a specific measure of ES (pijg = 0.13). Notably, those programmes 
predicted to be in this class that do pay based on a specific measure, do not do so to 
purchase an offset, credit, or tradable permit (as in class 1a, see ‘Offsets’ below). 
 
Exploring the data further, the programmes in this group tend to call the incentive they 
provide a payment, compensation for opportunity costs, or subsidy. The descriptive 
statistics also indicate that this class fits well with the most broadly cited concept of 
PES programmes (following Engel et al. 2008; Wunder 2005): it is primarily user-
financed or government-financed; paying households and farmers, or community 
groups that will funnel incentives to their members; via a direct bilateral arrangement or 
trustee (typically a trust fund). 
 
Based on the MNL results and predicted probabilities, it is clear that this class of 
incentives is relatively prevalent (compared to the other classes) in Asia (specifically 
China), Latin America, and to some degree in Europe too. Based on the predicted 
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probabilities in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, its use appears to increase with wealth. 
Experience in Asia, however, indicates that its use might peak at a wealth corresponding 
to middle-income countries. 
 
4.4.3. Reciprocity 
Class 3 is defined by all incentive packages including one or more non-cash benefits 
(pijg = 1.00) and being provided based on a change in practice (pijg = 1.00). To reiterate, 
a transfer of cash might occur between the payer (or intermediary) and provider, but the 
ultimate intent of it is to fund other in-kind or community benefits. This is also the class 
with the highest rate of technical assistance (pijg = 0.72) and lowest rate of cash 
incentives (pijg = 0.24). The majority of incentives are based on agreements of 
undefined length (pijg = 0.83) and have no specific upfront payments (pijg = 0.89). 
That said, timing is unclear for these incentives. The highest rate of intermittent 
incentives (pijg = 0.55) occurs in this class. Qualitatively, based on experience coding 
the data, it can be said that even for the programmes with interval timing, it is unclear 
when receipt of the incentive occurs in relation to meeting the environmental condition 
(i.e. carrying out a specific practice).  
 
The programmes in this group tend to call the incentive they provide compensation, 
benefits sharing, rewards, or benefits. Some in Latin America even refer to their 
programme as a reciprocal arrangement. Yet they are delivered through a seemingly 
similar institutional context to the regular payments in class 2 and incentives in class 3: 
funded primarily by users and government; to households and farmers, or community 
groups that will funnel incentives to their members; via a direct bilateral arrangement or 
trustee (typically a trust fund). 
 
The MNL results highlight that this class has the strongest positive association with an 
additional poverty objective, and strongest negative association with country wealth 
levels. The predicted probability results clearly illustrate the latter, indicating that even 
within Asia, Latin America and Africa, the prevalence of class 3 incentives drops 
drastically as wealth increases.  
 
4.4.4. Leases 
Class 4 incentives are a strictly United States (US) phenomenon to date. They are 
defined by upfront incentives (pijg = 1.00), paid for restricted resource use (pijg = 
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1.00), based on a measure of ES (pijg = 0.94). Most incentives are one-off (pijg = 0.88) 
and all are provided through an agreement of defined length (pijg = 1.00). All incentives 
are cash (pijg = 1.00) with some additional technical assistance (pijg = 0.24). 
 
It is clear from the programmes predicted to comprise this class, that these incentives 
are all water leases. The majority of leases are implemented for the purposes of 
restoring in-stream flows, often with the concurrent aim of improving conditions for 
biodiversity. These incentives are typically offered alongside offers from the ES buyers 
to purchase water rights. While the acquisition of water rights is also used in Australia, 
no examples of leasing were identified outside the US. Although property rights are not 
transferred from the ES provider to ES buyer in leases, the arrangement means the ES 
provider’s rights are contractually restricted during the agreement period, which could 
potentially be enforced through legal recourse. Indeed, a strong legal system may be 
necessary for this type of incentive to be implemented successfully.  
 
The MNL and predicted probability results reflect the fact that leases are often used for 
the benefit of biodiversity and primarily occur in the US. No examples of leases in 
developing regions were identified. 
 
4.4.5. Offsets 
The smallest class of incentives is Class 1a. Incentives in this class are defined clearly 
as one-off (pijg = 1.00) cash incentives (pijg = 1.00) paid based on the level of ES (pijg = 
1.00) provided by improving actions (pijg = 1.00). Notably, these payments appear 
strongly conditional, and are not paid before (pijg = 1.00) actions are implemented.  
 
The programmes predicted to be in this class call their PES arrangement a credit or 
offset. Polluters paying as a compliance option, with some room for NGOs to also 
contribute, fund all the programmes. The vast majority pay a family unit, or specifically 
farmers, and this is the class where the programme is most likely to include point source 
(PS) to PS pollution trading. Generally, this class includes programmes where non-point 
sources (NPS) of pollution (e.g. farms) implement good resource management practices 
(e.g. agricultural best management practices), thereby reducing their pollutant loads. 
The PS (e.g. wastewater treatment plants) pay for that reduction to be credited to them, 
thereby offsetting their own emissions into waterways. Paying for offsets are only 
observed in the United States and New Zealand in this data set. 
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4.5. Discussion 
In this chapter, a typology of PES for the provision of watershed services was 
developed. The 4-class model is a better fit as measured statistically by the BIC, and so 
is used to more accurately estimate predicted probabilities based on the data used here. 
For describing the typology, however, the 5-class model is more informative. Table 11 
provides a summary of the types of incentive package identified by the 5-class model, 
from most to least prevalent in the dataset used to develop this typology. 
 
The primary caveat to this study is that it is very difficult to understand what proportion 
of PWS programmes are captured and how representative the dataset is of the all 
programmes globally. Despite this difficulty, the study is based on the largest inventory 
of PWS programmes yet assembled and is believed to include most of the PWS 
programmes globally. Only a few programmes are known but excluded: less than 1% of 
programmes included in the database were excluded based on a lack of data. The main 
concern is which programmes were not known when the dataset was compiled. Since 
the data was collected, only a few programmes, representing less than 10% of the 
sample, have been identified. 
 
Table 11: Summarising the general characteristics of PES used for watershed services 
Type Primary benefit Required Action Agreement Attributes 
Cost-share Inputs and 
often technical 
assistance 
Practice-based, improving 
resource base 
Not well defined, but tends 
to be upfront payment (to 
cover cost of inputs) and 
one-off 
Regular 
Payments 
Cash incentive Practice-based, for either 
restricting resource use or 
improving resource base 
Payments at regular 
intervals, rarely including a 
signing bonus 
Reciprocity Non-cash 
benefits and 
technical 
assistance 
Practice-based, for either 
restricting resource use or 
improving resource base 
Often unclear timing of 
incentive, through an 
agreement of undefined 
length, rarely including a 
clear upfront incentive 
Leases Cash incentive ES-based, for restricting 
resource use 
All payments upfront and 
for a defined period of time, 
usually one-off, but 
agreement can re-start once 
completed 
Offsets Cash incentive ES-based, for improving 
resource base 
All payments one-off, with 
no upfront payment. 
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A key area of difficulty in terms of identifying programmes is ensuring that a 
programme where PES is one of multiple components is included. Specifically, this 
would relate to water leases, which are often within larger programs of water 
acquisition, and offsets, which are often part of a PS-PS credit trading programme. 
These two types of PWS, however, have been identified, so if there is a lack of 
representation, it has not hindered typology development. If more water acquisitions 
and water quality trading programmes were included, they would likely reinforce the 
types already identified. 
 
Broadly, if more programmes of any kind were included, they may potentially introduce 
additional incentive types, but would also reinforce the types identified. It is highly 
unlikely that the types defined here would be lost in a larger dataset. Throughout the 
analysis, the classes identified through the LCA were highly robust, with approximately 
the same parameters always identified.  
 
Based on that analysis, two types of incentive were identified that are predominantly 
used in the United States. The first, leases, has arisen due to the historical influence of 
westward expansion, where water rights in the Western US are based on the prior 
appropriation doctrine, colloquially known as “first in time, first in right” (Hansen 
2010). A similar basis of water rights exists in Australia, but programmes identified in 
Australia prefer to outright acquire water rights, rather than lease them (and so are not 
included in analysis). The second type of incentive, offsets, is also nearly exclusive to 
the US where PS to NPS water quality trading is accepted. Relevant programmes 
identified in Australia generally only permit PS to PS trading, while Europe has not yet 
embraced water quality trading (Greenhalgh & Selman 2012). Although offsets 
comprise the smallest class of incentives in relation to water, the class would likely be 
much larger if the research were broadened to include PES programmes with primary 
objectives of providing carbon services or improving biodiversity status. Both carbon 
and biodiversity offsets are a common type of PES. 
 
Beyond these incentive types that are US-centric (at least when used to incentivise the 
provision of watershed services), three others incentive types were identified as the 
most prevalent and are widely-occurring across the world: cost-share, regular payments, 
and reciprocity.  The second, regular payments, is in many ways the archetypal 
incentive described in original conceptualisations of PES (i.e. annual, conditional, cash 
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payments), but also reflects the reality of implementing PES, since payments in this 
class are made mainly based on resource users implementing practices believed to 
provide ES. There are also some unique elements. Specifically, although the majority of 
cases in this class are voluntary from the perspective of the provider, some are 
mandatory. These are cases in China where areas have been zoned for public benefit 
provision, and although they receive compensation, previous users of the resource face 
required restrictions on future use of the resource. Although the incentive looks like a 
typical PES, and it is compensating for opportunity costs, the context in which it is 
provided is not voluntary and so the programmes provide a different institutional 
context. 
 
In contrast, reciprocal incentives broadly fit the dominant institutional conceptualisation 
of PES in terms of payer (user- or government-financed), provider (mainly land users), 
voluntary nature of the programme, and exchange mechanism (direct or via 
government/civil intermediary). The incentive itself, however, in many ways 
incorporates the critiques of earlier conceptualisations of PES with which class 2 aligns. 
Researchers and PES practitioners with experience in developing countries questioned 
strict conditionality (Farley & Costanza 2010; van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010), 
highlighted the demand for non-cash benefits (Asquith et al. 2008; Leimona et al. 
2009), and even called specifically for a concept of PES that is reciprocal or otherwise 
supportive in nature (Asquith 2011; Farley & Costanza 2010; Kosoy et al. 2008; van 
Noordwijk & Leimona 2010; Vatn 2010): all characteristics of this incentive type.  
 
Regarding cost-share incentives, their prevalence and global dispersal is striking. 
Compared to the other types of incentive, this type is relatively heterogeneous, but 
clearly still has a common primary purpose of supporting ES providers in their own 
endeavours to provide ES. It is notable that this is the class with the highest proportion 
of providers that are mission driven, and also the class with the highest proportion of 
programmes that also directly invest in the provision of ES. It appears to be the 
incentive type that most aligns with the proposed PES paradigm of co-investment in 
stewardship (CIS) (van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010). Additional support for this comes 
from the fact that Van Noordwijk & Leimona (2010) derived their paradigms of PES 
from experience in Asia, and as indicated by the predicted probabilities, cost-share 
incentives are not at all uncommon in the region. 
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With a focus on developing countries, it is natural to ask if any statements can be made 
about the use of different incentives as countries develop. The evidence from Asia is 
most reliable in this regard and clearly indicates a transition through the three incentive 
types observed in developing regions as a country’s wealth increases. The predicted 
most-prevalent type of incentive transitions from reciprocity, through regular payments, 
to cost-share as country wealth increases. Evidence from Africa and Latin America is 
not as clear in this regard, but is in general alignment. The regions, respectively, provide 
a snapshot of the first stage where relatively lower income countries prefer reciprocity 
and the second stage where middle-income countries have transitioned to a greater use 
of regular payments. 
 
4.6. Summary 
This chapter is a novel contribution to the PES literature. It is the only attempt to date to 
define a typology of PES based on statistical methods. Following the transition to define 
PES as incentives (as recognised in Chapter 2) it is also the first typology, based on any 
method, to define types of PES as types of incentives, rather than institutional 
arrangements. That is highly valuable to inform future research on and design of PES, 
as well as the other studies presented in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
At a theoretical level, the study has highlighted that discussion of incentives and 
institutional arrangements for PES programmes should be better defined. That is not to 
say they should ever be completely decoupled, as institutional arrangements could 
influence the use of incentives. It is to conclude, however, that the research and practice 
of PES must not overly conflate the two considerations in policy design. The study has 
highlighted both how the same type of incentive can be transferred through highly 
contrasting institutional arrangements (i.e. regular payments for ES providers’ 
mandatory actions in China) and how very different types of incentive can be 
transferred through very similar institutional arrangements (i.e. comparing regular 
payments and reciprocal incentives). 
 
Not recognising these results related to incentives and institutions risks trying to 
compare apples and oranges, a concern highlighted by Pirard (2012) in his typology of 
MBIs for BD and ES. More worryingly, it risks not learning lessons from programmes 
that might seem dissimilar, but actually have a strong commonality in the incentives 
they provide. For example, cost-share programmes are observed in lower-middle 
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income countries in Asia, as well as the US and Europe, and beyond. Highlighting these 
similarities and differences is highly policy relevant. It permits a clearer comparison and 
learning between programmes that are similar, or that use similar incentives. It also 
helps highlight how PES programmes are different, and these differences should be 
clearly understood, particularly when most research on PES is based on case studies, 
many of which are qualitative and descriptive. Understanding similarities and 
differences in incentive type and institutional context are critical to appropriately taking 
lessons from one case and applying them to another. 
 
Finally, the transition of incentive prevalence as country wealth increases cannot be 
ignored. It is difficult from this data to identify specific mechanisms through which 
wealth might change incentive use. Yet, evidence from the literature, particularly 
related to market constraints and behavioural considerations as described in Chapter 3, 
aligns closely with this result. For example, the lowest income countries likely have the 
highest market constraints, in addition to related barriers such as low technical capacity 
of ES providers and low legal/enforcement capacity, which would predispose them to 
prefer the use of non-cash and technical assistance benefits in reciprocal arrangements. 
 
Future analysis should include additional PWS programmes. Ideally, the data would 
strive to include programmes representing a larger number of countries, particularly in 
Africa, and a broader range of wealth in Africa and Latin America. What may be more 
interesting, and inherently provide such variation, would be to include PES programmes 
focussed on different ES, such as carbon services or biodiversity conservation. This 
expanded data could provide more clarity on any link between wealth and incentive 
choice, and develop more evidence on different programme objectives and incentive 
choice. 
 
Yet even with the current dataset, significant and interesting results emerge that are 
novel and useful to PES research and practice. The remaining analytical chapters will 
note the incentive type being explored, with further discussion left for the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY 
 
Credit-based Payments for Ecosystem Services: Evidence 
from a choice experiment in Ecuador 
 
5.1. Introduction 
As described in Chapter 3, it was initially argued that direct performance-based 
payments were the most cost-effective form of incentive to induce the provision of ES 
and conservation of biodiversity (Ferraro & Kiss 2002; Ferraro & Simpson 2002). 
Where market constraints exist, however, indirect interventions that reduce them may 
be preferred by both the agent and the principal (Groom & Palmer 2010). In addition to 
economic constraints, current PES discourse continues to reference research from 
psychology and behavioural economics that explores the efficacy of direct incentives, 
with particular concern for the potential crowding-out of intrinsic motivation to provide 
ES (Farley & Costanza 2010; Muradian et al. 2010; Sommerville et al. 2009; Vatn 
2010). The key issue with alternative interventions, such as those that relieve market 
constraints, is that historically most have not been conditional and so do not ensure that 
conservation will occur (Wunder 2005). Thus the key innovation that is required is to 
incorporate ES conditionality into the reduction of market constraints. 
 
The research presented here uses discrete choice analysis (DCA, described in Chapter 1) 
to explore incorporating an environmental conditionality into what would previously be 
considered an indirect intervention for conservation that reduces market constraints. A 
choice experiment (CE) was carried out in Ecuador to explore local farmers’ 
preferences for a novel incentive: credit-based PES (CB-PES). The research adds to the 
literature in two ways. First, it is one of the few studies that empirically explores 
interventions to induce land use change through reducing market constraints in a PES 
context, and provides the first empirical research of incorporating strong conditionality 
into the provision of credit. Second, it also adds to the small literature that has used 
DCA to explore policy design from the perspective of the agent supplying the desired 
policy outcome. 
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Following this introduction, section 5.2. reviews the relevant literature on PES on credit 
and environmental outcomes. Section 5.3. describes the case study and analysis carried 
out, section 5.4. explains the results of that study, and section 5.5. discusses the broader 
implications of those results. Section 5.6. concludes. 
 
5.2. Toward Credit-based Payments for Ecosystem Services 
The proposal of CB-PES is motivated by two key considerations. The first is that 
market constraints can influence land-use decisions. Where conventional land-use is 
environmentally degrading, a transition to less damaging practices usually requires 
capital inputs. If capital constraints exist, it is arguably harder for a transition to the less 
degrading practices to occur, even in the presence of direct, demand-side incentives. 
The second consideration is motivation crowding. There is broad concern that direct 
payments can crowd out intrinsic motivations of the agent to provide positive 
environmental externalities, and thus reduce the effectiveness of those incentives. A 
credit-based intervention may be easier to align with the intrinsic motivations of the 
agent, reducing the risk of crowding-out or other negative consequences of non-
separability. Both of these issues are described in detail in the literature review in 
Chapter 3. As such, the remaining literature review specific to this chapter is focused on 
mechanisms linking credit and environmental outcomes.  
 
There is a small, but growing, literature on the interactions of credit and natural 
resource management (NRM) that is rooted in microfinance literature and relevant here. 
It is understood that microfinance institutions (MFIs) can impact NRM by effecting 
changes in physical, human, and social capital that interact with natural resources 
(Anderson et al. 2002). More recently, there is increasing attention paid to strengthening 
the link between credit provision and specific environmental outcomes. Allet (2011) 
identified five strategies that MFIs employ to manage their environmental impact. 
These strategies are not specific to MFIs and have been developed and used by financial 
institutions of varying size. They are adopting environmental policies, reducing the 
institution’s internal ecological footprint, managing portfolio environmental risks, 
providing green microcredit, and providing environmental non-financial services. 
Across the latter three strategies we observe different approaches to linking the 
provision of credit to environmental outcomes. Environmental organisations are also 
starting to implement these strategies, as well as introducing some of their own 
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innovations to link credit provision with environmental outcomes. The resulting five 
approaches are summarized in Table 12. 
 
The approaches established by financial institutions make credit provision weakly 
conditional on environmental outcomes. The first is selective lending, either through 
negative screening to exclude certain activities or borrowers with high environmental 
risk (Allet 2011), or by positive selection of inherently environmentally friendly 
enterprises, such as ecotourism projects (e.g. Conservation International 2013; 
EcoEnterprises Fund 2012; Proyecto CAMBio 2013). The second approach is 
concessional lending, which expands on selective lending, such that financed activities 
receive favourable lending terms (e.g. Annex 2 in Greiber 2009). Selective lending and 
concessional lending are the two types of lending typically considered green credit (or 
green microcredit) (Allet 2011) and would be considered an indirect intervention to 
improve conservation via the mechanism of reducing market constraints (Ferraro & 
Kiss 2002; Groom & Palmer 2009). The third approach is where access to credit is not 
coupled to the inherent environmental friendliness of the activity to be financed, but 
conditional on meeting environmental covenants, which may or may not be directly 
related to the financed activity, in order to access credit (Anderson et al. 2002; 
Assunção et al. 2013; Senaratna Sellamuttu et al. 2008; Yuhe & Yi 2000).
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Table 12: Approaches for incorporating an environmental condition into lending, with examples of micro- and meso-scale lending connected to biodiversity and ES. 
Environmental Conditionality Approach Description Example 
Strength Coupled to 
activity 
Reward 
Selective 
Lending 
Credit is only provided to inherently 
environmentally friendly activities 
There are a number of funds that selectively lend to 
biodiversity-friendly SMEs, with a particular focus on 
Latin America (Conservation International 2013; 
EcoEnterprises Fund 2012; Proyecto CAMBio 2013). 
Weak Yes Access to 
credit 
Concessional 
Lending 
Selected activities receive credit with 
reduced interest rates 
In 2000-2006, the former German Technical 
Cooperation Agency (GTZ) funded a short-term project 
in Colombia where farmers were given low-rate loans to 
finance the uptake of sustainable agricultural practices, 
with the ultimate aim of reducing eutrophication of the 
Fúquene Lagoon (Annex 2 in Greiber 2009). 
Weak Yes Favourable 
terms 
Covenants Meeting environmental conditions 
are either a requirement to become a 
member of a lending institution or 
are included as covenants in the loan 
contract 
Resolutions 3545 and 3583 published in 2008 by the 
Brazilian National Monetary Council made access to 
rural credit in the Amazon Biome conditional on 
borrowers adhering to environmental (and legal) 
regulations (Assunção et al. 2013). 
Weak No Access to 
credit 
Environmental 
Mortgage 
The total capital available for lending 
is correlated to and changes 
depending on the condition of the 
natural capital to be conserved 
Originally suggested by Mandel et al. (2009). Potential 
pilot projects are being scoped and assessed in Peru, 
Ecuador and Madagascar (Josh Donlan, personal 
communication). 
Strong No Access to 
credit 
Credit-based 
PES 
The repayment on credit is reduced 
only after confirmation that an 
environmental condition is met 
Wetlands International’s Bio-rights programmes provide 
credit that converts to PES (i.e. -100% interest rate) once 
conditions for mangrove or wetland restoration are met. 
They have implemented projects in Asia and Africa (van 
Eijk & Kumar 2009; Wetlands International 2009). 
Strong No Favourable 
terms 
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There are two approaches developed by conservation organizations that attempt to 
create a stronger conditional link between credit provision and an ecological objective. 
The first is to link access to credit to conservation outcomes. Mandel et al. (2009) 
proposed an environmental mortgage, where a community development fund would be 
capitalized to an amount that is correlated to the value of natural capital that the 
community is charged to protect. The natural capital acts as collateral against the value 
of the fund, and if it degrades, the size of the community fund would be decreased. 
Activities financed by the fund would not specifically face an environmental 
conditionality, but would need to be environmentally neutral or positive to ensure that 
they do not degrade the natural capital collateral. 
 
Credit can also be conditionally linked to environmental outcomes by making the cost 
of credit dependent on good environmental behaviour. An environmental condition can 
be included in the loan contract, such that the interest rate is lowered if the condition is 
met but is not lowered if the condition is not met. In other words, if the condition is met, 
a portion of the annual repayment is forgiven, either directly by the credit provider or by 
a third party paying a portion of the repayment. We call this a credit-based payment for 
ecosystem services (CB-PES) (Figure 8). Concessional lending ex-ante subsidizes 
credit and only lends to activities that are inherently environmentally friendly. In 
contrast, CB-PES is rewarded ex-post, if, and only if, the environmental condition is 
met. Additionally, the activity to be financed can be decoupled from the environmental 
objective, although as with environmental mortgages, it should at minimum be 
environmentally neutral. 
 
An intervention like CB-PES could be useful for both market and behavioural reasons. 
Where other interventions either aim to reduce market constraints or directly reward 
provision of ES, CB-PES links these two objectives. It is the only known intervention to 
include a clear conditional link between ES provision and the reduction of market 
constraints where success of meeting the condition is determined ex-post. Additionally, 
by reducing market constraints and being voluntary in nature such that the potential ES 
provider must choose to take out a loan, CB-PES intuitively fits the framing of a 
supportive incentive. 
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Figure 8: Conceptualising credit-based payments for ecosystem services (CB-PES). 
 
The examples that can inform CB-PES fall on either end of a spectrum of conditionality 
(Figure 8). At zero conditionality, some lenders include requirements for environmental 
actions in their contract (e.g. plant a tree) (Allet 2011; Anderson et al. 2002) or require 
that borrowers adhere to environmental regulation (Assunção et al. 2013) in order to 
access credit, but if the condition is not met, there is no change in the required 
repayment, and no other immediate reward or punishment. That is the covenants 
approach to linking credit and environment described above and in Table 12. 
 
At 100% conditionality, if the environmental condition is met, the loan is converted to 
PES and does not have to be repaid, which has been carried out in Asia and Africa (van 
Eijk & Kumar 2009). If the condition is not met, however, the loan must be repaid as 
normal.   
 
Between these two ends of the spectrum lay possible mechanisms where credit is 
borrowed and if an environmental condition is met, the interest rate and thus the amount 
that must be repaid is lowered. To the best of our knowledge, only convertible (i.e. 
100% conditional) loans have been implemented, and these projects have reported 
success (van Eijk & Kumar 2009; Wetlands International 2009). 
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5.3. Methods 
As discussed so far, for both economic and behavioural reasons, CB-PES could be a 
desirable incentive in various contexts, particularly in developing countries. To further 
explore this proposition, we carried out a CE to ex-ante assess the preferences for loan 
terms by small-scale agriculturalists living in an area where market constraints exist. 
Through implementing a CE among local households, we aimed to 1) understand 
farmers’ preferences for loan attributes, including an environmental conditionality, 2) 
comment on CB-PES as an incentive, and 3) understand the broader dynamics of 
providing CB-PES. 
 
5.3.1. Case study of the Intag Zone of Ecuador 
The Intag Zone of Northern Ecuador (Figure 9) ranges over approximately 1500-4000 
meters above sea level and includes the range of ecosystems seen across the Andes, 
from sub-tropical forest to páramo, including 44,000 hectares (Ha) of cloud forest 
(HidroIntag 2009). The loss of cloud forests is detrimental to society as they are a 
source of many ES, and are particularly valuable for their high level of biodiversity and 
regulation of water quality and supply (Bubb et al. 2004). Agricultural expansion is the 
greatest threat to cloud forests across Latin America (Bubb et al. 2004) and in the 
Ecuadorian Andes (Wunder 1996). Along with timber collection, agricultural expansion 
has led to large-scale deforestation in Intag. With much of the forest already removed, 
the average annual deforestation rate from 2001 to 2006 was 1.92% in Cotacachi 
Canton (Intag covers 75% of this canton) and 2.47% across the entire Imbabura 
Province in which Intag sits (Peck 2009). Both rates are greater than the average across 
Ecuador during the same time period (FAO 2010). 
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Figure 9: Map of Ecuador (left) indicating the location of Imbabura Province, and map of Imbabura 
Province (right) with the ecological boundary of Intag-Manduriacos ecological zone overlaid. Light green 
on the map of Imbabura (right) indicates the areas where the ecological zone reaches outside of the 
political boundary. The zone is often referred to simply as Intag, because the vast majority of the 
population in this area lives in the Intag River Watershed, which approximately comprises the Eastern 
half of the ecological zone. Following that convention, we refer to the entire ecological zone as Intag. 
Maps reproduced with permission from Kocian et al. (2011). 
 
The vast deforestation in Intag has led to a lower level of biodiversity habitat and 
multiple ES, which are valuable on local to global scales. Efforts to better conserve 
biodiversity and provide higher levels of ES in Intag have led to a recent focus on 
increasing agroforestry practices on private land. In Intag an uptake of such practices 
helps to decrease pressures on forests, in part through broader acceptance of protected 
areas (Mecham 2009). Additionally, ecologists and agricultural specialists working in 
Intag believe that agroforestry in the region directly provides key ES, in particular 
increased biodiversity habitat, increased carbon sequestration and storage, reduced soil 
erosion and consequent siltation of waterways, and increased water regulation. Not only 
are those services immediately valuable, but they also support climate change 
adaptation in the region. Climate change is predicted to increase annual rainfall in the 
zone,20 and practices of forest conversion and monocropping have left a highland 
landscape with much less tree cover than is natural. Without improved land-use 
practices, increases in rainfall will increase runoff, reducing the productivity of 
farmland and increasing siltation in waterways, with potentially severe implications for 
food security. 
 
In addition to these environmental benefits, over the long run, properly designed 
agroforestry systems are more profitable than most conventional agricultural systems in 
the region. Table 13 presents the net present value (NPV) of three production systems 
that are not conventional in Intag, but produce greater levels of the environmental 
                                                
20 As indicated by the climate scenarios in ‘Proyecto de Adaptación al Cambio Climático a través de una 
Efectiva Gobernabilidad del Agua en el Ecuador (PACC),’ http://www.pacc-ecuador.org/. 
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benefits noted above. They are shade-grown coffee, mixed agroforestry, and sustainable 
forestry patches included in the farm mosaic.21 The NPV calculation includes all costs 
associated with establishing these new systems. For comparison, the NPV of ongoing 
cash flows associated with two conventional systems are also presented. The most 
prevalent conventional system is rotating maize and bean production, which provides 
two crops that can be consumed or sold by households. Sugar cane production is the 
only conventional system in the area that can compete in terms of income with the 
agroforestry systems. It is less prevalent throughout the region though, due to its high 
costs and the fact that it produces a cash crop and is not as useful for subsistence 
production. Two notable features of the comparison are that the agroforestry systems 
are more profitable than the most prevalent conventional systems, but will not be 
profitable for a few years after implementation. Even though shade-grown coffee and 
mixed agroforestry break even in year 2 and 3 respectively, neither reaches full 
productive capacity until year 4. Financing is needed to help bridge this temporal gap in 
profitability. 
 
Table 13: Summary of cash flow models of shade-grown coffee, mixed agroforestry, and sustainable 
forestry systems in the Intag River Region of Ecuador, compared to two conventional agricultural 
systems. Net present values (NPV) are per hectare, and assume that introduced production systems are 
implemented to a high quality.  
Production System NPV 15 yearsc 
NPV 
25 yearsc 
Break Even 
Year 
Shade-grown coffeea $ 15,571 $ 33,205 2 
Mixed agroforestrya $ 25,909 n/a 3 
Sustainable forestrya $ 22,571 $ 25,071 12 
Mixed beans and corn (low)b $ 3,815 $ 5,180 n/a 
Mixed beans and corn (high)b $ 10,604 $ 14,399 n/a 
Sugar caneb $ 20,925 $ 28,413 n/a 
a Data provided by local agricultural expert (Jose Cueva, personal communication) 
b Annual cash flow estimates from (Martinet 2006) as cited in (Kocian et al. 2011) 
c Discount rate of 5% 
                                                
21 Nair (1993) explains that for many years, the working definition of agroforestry at the International 
Centre for Research in Agroforestry (ICRAF) was “land-use systems and technologies where woody 
perennials (trees, shrubs, palms, bamboos, etc.) are deliberately used on the same land-management units 
as agricultural crops and/or animals, in some form of spatial arrangement or temporal sequence.” (pg. 14). 
ICRAF is now also known as the World Agroforestry Centre, and on its website presents a broad 
definition of agroforestry as simply “integrating trees into agriculturally productive landscapes”. 
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Households in Intag have increasingly practiced agroforestry since 1998 with the 
establishment of the Asociación Agroartesanal de Caficultores Rio Intag (AACRI), a 
local coffee cooperative. A UK-based NGO, Rainforest Concern, is also carrying out a 
conservation project in the region to create the Chocó-Andean (ecological) Corridor 
including a 5,000-hectare area known as Paso Alto. A management plan for Paso Alto 
was developed by Rainforest Concern, AACRI, and ALLPA (a partner organisation to 
AACRI), and agreed with the Ecuadorian Ministry of the Environment. Promoting 
sustainable agricultural practices is a significant part of that plan. Under the project, 
over 40 farms were provided finance to convert a one-hectare parcel of their land to 
agroforestry (mainly shade-grown coffee), with the aim that they would see the benefits 
and independently convert further land to agroforestry (Mecham 2009). 
 
To date, however, the support for agroforestry practices has been primarily grant-based. 
Further, agroforestry is still only practiced by a minority of households, and only on a 
small fraction of the land of those households. A major reason is that broad market 
constraints are present in the zone: Intag is remote and the terrain is tough, making it 
difficult to get supplies in and goods out. Post-production constraints are being reduced 
through cooperatives in the region that either purchase crops directly (as with AACRI 
and coffee) or are developing projects to support getting crops to market, such as an 
Intag store in the nearest major market town. Pre-production constraints, however, 
remain more difficult to remove. Specifically, although households in the region are 
familiar with credit, it is not readily available in the region, and local agricultural 
specialists believe that to be constraining the uptake of agroforestry systems (Arisman 
2012; Cranford et al. 2010; Jose Cueva, personal communication). As predicted by 
Groom and Palmer (2010), with these market constraints in place, donors (the ES 
buyers) are interested in the potential for linking credit provision and conservation 
activities. 
 
5.3.2. Survey and choice experiment 
A survey of households in Intag was carried out from August to mid-October, 2010. 
The sample was collected by local extension workers, which due to very difficult terrain 
could only be done through opportunistic sampling, but with some guidance. Extension 
workers focused on communities situated on the south-eastern side of the Intag River, 
lying between the river and the Chocó-Andean corridor project noted above. Since some 
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of the communities in this part of Intag have been engaged in shade-grown coffee or the 
specific pilot programme to promote agroforestry as part of the Paso Alto management 
plan, the extension workers’ aim was to collect a sample of households with a range of 
agroforestry experience. The extension workers also strived to collect surveys across a 
range of altitudes to ensure the sample included a diversity of ecosystem contexts and 
farm compositions that represented the zone and the Andes more broadly. 
 
The main body of the survey collected information about each household’s social 
characteristics, land ownership and use, crop production, livestock rearing, forest-
related activities, and non-farm income. The latter portion of the survey collected 
information on their experience with and views towards agroforestry, which was 
followed by a CE. The CE was designed to determine a household’s preference for the 
attributes of a loan, with particular focus on an environmental condition. The 
hypothetical situation presented was as realistic as possible and involved a conversation 
between the survey implementer and respondent that covered these key points: 
1) An organization could provide credit to some families in your community 
2) Credit could be borrowed for any purpose 
3) The organization would like to see an increase in agroforestry 
4) Some of the loans may have a lower interest rate and a condition that you must 
convert one hectare of your land to agroforestry 
5) That lower interest rate, however, is only available if you are able to meet the 
condition 
6) If you do not meet the condition, you will have to pay back the loan at normal 
interest rates (which are 12-18% in surrounding areas). 
 
The attributes of the alternatives were basic loan characteristics, and the attributes and 
levels were determined through meetings with extension workers and local agricultural 
experts. The four attributes presented in the choice experiment (Table 14) were loan 
size (in US $), maturity (years), conditionality (a binary dummy variable), and annual 
interest rate (%). To reduce cognitive burden, the average annual payment associated 
with the loan was listed as a value in US $ alongside the interest rate as a percentage.22 
 
                                                
22 The annual repayment amount shown on the choice card and throughout this paper always assumes a 
normal amortizing loan. 
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Table 14: Attributes and levels for choice experiment in Intag agroforestry survey. 
Attribute Levels 
Loan size $1000, $2500, $5000 
Maturity Short (1-2 years), Medium (3-5 years), Long (6-10 years) 
Conditionality 1 if conditional loan, 0 if unconditional loan 
Interest rate 0%, 5%, 12%, 18% 
 
The levels of the loan size and maturity were determined by ensuring that the middle 
level of each matched the amount of investment needed to meet the environmental 
condition and the timeframe over which a positive return on shade-grown coffee (the 
most prevalent and popular form of agroforestry) would be realized. That information 
was based on the business models of agroforestry developed by local agricultural 
experts (Table 13). One level lower and higher than these middle levels were also 
included to ensure that the hypothetical loans could be decoupled from the 
environmental condition and used for other activities. The lower loans were too small 
and too short to provide the total support for conversion to any form of agroforestry, 
while the larger levels were too large and too long to be appropriate for the single, 
specific use of converting one hectare to agroforestry.23 
 
A full factorial design of the attributes produced 72 possible loans, which were reduced 
to 16 using an orthogonal design. From this fractional factorial design, a shifting 
procedure24 was used to create 16 pairs of 32 alternatives. Although this CE design 
approach is sometimes not viewed as the most efficient, it was deemed appropriate here 
due to the relatively small sample size and lack of a-priori information about the 
parameter values of the econometric model (Ferrini & Scarpa 2007).  
 
Due to the condition attribute being binary, the shifting technique naturally produced 16 
choice sets where there was always one conditional and one unconditional loan. The 
                                                
23 The extension workers implementing the survey were permitted to discuss the costs of agroforestry 
with any respondent that required it. It is assumed that respondents that had previous experience with 
agroforestry or knowledge of it (63% said they understood what agroforestry was) would have reasonable 
knowledge of the costs associated with conversion to agroforestry practices.  
24 The levels of a given attribute are qualitatively coded in rank order (e.g. 1, 2, 3 for an attribute with 
three levels). Each attribute is shifted one level up, where if the top level is reached, on the next shift the 
level returns to 1. 
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order of the two loan alternatives on each card was randomized (i.e., A, B vs. B, A), 
meaning that the CE was unlabeled. In addition to the conditional and unconditional 
loan options, each choice set included an option to not take any loan (an opt out/status 
quo option). An example of a choice card used during the survey is presented in Figure 
10.  
 
The sample included 345 households in 50 of the approximately 76 rural communities 
in Intag25  (Kocian et al., 2011). Due to the nature of the non-linear models used to 
analyze choice experiments, precisely determining the optimal sample size depends on 
having a-priori information about the values of the model parameters (Hoyos 2010), 
which did not exist in this case. Nonetheless, rules of thumb are available to provide 
some confidence that a sample is large enough to produce stable estimates of the 
parameters. (Orme 1998) as cited in (Rose & Bliemer 2008) reports the rule of thumb 
presented in Equation 3. 
 
Would you prefer:  OPTION A OPTION B NEITHER  ? 
 A B 
Amount 
 
 
 
 
 
Payback 
Time 
Long 
(6-10 years) 
Medium 
(3-5 years) 
Condition 
You have to convert one hectare of 
your land to agroforestry 
None 
Interest 
0% 
(pay between $833 and $500 during 
each year of the payback time) 
5% 
(pay between $918 and $577 during 
each year of the payback time) 
Figure 10: Example of choice card in choice experiment for CB-PES. 
 
                                                
25 The idea of a “community” in this case refers to any named collection of households. Some are large 
villages, others are a small collection of houses. 
$5000 
 
$2500 
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Equation 3: Estimating the minimum sample size for choice experiments.  
 
 
where L is the largest number of levels for any attribute, J is the number of alternatives 
per choice set, and T is the number of choice sets for each respondent. In this study, for 
the initial 30% of respondents, only one randomly assigned choice set was answered in 
order to ensure the choice experiment was functioning properly, which it was. For the 
remaining 70% of the respondents, four choice sets were randomly assigned without 
replacement, and no other changes to experimental design were made. In relation to 
minimum sample size, the average number of choice sets per respondent was used for T 
(i.e., 2.95), and the rule of thumb indicates a minimum sample size of 226, which is 
66% of the sample collected. Additionally, there is no standardized information 
available on the number of households in Intag, however it is broadly cited that there 
were approximately 17,000 inhabitants in the region around the time of this study 
(HidroIntag 2009; Kocian et al. 2011). Based on the number of people reported 
dwelling in each household surveyed here, approximately 7.6% of the population of 
Intag was accounted for in this survey. 
 
5.3.3. Econometric framework and model specification 
A mixed logit (MXL) model, also known as a mixed multinomial logit or random 
parameters logit, was used to analyze the CE. The MXL was introduced by (Boyd & 
Mellman 1980; Cardell & Dunbar 1980), developed through a sizeable literature, and 
demonstrated as able to approximate any logit model for discrete choices under utility 
maximizing behaviour by (McFadden & Train 2000). We implemented a CE where 
each respondent was presented with multiple choices sets. Under this condition, the 
random utility function with random parameters takes the form in Equation 4 (following 
Train 1998). 
 
Equation 4: Random utility function with random parameters. 
 
 
where U is the utility of alternative j (j = A, B, C) in choice set t (t = 1, …, 4) to 
household n (n = 1, …, N). xjtn is a vector of explanatory variables that are observed and 
include attributes of the alternatives, socio-economic characteristics, and potentially 
descriptors of the decision context. !n and "jtn are stochastic influences not observed by 
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the analyst and "jtn is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (IID) 
extreme value type 1. Under a multinomial logit (MNL) model, ! is fixed across the 
population, but in a random parameters specification, the vector !n is expressed as the 
population means b and individual deviations #n from those means to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity. The vector #n is correlated over alternatives and choices 
situations and can take various distributional forms across the population. The form can 
be different for each x leading to a mixed distribution when estimating the econometric 
model. 
 
The model is operationalised using a logit formula, the outcome of which is integrated 
over the mixture distribution of # to determine the probability of the respondent n 
choosing alternative j. The integral does not take a closed form and is estimated using 
simulation techniques. Estimation was carried out in Stata 11 using the mixlogit 
command (Hole 2007). The final results from MXL are the estimation for each 
parameter of 1) the population mean, and 2) the standard deviation of the population 
around that mean, dependent on the distributional form the analyst applies to that 
parameter. 
 
The MXL model was chosen here in order to remove the three restrictive assumptions 
of the more prevalent MNL models.26 Specifically the MXL 1) does not assume 
independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and so permits unrestricted substitution 
patterns, 2) can easily be adjusted to account for correlation in unobserved factors over 
choice situations, and 3) incorporates random parameter estimates to account for 
preference heterogeneity among respondents (Train 2009). 
 
The first point is important because early exploration of the data for this paper 
compared a nested logit to a MNL. It was found that there are unobserved factors that 
are constant over the unconditional and conditional loan alternatives that need to be 
accounted for. The MXL relaxes the IIA assumption and an analogue to a nesting 
structure can be incorporated into MXL by addition of a dummy variable for the 
hypothesized nest (Train 2009), in this case a dummy variable for loan was included. 
                                                
26 A MNL was also estimated for this data and the results agree with those of the MXL: the sign of the 
MNL parameters are all the same as the sign of the mean of the parameter in the MXL. Additionally, all 
interactions included in the MXL were significant to at least 90% in the MNL. 
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Related to the second point, to account for repeated choices by each respondent, 1) the 
mixed logit model is specified so that the random parameters vary over individuals, but 
held constant over the choice sets each individual was presented with, and 2) the 
unconditional probability used for maximum simulated likelihood estimation is based 
on the probability of the sequence of choices made by an individual, not the probability 
of each choice treated separately (Train 2009). 
 
Finally, the third point is testable using a MXL. In our case we found that the standard 
deviation of two attributes and the loan dummy variable entered the model with 
statistical significance, indicating they could be modelled as random to account for 
unobservable preference heterogeneity among households. Some preference 
heterogeneity is observable and introduced in the model through interactions between 
household characteristics and loan attributes. 
 
Table 15: Variables included in the models of loan choice. Attribute averages are calculated over all 
chosen alternatives and over chosen alternatives that were loans, household characteristic averages are 
calculated across all 345 households in the sample. 
Variable 
Type 
Variable Description Mean 
[Min, Max] 
(All Chosen 
Alts.) 
Mean 
[Min,  Max] 
(Only if 
Loan 
Chosen) 
Loan =1 if choice alternative is a loan 0.87 
[0, 1] 
1 
[1, 1] 
Size of 
loan 
 In US$, scaled by 1/1000 2387.30 
[0, 5000] 
2785.19 
[1000, 5000] 
Payback 
period 
 Maturity of loan, in years 3.66 
[0, 8] 
4.27 
[1.5, 8] 
Condition =1 if agroforestry condition applied 0.41 
[0, 1] 
0.48 
[0, 1] C
ho
ic
e 
A
ttr
ib
ut
es
 
Interest  
rate 
Annual rate as a %, i.e. 5% = 5 3.49 
[0, 18] 
4.07 
[0, 18] 
Afford 
loan 
=1 if household’s annual gross cash 
income is greater than size of 
chosen loan  
0.75 
[0, 1] 
0.71 
[0, 1] 
Titled 
land 
=1 if a household claims title to 
some land 
0.63 
[0, 1] 
Crop 
value 
US$ value of all crops produced in 
2010  
3912.56 
[0, 132650] R
es
po
nd
en
t 
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
Children Number of children in household 1.37 
[0, 7] 
 
The final variables used in the regression are presented in Table 15. In order, they 
include a dummy variable for the hypothesized nest of loan discussed above, the four 
loan attributes, and four respondent characteristics included as interactions with 
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different loan attributes. The loan dummy variable was included to account for latent 
demand for credit, irrespective of whether or not it was conditional credit. The loan 
attributes are all included, to model respondent preferences for different credit terms. 
Finally, respondent characteristics were only introduced into the model specification 
process if there was a possible economic reason for them to interact with specific loan 
attributes. These interaction terms were introduced using a blocking approach in a 
nested logit specification, and those found to be statistically significant were maintained 
in the MXL models only if they passed a log-likelihood test compared to a model 
excluding them in the nested logit specification. Further detail of the estimated 
parameters associated with these interaction terms and economic reasoning for their 
inclusion is provided in Section 5.4.2. 
 
One characteristic that was included through an interaction term, crop value, is a 
constructed variable, calculated using Equation 5. 
 
Equation 5: Constructed variable of crop value. 
 
 
where V is the total value of all crop production by a household n, P is the farm-gate 
sale price of crop c that household n reported, and Q is the quantity of c that household 
n produced. Where a household did not report selling any portion of Qc, and so did not 
report a farm-gate sale price, P is the average of the prices reported by all other 
households that did report selling a portion of Qc. 
 
The aim of this constructed variable is to provide a proxy to account for the loss or gain 
a household would receive from carrying out the environmental condition, and in the 
final model it is interacted with the condition attribute. Crop value is a complex variable 
that includes information about factors such as amount of land, productivity of land, 
availability of inputs to production, a household’s knowledge of and ability to farm, and 
the market price that a household could receive for crops. Where crop value is low, 
these underlying variables are likely to be smaller, indicating a greater opportunity cost 
and a lower chance of profiting from the agroforestry condition. Where crop value is 
high, however, it indicates that one or more of these underlying variables are higher and 
the household’s opportunity cost of the condition is lower, and in many cases even 
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negative (i.e. a gain from the condition). It is expected that households will have a 
negative preference for the condition overall, but that households with high crop value 
will have a less negative preference. 
 
5.4. Results and Post-estimation Analysis 
5.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The survey implementers were instructed to try and speak with male heads of 
households, who have the most say over household and land-use decisions. The average 
respondent was male, 50 years old, and with 5.7 years of education, corresponding to 
primary school in Ecuador. Their household included 2.4 adults and 1.3 children (<18 
years of age). Regarding land, 63.8% of households claimed legal title to a portion of 
their land. On average, households claimed some form of tenure over 15.4 hectares of 
land, 3.6 of which was set aside for cultivation and 6.1 of which was actively used for 
pastureland. A summary of these descriptive statistics and comparison to data from 
censuses or other studies is provided in Table 16. The median (mean) annual gross cash 
income for 2010 was $4,014 ($6,736) and the median (mean) portion of that income 
from crops was 63% (55.5%).27 No data was identified with which to compare 
household income. 
 
In relation to agroforestry, 63% of respondents stated they understood what agroforestry 
was before an explanation was given. After that explanation, 90% of respondents 
reported preferring agroforestry to traditional agriculture and 57% stated an economic 
reason why they believed agroforestry was better. The primary reason given was that 
agroforestry incorporates a diversity of crops that helps smooth production and income 
over the year. All households believed agroforestry to be more environmentally 
friendly. On average, each household currently has 1.4 Ha of land under a use that could 
be considered agroforestry, but if lending was available and affordable, they would on 
average like to convert an additional 2.9 Ha, with the greatest demand for silvopasture 
at 1.7 Ha. 
 
                                                
27 The most prevalent source of non-farm income was still related to agricultural practices in the region: 
57% of households reported that one or more household members earned income by providing manual 
labor on other households’ farming land. 
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Table 16: Select descriptive statistics of the sample compared with information from censuses and other 
studies. INEC (2010) is the population census in the same year as this study, carried out by Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC). INEC (2000) is the most recent agricultural census, carried out 
by INEC and Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca (MAG). Arisman (2012) is a 
study focused on agroforestry in Intag that also used an opportunistic sample of 41 households and tried 
to survey the head of each household. 
Comparison Description (units) Sample Value Value Scale Source 
Respondent 
   Average Age (years) 50 51 Intag Arisman 
(2012) 
Household 
   Average household size 
(people) 
3.7 4 Intag Arisman 
(2012) 
   Titled land (% of HH) 64 70 Imbaburaa INEC (2000) 
   Average farm size (Ha) 15.4 14.7 Cotacachib INEC (2000) 
  17 Intag Arisman 
(2012) 
Population/Sample 
   Achieved 1o education (%) 77 67 Intag (men)c INEC (2010) 
   Achieved >1o education (%) 8 20 Intag (men)c INEC (2010) 
   Under 18 years of age (%) 38 42 Intag INEC (2010) 
a Intag is located in, but comprises a small area of, Imbabura province. 
b Intag includes seven parishes, six of which are located in and comprise ~75% (by area) of Cotacachi 
county. 
c 93% of survey respondents were male, making the comparison to men only more meaningful than a 
comparison to the entire mixed population. 
 
5.4.2. Model results 
Results from three mixed logit models are presented in Table 17. The first model 
includes only the attributes of the CE and estimates their coefficients as random 
parameters, the second is the same as the first, but also includes interaction terms. The 
third model includes the interaction terms, but only models the alternative attributes as 
random parameters if their standard distribution entered significantly into model 2. 
 
 131 
Table 17: Mixed logit model of loan choice, estimated via simulation with 1000 Halton draws. 
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Attribute Element Coeff. S.E. p Coeff. S.E. p Coeff. S.E. p 
Mean 2.653 (0.340) *** 1.871 (0. 335) *** 1.867 (0.327) *** 
St. Dev.a 1.309 (0.282) *** 1.249 (0. 302) *** 1.250 (0.280) *** 
Loan 
(dummy variable) 
* # Children in HH    0.427 (0. 126) *** 0.423 (0.124) *** 
Mean 0.207 (0.042) *** 0.145 (0. 043) *** 0.146 (0.042) *** 
St. Dev.a 0.149 (0.095)  0.103 (0. 142)     
Size of loan ($) 
(scaled by 1/1000) 
* HH can afford loan    0.293 (0.059) *** 0.291 (0.057) *** 
Mean 0.355 (0.092) *** 0.673 (0. 138) *** 0.672 (0.137) *** 
St. Deva 0.063 (0.352)  0.007 (0. 213)     
Payback period (years) 
(transformed by Ln) 
* Titled land    -0.512 (0. 162) ** -0.509 (0.161) *** 
Mean -0.150 (0.117)  -0.800 (0. 308) ** -0.808 (0.306) ** 
St. Dev.a 0.654 (0.250) ** 0.721 (0. 246) ** 0.737 (0.241) ** 
Condition 
*Ln (Crop value)    0.107 (0. 044) * 0.107 (0.043) * 
Mean -1.416 (0.080) *** -1.382 (0. 079) ** -1.387 (0.076) *** Interest rate (%) 
(multiplied by -1) St. Dev.b 0.555 (0.079) *** 0.517 (0. 077) *** 0.523 (0.074) *** 
Simulated LL -706.57159 -678.14348 -677.99478 
LR !2 53.21 49.79 50.08 
Total Choice Sets 1017 1017 1017 
Respondents (N) 345 345 345 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
a Normal distribution 
b Lognormal distribution
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The results confirm that there is demand for credit as indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficient for the loan dummy variable. Importantly, the parameter for loan 
is modelled as random to account for unobserved characteristics of respondents that 
would influence their preferences related to borrowing. Some of that heterogeneity is 
observed in the interaction of loan and the number of children in a household. The more 
children, the greater the probability a household will demand a loan. That is likely 
because these households have a future to invest in and include more individuals able to 
work to help ensure the loan is repaid. 
 
In contrast, the environmental condition has a negative association with choice of an 
alternative. Without considering interactions (Model 1), there appears to be preference 
heterogeneity for the condition because although the population mean is not statistically 
different from zero, the standard deviation is. In Models 2 and 3, an interaction of the 
condition and the natural logarithm of the value of a household’s crop production was 
introduced, to account for the potential opportunity cost or gain associated with meeting 
the condition. It reveals that the mean main effect of the condition on choice of 
alternative is negative, and that households with higher crop value demonstrated a less 
negative, and possibly positive preference for the condition. The result it predicts is 
intuitive, but important to have empirically shown: that the uptake of CB-PES will 
depend on a household’s predicted cost or gain associated with the environmental 
condition proposed. 
 
Finally, interest rate has a negative association with the respondents’ choice of 
alternative. As is expected and common in CEs, respondents demonstrate a negative 
utility for the attribute associated with them making a payment. It is highly unlikely that 
any respondent would demonstrate a positive utility for interest rate, so the random 
parameter for this attribute is specified in the model to integrate that assumption. 
Following common practice, this was done by multiplying the variable by negative one 
and then modelling it using a lognormal distribution (Hensher et al. 2005). That 
negative transformation is reversed for all post-estimation analysis. 
 
5.4.3. Welfare change associated with environmental conditionality 
The choice experiment method is consistent with utility maximization and demand 
theory, so when the parameter estimates of the model are obtained, welfare measures 
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can be obtained (Bateman et al. 2002). The marginal change in welfare of an attribute is 
usually expressed as a monetary value and found by taking the ratio of the coefficient of 
that attribute over the coefficient of a price attribute (Hoyos 2010). Here, the same basic 
approach is applied to measure the welfare change associated with the attribute of the 
environmental condition, but uniquely and appropriately to the context, the valuation 
attribute used is annual interest rate of a loan. The resulting marginal willingness-to-pay 
(MWTP) can be interpreted as the increase or decrease in interest rate that a household 
would require in order to accept a change in the relevant loan terms. 
 
There are a number of specific approaches used to estimate the MWTP in an MXL 
model when one or more of the parameters is random (Sillano & Ortúzar 2005). The 
simplest and most common method is to use only the mean of the random parameters in 
any associated MWTP calculation. It is preferable to use all of the information 
associated with the random parameter and simulate the MWTP (Hensher et al. 2005), 
but that leads to estimates further from zero and with larger confidence intervals. Both 
methods were carried out and the results are presented in Table 18. 
 
The most relevant portion of these results is the MWTP for the agroforestry condition 
(MWTPAFC). Prior to further discussion of that result it should be noted that although 
agroforestry may be more profitable in the sense that it increases cash flow per hectare, 
a household’s decision to transition to agroforestry would depend on a number of other 
considerations and potential opportunity costs. For example, to convert one hectare of 
land to agroforestry, a household with only a small area of land under tenure would 
forgo a larger proportion of their land available for subsistence food production 
compared to a household with more land. So although agroforestry may have a higher 
NPV based on cash flow analysis, the transition to agroforestry will be more or less 
desirable based on household characteristics. That broader idea is what is being 
considered when we discuss change in welfare associated with the condition, which is 
estimated as the MWTP for the condition. When that MWTP is negative, it implies that 
a household perceives its total costs of conversion to agroforestry as relatively high, so 
would require a relatively lower rate of repayment in credit in order to compensate for 
that. 
 
The results indicate that, holding all else equal, the main effect of including the 
environmental condition is to lower the WTP for a loan by approximately 3% of the 
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annual interest. That effect is reduced and potentially reversed by a positive MWTP 
associated with the interaction of condition and Ln(Crop value), such that for every unit 
increase on this scale, a household’s WTP for a conditional loan increases by 
approximately 0.4% annual interest rate. 
 
Table 18: Mean marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for a loan where annual interest rate (%) is the 
price parameter. Simulations carried out with 1000 Halton draws. 
Attribute Parameter MWTP [95% C.I.]c 
Simulated MWTP 
[95% C.I.]d 
(main effect)a 6.516 
[4.484, 8.549] 
 7.773 
[-2.011, 20.824] 
Loan 
(dummy variable) 
* # Children in HHb  1.478 
[0.643, 2.313] 
 1.761 
[0.977, 2.940] 
(main effect)b  0.511 
[0.226, 0.796] 
 0.609 
[0.338, 1.016] 
Size of loan ($) 
(scaled by 1/1000) 
* HH can afford loanb  1.015 
[0.632, 1.398] 
 1.209 
[0.671, 2.018] 
(main effect)b  2.347 
[1.391, 3.303] 
 2.796 
[1.551, 4.667] 
Payback period (years) 
(transformed by Ln) 
* Titled landb  -1.777 
[-2.866, -0.688] 
-2.117 
[-3.533, -1.174] 
(main effect)a  -2.822 
[-4.908, -0.736] 
-3.347 
[-10.826, 2.392] 
Condition 
* Ln(Crop Value)b 0.375 
[0.081, 0.670] 
 0.447 
[0.248, 0.746] 
a Simulated MWTP has a random parameter in numerator and denominator 
b Simulated MWTP has a random parameter in denominator only because the numerator is either an 
attribute modelled with a fixed parameter or an interaction term (which were all modelled as fixed 
parameters). 
c Estimated via delta method 
d Estimated via Krinsky-Robb method 
 
Understanding these population moments is very useful, but can disguise underlying 
complexity in the MWTP distribution. To fully explore the MWTPAFC, another 
simulation was carried out that 1) jointly considered the main and interaction effects for 
the condition, and 2) used the sample population data for crop value to relate it to the 
case study. The results presented in Figure 4 show a more complex picture of 
MWTPAFC in this case study. It indicates the existence of three groups with varying 
levels of crop income and resulting MWTPAFC. One group has high crop income and a 
positive MWTPAFC for the condition, one has lower crop income and a negative 
MWTPAFC, and the final group has very little or no crop income and a large negative 
MWTPAFC. The characterization of these groups is presented in Figure 11 and Table 19.  
The overarching result, however, is that the majority of the population has a small 
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positive or small negative MWTPAFC, with an estimated small negative mean MWTPAFC 
across the entire population. 
 
 
Figure 11: Histogram of the proportion of the sampled population with a given marginal willingness-to-
pay for the agroforestry condition (MWTPAFC), measured as a change in annual interest rate of a loan (%). 
Categories on the x-axis are .1% ± 0.05% change in annual interest rate. The results presented are from a 
simulated MWTP incorporating the attributes: condition, condition*Ln(Crop value), and interest rate of 
the loan. It was simulated using 1000 Halton draws and the crop value data of the 345 households 
sampled. 
 
Table 19: Three subgroups with differing MWTP for the agroforestry condition (MWTPAFC), measured as 
a change in annual interest rate (%). 
Group (+)MWTPAFC (-)MWTPAFC (- -)MWTPAFC Whole 
Sample 
Mean MWTPAFC 0.53% -0.58% -3.31% -0.27% 
Max. MWTPAFC 1.99% -0.01% -3.26% 1.99% 
Min. MWTPAFC 0.02% -1.98% -3.39% -3.39% 
Portion of 
Population 
46.38% 46.09% 7.54% 100.00% 
 
5.4.4. Simulating demand 
The predicted utility to each respondent of alternatives with specified attribute levels 
can be simulated based on the MXL coefficients, from which the rate of demand for 
conditional and unconditional loans can be estimated. The actual uptake of such loans 
will depend on a number of other factors, but simulating demand helps to understand 
households’ preferences for and perceptions of these loans. Table 20 presents the 
estimated demand for a conditional, $2,500, four-year loan where the reference market 
interest rate for unconditional loans is 12%. That reference rate is the low-end of market 
rates in areas surrounding the case study area, but is presented here for illustrative 
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purposes and deemed reasonable since it is assumed that measures to ensure credit 
repayment, such as joint liability or collateral requirements, would be put in place and 
permit this more reasonable rate. 
 
Table 20: Simulating demand for loans with an agroforesty condition, based on a $2500, 4-year loan in a 
choice set with 1) the same unconditional loan at 12% interest, or 2) no-loan status quo. The second to 
last column indicates the portion of the CB-PES that corresponds to compensation for the marginal 
change in welfare associated with the PES condition, averaged based on expected participation in CB-
PES at a given interest rate. The last column is the same statistic, but averaged over the entire sample. 
Interest 
Rate 
(%) 
Predicted 
Demand 
(%) 
CB-
PES 
($/year) 
CB-PES as % 
of annual loan 
repayment 
Mean % of CB-
PES that 
compensates self-
selecting 
participators 
Mean % of CB-
PES that 
compensates across 
whole sample 
12 34.89 - - - - 
10 45.50 34.41 4.18 3.51 13.28 
8 56.15 68.28 8.30 2.43 6.59 
6 66.31 101.61 12.34 2.11 4.35 
4 75.15 134.36 16.32 1.94 3.23 
2 82.26 166.53 20.23 1.79 2.56 
0 87.61 198.09 24.07 1.65 2.11 
 
Following the third row of Table 20 where the interest rate for a conditional loan is 8%, 
we find that given this scenario, it is predicted that 56% of respondents would like to 
receive a conditional loan. Compared to a 12% market rate, the conditional 8% interest 
rate corresponds to a CB-PES payment of $68.28 per year, which would be awarded as 
a decrease in the amount that the borrower had to repay each year of the loan as long as 
the environmental condition was being met. 
 
During the simulations for predicted demand, each household’s MWTP for the 
condition was also simulated (following the same approach as in Figure 11 and Table 
19) as an estimate of that household’s welfare change associated with accepting the 
agroforestry condition. Multiplying the probability of household n accepting a 
conditional loan by their MWTP for the condition gives an expected change in welfare 
associated with the condition for each household, under the given loan conditions. The 
mean expected MWTP is presented in column five as a percentage of the CB-PES.  
 
There are two key results revealed by Table 20. First, when the interest rate offered if 
the condition is met is 8%, the CB-PES represents only 8.3% of the total annual loan 
repayment. Even at lower rates (thus larger CB-PES), the ES payment always represents 
a small portion of total loan repayment, meaning that under this scenario, households 
are willing to take on the majority of the financial burden of borrowing a conditional 
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loan. That indicates that households do demand credit and providing it, even with an 
environmental condition, would be relieving a market constraint. The result aligns with 
the fact that the coefficient for a loan, irrespective of whether or not it is conditional, in 
the econometric model is positive and significant, indicating latent demand for credit. 
 
Second, based on the expected household demand for conditional loans (i.e. assuming 
self-selecting participation in a CB-PES program) at an 8% interest rate, only 2.4% of 
the CB-PES represents compensation for the on-average negative marginal change in 
welfare a household anticipated to experience due to the agroforestry condition. That is, 
on average across the 56% of households demanding loans with these terms, only $1.66 
of the entire $68.28 CB-PES is compensation for an anticipated decrease in welfare 
associated with carrying out the environmental condition. For comparison, assuming 
non-self-selecting participation was feasible and implemented, the mean (negative) 
MWTPAFC across the entire population could be covered by only 6.6% of the CB-PES 
under this scenario. That is 3-fold higher than a self-selecting scenario, but still only a 
small portion of the CB-PES. The general result is the same for all scenarios simulated: 
only a small portion of the CB-PES would be compensation for the opportunity costs of 
meeting the agroforestry condition. 
 
Table 21: Comparing the annual loan repayment if the condition is met to the repayment required if the 
condition is not met, expressed in both $/year and as a % of reported 12-month gross cash income. Both 
are estimated as a mean expected value of the portion of the population that it is predicted would accept 
CB-PES at the interest rate given. Based on a $2500, 4-year loan. 
Condition is Met Condition is Not Met (12% Interest 
Rate) 
Interest 
Rate 
Repayment 
($/year) 
Repayment as % 
of Gross Cash 
Income 
Repayment 
($/year) 
Repayment as % 
of Gross Cash 
Income 
12% $823 12.65% $823 12.65% 
10% $787 15.67% $823 16.32% 
8% $755 18.64% $823 20.28% 
6% $721 21.25% $823 24.16% 
4% $689 23.22% $823 27.64% 
2% $657 24.45% $823 30.51% 
0% $625 24.98% $823 32.72% 
 
A final key consideration is to look further at the debt burden that households are 
hypothetically being asked to accept if they participate. Table 21 compares the annual 
repayment that a household would be liable for with conditional loan interest rates 
ranging from 12% to 0%. The liability is expressed in both $/year and as a percentage of 
gross cash income reported for the 12-month period prior to the survey being 
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implemented. The percentage does not account for the entire population, but is a mean 
expected value representing only the portion of the population that it is predicted would 
demand conditional loans with the given loan terms. 
 
It is difficult from this data to say what an acceptable level of liability is, but an annual 
repayment of 20-30% of annual income is reasonable compared to microcredit 
examples in other countries where smaller loans (on the scale of $100’s, rather than 
$1,000s) are taken out and repaid multiple times a year in communities with lower 
average annual income than this case study (Collins et al. 2009). More importantly, the 
increase in liability if the CB-PES condition is not met, is not very large for all 
reasonable scenarios. If a household were deemed able to handle the liability in the first 
place, then the change associated with the undesirable outcome of not meeting the 
conditionality generally represents only a few percent of gross annual income. As such, 
the surprise liability if the condition were not met does not appear overly burdensome 
relative to the total liability a household would be accepting. 
 
5.5. Discussion 
5.5.1. Summary of case study 
The Intag Zone represents a credit-constrained context where it is believed that 
increasing the use of agroforestry helps save the forested area that remains, provides 
increasing levels of biodiversity and ES on agricultural land, and supports adaptation to 
climate change. Our choice model and simulation results indicate that if CB-PES were 
implemented, where the magnitude of payment is approximately $70 per hectare per 
year with a condition of converting one hectare of land to agroforestry, more than half 
of households would be interested in accepting conditional loans of $2,500 paid back 
over four years. A payment of that size is in line with other case studies in Latin 
America.28 For example, a case study of implementing the World Bank’s RISEMP in 
Nicaragua, reported a maximum PES of $75/ha/yr over 4 years (Pagiola et al. 2007). In 
                                                
28 No comparable case studies were identified of PES for agroforestry actions in Ecuador. For reference, 
however, one case of PES for reforestation in Ecuador paid approximately $40-$60 per hectare 
annualized over 3 years (Wunder & Albán 2008) and the country’s national program for forest 
conservation, Socio Bosque, pays $30/ha/yr for the first 50 hectares of forest cover under contract (Fehse 
2012). 
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Costa Rica, the national PES program paid $1.30/tree in an agroforestry system, spread 
over three years (FONAFIFO 2009); when the same terms are applied to the cash flow 
models of a mixed agroforestry system in Intag (Table 13) it equates to an average 
$100/ha/yr over the first five years. Most interestingly, under these CB-PES conditions, 
the participating households are willing to accept over 90% of the loan repayment 
burden and only 2.4% of the CB-PES compensates for the negative average welfare 
change associated with meeting the agroforestry condition.  
 
5.5.2. CB-PES as incentive 
The case of Intag does not allow a direct comparison between CB-PES and more 
conventional cash PES, but it does illustrate some key points about CB-PES as an 
incentive. By incorporating strong conditionality into credit provision, CB-PES 
explicitly links the dual objectives of overcoming market constraints and providing a 
relatively direct reward for the provision of ES. It is inherently designed to support both 
environment and development objectives, rather than create trade-offs, which is 
something that all stakeholders should prefer. 
 
The key empirical result is that CB-PES fits key criteria of a good incentive as proposed 
from behavioural studies. The results indicate that under any reasonable scenario, 
potential ES providers are willing to take on the majority of the burden of a conditional 
loan repayment and only a small proportion of the CB-PES reward is considered 
compensation for meeting the environmental condition. CB-PES is thus an incentive 
that potential ES providers would perceive as supportive, rather than controlling (Frey 
& Jegen 2001). Related to that, CB-PES fits the paradigms of PES as co-investment 
(van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010) or a more reciprocal arrangement (Farley & 
Costanza 2010) that many PES academics and practitioners consider the best ways to 
frame PES, particularly in a developing country context, and especially in Latin 
America. 
 
It is recognised that the case study presented here was where the condition aligned with 
a broad agenda in the area, the increase of agroforestry. Nonetheless, even for 
households that are expected to have a negative welfare change associated with 
agroforestry, the results hold. When the interest rates of conditional loans are so low 
that it is estimated that nearly 90% of the households would demand them, those 
households would have to accept 75% of the loan repayment and the compensatory 
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portion of CB-PES would continue to only represent a small portion of the reward. In 
effect, the CB-PES would be primarily working to make borrowing more affordable 
instead of compensating for opportunity costs of the environmental condition. 
 
Further, because the reward is time constrained and is really a reward that lowers a 
burden, rather than increases a payment, it is less likely to induce long term shifts in 
endogenous preferences. In practice, this would reduce the risk of entitlement among 
ES providers, which is a concern of direct cash PES highlighted by ecological and 
institutional economists (Farley & Costanza 2010; Vatn 2010). 
 
5.5.3. Implementing CB-PES 
In analyzing the dynamics of CB-PES the empirical results highlight considerations for 
its implementation.29 Both the cost to the ES buyer and demand for conditional loans of 
the ES provider are sensitive to the reference market interest rate. A higher market 
interest rate would imply a greater demand for the conditional loan at any given interest 
rate. That is, if the reference rate were 18%, the demand for conditional loans would be 
greater than the 56% illustrated in this study when the reference rate was 12%. That 
dynamic is intuitive: if the unconditional reference rate is higher, households will have a 
greater willingness to accept the environmental condition in order to receive a lower 
interest rate. Any organization wanting to implement CB-PES would need to determine 
what the appropriate and/or feasible reference interest rate for loans is before being able 
to understand the cost of such a program and willingness of households to accept 
conditional loans. 
 
Our case study and model also illustrate that the demand of an individual household for 
a conditional loan is dependent on their expected loss or gain associated with carrying 
out the environmental condition. As is the case with any voluntary incentive policy 
there is a self-selection bias, where households that anticipate a low cost or even a gain 
associated with the condition are more likely to participate. Targeting may be required 
to improve the environmental performance of CB-PES, as is true with PES broadly 
(Wünscher et al. 2008). That would change the cost of the program and require 
                                                
29 In addition to the considerations for implementation that arise from the analysis here, various other 
implementation issues would need to be considered. For example, monitoring and enforcement would 
need to be addressed. 
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heterogeneous contracts to achieve optimal cost-effectiveness, but the results related to 
acceptance of repayment burden and only a small portion of CB-PES being 
compensatory would hold. That is demonstrated in , where the compensatory portion of 
CB-PES is assessed over the entire sample and not just the households that would self-
select to participate under specific conditions. Further, the variation in the anticipated 
cost or gain of meeting the condition provides a second reason specific to CB-PES for 
preferring heterogeneous contracts. With variation in the MWTP for an environmental 
condition, heterogeneous contracts would permit cross-subsidization between 
borrowers, reducing the total current cost to the ES buyer. Doing so would help 
maintain the level of capital available for lending, bringing the mechanism closer to 
being self-financing once capitalised.  
 
Additionally, access to affordable credit is considered a development issue and CB-PES 
is an incentive mechanism with dual environment and development objectives. If the 
proposed reward is large, more households will be interested in accepting conditional 
loans with the reported intent of meeting the condition, but there is concern over 
whether they would be able to pay back the loan at the higher reference rate if the 
condition is not met. In the case study here, the level of payback appears reasonable, but 
safeguards would nonetheless need to be in place to ensure no household is taking on an 
unacceptable level of debt. Further, to be supportive of lower-income households 
participating in CB-PES, the reward may be better constructed as a partially conditional 
reward. For example, if the reward were a reduction in annual repayments of $100, 
perhaps $50 would be unconditional and reward the attempt to meet the condition, 
while $50 would be conditional. Or put another way, $50 could be considered paying 
for the development benefit of access to affordable credit, while $50 could be 
considered paying for the delivery of ES. If multiple donors with these different 
objectives could work together, that approach could both 1) reduce the interest rate 
lower than the budget constraint of the ES buyer, and 2) reduce the surprise burden if 
the environment condition is not met. 
 
Finally, only one institutional factor entered the model, and it is one worth noting: land 
title. Respondents with legal title to at least some portion of their land had a lower 
utility for longer-term loans than those without any legal title. That implies titled 
households are more willing to accept shorter loan periods. A shorter period would 
require higher annual repayments, but leads to an overall lower cost of financing. That 
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would in turn lead to a lower CB-PES. Land titling could also make CB-PES more 
feasible, particularly if a normal lender was providing the loan, and the CB-PES was 
paid by a third party interested in environment (and/or development) outcomes. An 
evaluation of a pilot project by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to 
improve land titling in Ecuador found that, amongst other benefits, improved land 
titling permitted agriculturalists greater access to credit, and a larger-scale project is 
now underway (IDB 2013). Overall, it appears that improved land tenure could make 
CB-PES more feasible and cheaper to implement. 
 
5.6. Summary 
In this study we propose and ex-ante assess CB-PES, a novel incentive for the provision 
of ES alongside the reduction of a key market constraint. It is found to be a promising 
form of PES that combines a performance reward with a reduction in the credit 
constraint, and in doing so fits key criteria that are believed to make for good incentives 
and are increasingly discussed in the PES literature. 
 
Through this study, the broader dynamics and key implementation considerations are 
also identified. In terms of design, the uptake of conditional loans and cost of CB-PES 
will depend greatly on the reference market interest rate and the expected loss or gain 
associated with the environmental conditionality. In terms of implementation, particular 
attention should be paid to the debt burden a potential ES provider may be attempting to 
take on; heterogeneous contracts could be highly beneficial; there is a case for both 
environmental and development benefits to be jointly financed through a credit-based 
reward; and improved land tenure could make CB-PES more feasible and cheaper to 
implement.  
 
The case study was chosen as one where negative environmental trends need to be 
reversed and market constraints relieved to ensure sustainable development of the area. 
It is a context that is prevalent throughout developing countries and so our results are 
widely relevant. Based on those results, it is wholly recommended that the CB-PES be 
explored further and piloted beyond the few examples of convertible lending that, 
notably, have reported success. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY 
 
Incentive Choice and Joint Liability in Payments for 
Ecosystem Services: Evidence from a choice experiment in 
Colombia 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Despite such wide proliferation of PES, there remains a lack of well-designed studies 
evaluating their effectiveness (Miteva et al. 2012; Pattanayak et al. 2010). Costa Rica’s 
national PES program is the longest standing and most researched PES programme in 
the tropics. Evaluations indicate the introduction of incentives had little aggregate 
impact across the nation on improving forest cover (Robalino & Pfaff 2013), but a 
moderate positive impact in well-targeted areas (Arriagada et al. 2012) implying a 
heterogeneous effect across the country. Heterogeneity in the effect of PES can arise 
from difference in the quality of implementation across the country or differences in the 
responses to the incentive by PES-recipient subgroups (Arriagada et al. 2012). 
 
The case study here focuses on the latter, because despite PES programmes being 
incentive-based mechanisms (Jack et al. 2008), efforts to apply economic knowledge of 
incentives to PES design is still limited and primarily focuses on contract theory (e.g. 
Zabel & Roe, 2009). There is evidence that in non-industrialised nations various factors 
can affect the optimal choice and design of conservation incentives. For example, 
different market contexts can affect the outcomes of direct compared to indirect 
incentives (Muller & Albers 2004); different social preferences can affect whether 
household- or community-based incentives are preferred (Narloch et al. 2012); and 
perceptions of the ES buyer can affect the type of incentive an ES provider would 
accept from the buyer (IIED 2012). 
 
This chapter explores two key aspects of incentive design for PES. First, the research 
directly compares cash and in-kind incentives, an issue that has received significant 
attention among PES researchers and practitioners, but without much empirical 
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research. Second, it analyses the possibility of joint liability PES (JL-PES), where a 
group of households will all receive a reduction in their payment if one household 
within that group fails to meet the environmental condition of the PES. A choice 
experiment (CE) is used to ex-ante assess incentive design in a developing PES 
programme in Colombia to explore both aspects of PES design. The CE was 
implemented with respondent households living in communities that are already 
targeted as conservation priorities, so would be the pool of potential recipients of a PES 
programme under development. The key question is how best to design incentives to 
ensure that these households work to provide the desired public goods. 
 
Following this introduction, the next section provides a focussed literature review on 
these two key aspects of incentive design for PES. Section 6.3 describes the methods 
used for this case study and Section 6.4 presents the results. Section 6.5 discusses those 
results in more depth, followed by a summary in Section 6.6. 
 
6.2. Two Aspects of Incentive Design 
6.2.1. Cash or in-kind incentives 
To date, the primary argument for cash over in-kind PES is their economic flexibility 
(Wunder 2005), permitting recipients to spend the money as they want. Arguments 
against cash payments in the PES literature are primarily based on psychological 
evidence of the negative cognitive effects of extrinsic incentives on pro-social 
behaviour (Farley & Costanza 2010; Sommerville et al. 2009; Vatn 2010). The 
cognitive literature cited usually states or implies that the extrinsic incentive provided is 
cash. Specific studies on the introduction of cash corroborate the cognitive effects. 
Reviewing a series of experiments, (Vohs et al. 2006) conclude that the introduction of 
cash, or even just the idea of cash, can induce a reduction in pro-social behaviour. In 
contrast, through laboratory experiments, (Heyman & Ariely 2004) find that subjects 
exert more effort for low-level in-kind than low-level cash rewards. 
 
There is another literature relevant here, on cash compared to in-kind transfers in 
redistributive policies. As in the PES literature, the primary argument for cash over in-
kind transfers is that they are flexible and can be used for whatever the recipient wants 
to purchase: “in-kind incentives constrain the behaviour of the recipients, while cash 
transfers do not” (Currie & Gahvari, 2008, pg. 333). There is an additional overlap 
between the two literatures as PES can be part of a redistributive policy. Some policy 
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programmes that use positive incentives have an element of or are wholly viewed as 
revenue recycling or benefit-sharing mechanisms, as is true with national REDD+ 
programmes (Peskett 2011). 
 
In the literature on redistributive policies, the theoretical arguments for in-kind transfers 
are usually based on paternalism, self-selection, or political economy (Currie & Gahvari 
2008; Hessami & Uebelmesser 2013). The arguments for in-kind transfers based on the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma and pecuniary benefits are also relevant to PES. All five are 
briefly presented in turn (drawing on Currie & Gahvari, 2008): 
 
1) When there is some social or government preference for what transfer 
recipients should consume, this paternalism can be implemented through 
providing in-kind transfers. There is a related consideration in the PES literature, 
that if given cash, PES recipients may indulge in myopic spending (Wunder 
2005); spending on short-term indulgences, rather than spending on needed 
goods and services, such as health and education. In which case, less flexible in-
kind incentives may be preferred in order to guide recipients’ consumption. 
 
2) Under information asymmetries, providing in-kind transfers may induce self-
selection of recipients. If cash is provided, there is inevitably a set of individuals 
that are not the main target of the policy, but would be incentivized to try to 
claim eligibility. There is a range of transfer-design strategies to help ensure 
self-selection by making an in-kind transfer only valuable to the targeted 
population. As in any incentive-based policy, PES must also overcome issues of 
information asymmetries and targeting. 
 
3) The political feasibility of cash or in-kind transfers may determine which is 
used. One study of PES found that in-kind incentives were preferred by 
recipients if the ES buyer was a non-governmental organization (NGO), but cash 
was preferred if the buyer was the government (IIED 2012). Recipients of PES 
deemed it unacceptable that the government might provide social benefits 
conditional on good environmental behaviour, when the government was always 
responsible for providing those benefits. Additionally, in-kind incentives may be 
more politically palatable for community-based incentives because an 
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egalitarian allocation is considered fairer when it is an allocation of goods rather 
than cash (DeVoe & Iyengar 2010). 
 
4) The Samaritan’s Dilemma (Buchanan 1975) argues that when receiving 
financial support, the recipient may come to rely on it and not invest in their 
own human capital improvement to move out of poverty. In-kind transfers may 
be preferred to directly provide the human capital development. This is a similar 
mechanism to entitlement cited in PES literature, where because recipients 
receive cash incentives, the intrinsic motivation to provide public goods is 
reduced, leaving everyone worse off if cash payments cease (Farley & Costanza 
2010). 
 
5) There may be pecuniary benefits to providing in-kind transfers. One argument 
is that by providing goods or services directly as in-kind incentives, the public 
sector will increase their supply and lower the price in the local market into 
which they are introduced. Such a mechanism may be beneficial for PES, 
particularly in developing countries. There is concern that PES can have 
livelihood impacts on those not participating in the programme, through, e.g., 
changing labour markets or local commodity prices (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). 
Well-chosen in-kind incentives may make these impacts more positive. 
Similarly, providing in-kind benefits could insulate recipients from inflation, 
which has at times been a motivation for their use in OECD countries (Hessami 
& Uebelmesser 2013). 
 
Table 22: Perceptions of cash and non-cash payments for ecosystem services in a Bolivian case study. 
Adapted from Asquith et al., 2008; Robertson & Wunder, 2005. 
Category Perceptions of cash vs. beehives as incentives 
Economic 
character of 
incentive 
- Beehives are inflexible assets to sell 
- Beehives are inflexible assets to subdivide 
- Cash would be spent rapidly and leave no long term benefits 
- Honey is a useful subsistence or sellable product 
Cognitive 
perception of 
incentive 
- Some recipients reject money 
- Receiving cash ‘smells’ more like giving up future property rights 
- Demonstration effect (to neighbours) of bees and the sweet taste of honey 
gives PES implementers more goodwill than a corresponding cash transfer 
Effects on 
cost/benefit of 
program 
- Some recipients little skilled and little interested in beekeeping, thus losing 
benefits 
- Extra training costs for implementing NGO 
- Extra costs for recipients to benefit because beekeeping demands labour 
inputs 
- Beekeeping includes an incentive to protect forest as bee habitat 
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Despite a well-developed theoretical literature, there is limited empirical evidence of 
why cash or in-kind transfers are ultimately used, or the factors that may shift that 
preference (Hessami & Uebelmesser 2013). The empirical literature “seems to largely 
accept the paternalism theory and move on to other questions” (Currie & Gahvari 2008; 
pg. 334). There is equally limited empirical evidence comparing cash or in-kind PES. 
One problem is that much PES literature presents in-kind incentives as synonymous 
with community-level social benefits (Goldman-Benner et al. 2012; IIED 2012; 
Sommerville et al. 2010), conflating the discussion of type of incentive with the pros 
and cons of community-level incentives and interventions. 
 
Only one case study of a PES programme was identified that directly compared 
household-level cash and household-level in-kind incentives (Asquith et al. 2008; 
Robertson & Wunder 2005). When establishing a programme of payments for 
watershed services in Los Negros, Bolivia, the programme proponents discussed the 
benefits of cash or a particular in-kind incentive that would provide an alternative 
livelihood: beehives. The ES providers’ perceived advantages and disadvantages of cash 
and in-kind incentives were reported, and they fall into three categories (Table 22). The 
first is the economic character of the incentive, which broadly aligns with the arguments 
of flexibility of the incentive, for good or bad. The second are the cognitive perceptions, 
all favouring in-kind PES. The third is the effect of the incentive on the costs or benefits 
of the PES program. The direct effects noted are that in that particularly case study, 
there would be some additional costs associated with the in-kind incentive (e.g. 
training). There is also an indirect effect that the in-kind incentive is related to a joint 
production activity, which aligns with a paternalistic argument: the in-kind incentive 
provides not only a direct motivation to not fell trees, but also a secondary benefit of 
moving recipients towards livelihoods that are socially preferred. 
 
6.2.2. Joint liability 
As described in Chapter 3, joint liability is a key economic innovation for lending to 
overcome the effects of information asymmetries—both adverse selection and moral 
hazard—in a context similar to that in which many PES programs, particularly in 
developing countries, are implemented. It involves a group of borrowers all being liable 
for the repayment of the loan borrowed by a single member of that group. If one 
borrower defaults, the group defaults and no more lending is offered to any member. 
Group liability leverages the fact that group members have better information about 
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who would be a good borrower than the lender initially has, and relies on self-selected 
groups to form based on that information. It also leverages the social ties between group 
members because they will work together to ensure that no single member defaults, 
either through social pressure (when the borrower has the ability to repay) or developing 
a side arrangement to finance repayments (when the borrower does not have the ability 
to repay) (for deeper reviews of the economics of joint liability see Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2005 or Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999).  Joint liability could help overcome 
information asymmetries in PES through 1) using self-selected groups as a strategy to 
identify households that are ex-ante more likely to meet their contractual obligations 
(i.e. overcome ex-ante moral hazard), and 2) leveraging social ties to ensure that 
households do in fact meet them (i.e. overcoming ex-post moral hazard or unintended 
failure). There are two relevant literatures that indicate the potential dynamics of JL-
PES. 
 
The first and most immediately relevant is on collective action to conserve common-
pool resources. Evidence of the effect of group size is mixed and hampered by lack of 
consideration for relevant contextual factors (Poteete & Ostrom 2004; Yang et al. 
2013). Broadly, however, there appears to be evidence of both positive and negative 
effects of group size on collective action outcomes. Yang et al. (2013) reviewed this 
literature and evaluate the effect of group size on a PES program in Wolong Nature 
Reserve, China. In this program, groups of one to 16 households were responsible for 
monitoring parcels of land, in order to deter illegal logging, but over which no 
household had tenure. If the reserve administration found evidence of illegal logging on 
that parcel, all responsible households would receive a reduced PES. The authors found 
that, ceteris paribus, the most monitoring effort per household and the greatest 
environmental success occurred at an intermediate group size, nine on average. Based 
on their case study and the literature they argue that increasing group size supports 
better within-group enforcement, but that at some point the incentives to free ride begin 
to overwhelm those benefits, leading to an overall parabolic dynamic of group size on 
level of monitoring and ultimately, environmental outcomes. 
 
The second literature is joint liability in lending. There is some evidence that the same 
two opposing effects occur, leading to a quadratic dynamic. In their review and analysis 
of the economics of joint liability, Ghatak & Guinnane (1999, pg. 217) suggest that as 
group size increases the benefits also increase, but at some point “coordination 
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difficulties and free-rider problems in organizational matters overwhelm the 
informational and enforcement benefits of a group”. They note that through trial and 
error Grameen Bank in Bangladesh settled on five as the preferred group size, and cite 
qualitative reports that a group of 20 lenders is too large in Nepal (Mosley & Dahal 
1985) and the Dominican Republic (Devereux & Fishe 1993). Moving beyond 
qualitative case studies, modelling efforts also provide evidence that the intermediate 
group sizes are optimal (Armendáriz de Aghion 1999; Kaminski 2009) and its specific 
size will depend on the ability for within-group enforcement (Kaminski 2009). 
 
There are already examples of PES for communities rather than households, and at least 
one clear example of group-based PES that could be considered JL-PES (Yang et al. 
2013). Those examples, however, are where PES are used to incentivise collective 
action for directly conserving a common-pool resource (CPR). There are also many PES 
used to incentivise provision of ecosystem services from private land. Joint liability 
could improve PES in these cases by overcoming information asymmetries, but 
empirical research is needed to understand how potential PES recipients would perceive 
it. 
 
6.3. Methods 
To test potential PES recipients’ preferences related to incentive choice and joint 
liability, we use a CE of a developing PES programme in Colombia. As part of the CE, 
potential recipients chose between receiving cash and in-kind incentives (or receiving 
no incentive and not participating in the program). The aim was to provide some 
empirical evidence of why cash or in-kind incentives may be preferred by ES providers, 
and see how that relates to policy design arguments for use of one or the other 
(borrowing from the literature on redistributive policies). We do not attempt to 
demonstrate any cognitive effects, but to complement the psychological evidence 
already broadly cited in the PES literature. We focus on the more traditional economic 
effects, asking if there is any evidence that PES design could be informed by the 
arguments for in-kind transfers, or other additional arguments for cash or in-kind PES 
that may emerge. Additionally, within the CE, potential recipients were also presented 
with different group sizes under JL-PES. The aim was to assess the overall effect of 
group size on the acceptable value of the incentive, and identify any characteristics of 
households that would affect this dynamic. 
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6.3.1. Case study 
The emerging model for watershed conservation in Latin America is a water fund 
(Goldman-Benner et al., 2012). Bennett et al. (2013) tracked 23 active funds in 2012, 
with more in development, and in 2011 the Latin America Water Funds Partnership 
pledged USD 27 million to support and capitalize such funds.30 In a water fund, various 
ES buyers will raise finance for watershed conservation from special water use fees, 
through normal household and business water utility bills, international donor financing, 
and/or contributions from private companies. These funds will be held by a joint 
committee of the buyers and other relevant programmes stakeholders (e.g. 
representatives of affected communities) and is usually managed as a trust fund. The 
committee will then decide how best to invest finance for watershed conservation. That 
investment can be in land purchase, land restoration, community conservation projects, 
PES, and more. 
 
In 2011, the capital of Colombia, Bogotá produced 24.4% of Colombia’s GDP (DANE 
2013) and it currently has an estimated population of nearly 8 million people. Bogotá 
receives all of its water from national parks comprised of páramo and cloud forest, and 
investing in reducing sedimentation through land use change could reduce water 
treatment costs by millions of dollars (Calvache et al. 2012). These national parks also 
provide habitat to a range of threatened and endemic species. That scenario is common 
throughout Latin America, and water funds are proliferating. 
 
To help maintain the vital ecosystems around Bogotá a water fund called Agua Somos 
was formally launched in 2010.31 The fund stakeholders include Empresa de Acueducto 
y Alcantarillado de Bogotá (EAAB; Bogotá’s water utility), Bavaria (a beer maker), 
Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia, Patrimonio Natural (national conservation 
trust fund), The Nature Conservancy, and the Inter-American Development Bank. As 
part of its suite of efforts to protect the ecosystems that provide water to Bogotá, Agua 
Somos is considering providing positive incentives (i.e. PES) to households living 
around the protected areas that provide water to Bogotá. 
 
                                                
30 The partnership is a joint effort of The Nature Conservancy, FEMSA Foundation, Inter-American Development Bank, and Global 
Environment Facility. More at http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/latinamerica/latin-american-water-funds-partnership.xml  
31
 For more on Agua Somos, see http://www.aguasomos.org/. 
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To inform the use of PES by Agua Somos and other water funds in Latin America, a 
case study was developed for Chingaza National Park. More than 80% of the water used 
for human consumption in Bogotá comes from Chingaza (Calvache et al. 2012).  
Additionally, as with many water funds and PES programs across the region, the main 
threat to the provision of water services and biodiversity habitat in Chingaza continues 
to be livestock production. 
 
6.3.2. Survey and choice experiment 
A local extension worker and the primary researcher carried out a survey of 152 
households from 17 communities in August through October 2011. EAAB has carried 
out community conservation with a small, but increasing number of households around 
Chingaza since 2007. These activities have been implemented in the communities with 
which it is most important to work to protect the watershed as initially determined by 
EAAB32. As such, these are the most likely to receive PES and sampling was carried out 
to focus on them. In the highest priority communities nearly 100% of households were 
surveyed, and sampling was opportunistically carried out within communities that a 
potential PES program may expand into in the future. Overall, 45% of households 
surveyed had previously been directly engaged with EAAB-funded activities. As such, 
the sample covers all of the households that would be primary targets for PES, and 
many target households of secondary importance.33 
 
The main body of the survey collected information about each household’s social 
characteristics, economic activities, and views related to the key ecosystem services 
provided by Chingaza. That was followed by a CE designed to understand households’ 
preferences for cash compared to in-kind incentives and their willingness to participate 
in JL-PES. 
 
The hypothetical situation presented was as realistic as possible and due to the 
complexity of the attributes, was presented in two parts. The first part focused on 
incentive types. It described that a conservation NGO would like to improve the 
                                                
32 Now the stakeholders of Agua Somos are working together to determine the areas that are conservation 
priorities. 
33 It is also worth noting that the sample size was sufficient for analysis based on the rule of thumb for 
minimal CE presented in Equation 3. In this case study, the minimum would be 111, which is 73% of the 
actual sample. 
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sustainability of production systems around Chingaza to help protect local water 
resources and biodiversity. It then stated that under a potential PES program: 
• Households would include approximately 160 additional trees on their land, 
across slightly more than 1 Ha 
• Trees would be for living fences or riparian reforestation as agreed between 
household and NGO 
• The NGO would cover up-front costs, but the household has to manage and 
protect the new trees. 
 
Four types of possible incentives in the PES program were then discussed and examples 
given for each (Table 23). The incentive options were cash or three types of in-kind 
incentive: livestock support, crop support, and alternatives to tree use. Within the three 
types of in-kind incentive it was clear that they were all household-level incentives, and 
did not include social benefits (e.g. schools) or physical capital (e.g. irrigation). While 
discussing the four different types of incentive, respondents were asked to rank them in 
order of most preferred to least preferred for their household. The examples given for 
the in-kind incentives were either support that EAAB had already given or EAAB or 
Agua Somos had discussed, so they were generally familiar to respondents and all 
possible to implement. 
 
Table 23: Types of incentives described in the CE scenario. 
Incentive Type Example 
Cash To use however your family wants 
Support for crop 
production 
Good seeds, subsidies for manual labour, organic fertilizers 
Support for livestock 
production 
Good feed, subsidies for more productive cattle, support for 
better pasture production (e.g. organic fertilizers) 
Alternatives to tree use Subsidies for natural gas, fuelwood from elsewhere, treated wood 
for posts that last longer 
 
The second part of the scenario introduced the concept of joint liability. It was 
explained to respondents that to reduce monitoring costs, the NGO might randomly 
assign participating households to groups of up to seven families (i.e. the responding 
household plus six more). The NGO would only monitor one randomly selected 
household per group per year, if that household had protected its trees, all families 
would receive their PES, if not, then no family would. The basic costs and benefits were 
also outlined: that each family would have to expend some effort to ensure that other 
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families in their group were managing their trees, but also families could support each 
other in their efforts. 
 
Following the scenario, a CE was carried out where the attributes of the alternatives 
were value of the incentive (in Colombian Pesos; COP), group size (number of 
households), and whether or not the incentive was cash or in-kind (binary) (Table 24). 
The levels of the value and group size were determined based on a small pilot survey, 
with input from the local research assistant and EAAB. It was estimated that the average 
main effect would be positive for higher incentive values, and the effect would be 
quadratic for group size. 
 
Prior to the survey and CE it was unclear whether respondents would prefer cash or in-
kind incentives. Respondents were permitted to assume that the in-kind incentive was 
whatever type of incentive they preferred, and that was directly recorded on the choice 
card (on the line underneath “Materials”, Figure 12). The choice of in-kind incentives 
was permitted in order to neutralize the flexibility benefit of cash. That benefit is well 
established, and so here the aim was to observe what other dynamics were at work.  
 
Table 24: Incentive attributes and levels for choice experiment in Chingaza PES survey. 
Attribute Levels 
Value (COP) 150000, 235000, 260000, 350000  
Group size (Number of jointly liable households) 1 (i.e. solo, no group), 3, 4, 7 
Type Cash or In-kind 
 
A full factorial design of the attributes produced 32 unique alternatives, which were 
reduced to 16 using an orthogonal design. From this fractional factorial design, a 
shifting procedure34 was used to create 16 pairs of 32 alternatives. Although this CE 
design approach is sometimes not viewed as the optimal method, it was deemed 
appropriate here due to the relatively small sample size and lack of a-priori information 
on parameter values of the econometric model (Ferrini & Scarpa 2007).  
 
Due to the in-kind attribute being binary, the shifting technique naturally produced 16 
choice sets where there was always one cash incentive and one in-kind incentive. The 
order of alternatives in each choice set was randomized (i.e. A, B vs. B, A), meaning 
                                                
34 The levels of a given attribute are qualitatively coded in rank order (e.g. 1, 2, 3 for an attribute with 
three levels). Each attribute is shifted one level up, where if the top level is reached, the level returns to 1. 
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that the CE was unlabeled. Each choice set also included an option to not receive any 
PES and so not participate in the program (a status quo option), so each choice set 
included three alternatives. An example of a choice card used during the survey is 
presented in Figure 12. For each respondent, six choice sets were randomly assigned 
without replacement. 
 
 A B 
Value of 
incentive 
COP 350,000 
per family per year 
COP 150,000 
per family per year 
Type of 
incentive 
 
 
Materials… 
 
_________________ 
4 families Only your family 
Family 
group  
 
 
 
To protect approximately 160 native trees in living fences in two fanegadas of your 
productive land, which incentive would you prefer? 
 
A B Neither 
 
Figure 12: Example of a choice card from the Chingaza PES survey, translated from Spanish. 1 fanegada 
= 0.64 hectares. 
 
6.3.3. Econometric framework and model specification 
The econometric approach for this case study is the same as that in Chapter 5 and is 
fully described there. As noted in Section 5.3.3, one of the benefits of the mixed logit 
(MXL) model of the multinomial logit (MNL) model is that incorporates random 
parameter estimates to account for preference heterogeneity among respondents (Train 
2009). That should be tested to ensure that the MXL is a valid model for any given data 
set.  When analysing the data from Chingaza, the standard deviation of all three CE 
Cash 
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attributes entered the model with statistical significance, indicating they could be 
modelled as random to account for preference heterogeneity among households. 
 
It was important to account for this preference heterogeneity in this case because the in-
kind attribute was a broadly defined one, which different respondents could interpret 
differently. That interpretation could lead to preference heterogeneity of the attribute 
itself, and also manifest in the trade off between attributes. Some of the heterogeneity is 
observable and accounted in the model through interactions between respondent 
characteristics and incentive attributes. The remaining heterogeneity is unobserved and 
accounted for by using the MXL specification. 
 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Descriptive results 
The average respondent was 51 years old with 5.4 years of education, corresponding to 
only completing primary education, and 54% were male. Households comprised on 
average 2.9 adults and 1.2 children (under 18 years old). They reported a median gross 
annual income of USD 4,392. The average household received 33% of its income from 
off-farm activities, including 32% of the sample that did not have any off-farm income. 
 
On average, households claimed some form of tenure to 17.2 hectares (Ha) of land each, 
which included 6.6 Ha for grazing livestock, 5.2 Ha of wooded area, and only 0.6 Ha 
for crop cultivation. Regarding the type of tenure, 59% claimed they had title to some of 
their land, while 48% claimed traditional rights to some land. Typically, titled land was 
used for pasture and was closer to the household, while traditional rights were claimed 
for páramo in the national park. Households claiming tenure of páramo area generally 
stated they no longer use it for grazing, but that they still hold familial rights to the land. 
 
Descriptive statistics of the ranking of incentive type are presented in Table 25, which 
indicates the percentage of the sample that gave each type of incentive (columns) a 
given ranking (rows). The two most popular incentives are livestock support and cash. 
Livestock, however, is preferred with a steadily declining proportion of sample ranking 
it 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Cash, however appears to most often be the preferred 
incentive (ranked 1), or notably not preferred (ranked 3 or 4). Crop support is the least 
popular incentive type. 
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Table 25: Ranking of incentive types by respondents to Chingaza PES survey. 
 Livestock Cash Trees Crops 
1 38% 36% 22% 5% 
2 31% 14% 39% 16% 
3 24% 29% 24% 23% 
4 7% 21% 16% 57% 
 
In addition to the ranking exercise, descriptive information was collected on each 
respondent’s choice heuristics during the choice experiment. After each choice set was 
presented and an alternative chosen, the respondent was asked which attribute most 
influenced their choice, which was crosschecked with observations by the researchers to 
determine the attribute that was most important on the majority of choice sets for a 
given respondent, as well as the attribute that was most important on the second most 
number of choice sets. Choosing a choice set based largely on these attributes was 
considered the primary and secondary choice heuristic, respectively, of the respondent. 
Table 26 indicates that 56% of the sample initially stated a negative preference for 
group liability, while only 14% have a distinct positive preference for group liability. 
Additionally, 40% of the sample has an observable negative preference for cash 
incentives, while only 21% have a clear positive preference for cash. 
 
Table 26: Observed heuristics by CE respondents. Percentages represent the proportion of respondents 
that stated a positive opinion (+) or negative opinion (-) of the attributes that were their primary and 
secondary choice heuristics. 
Incentive 
Attribute 
Respondent 
Opinion Primary Secondary 
Primary or 
Secondary 
Group – 35.53% 20.39% 55.92% 
Cash – 25.00% 15.13% 40.13% 
Value + 19.74% 17.76% 37.50% 
Cash + 11.84% 9.21% 21.05% 
Group + 6.58% 7.24% 13.82% 
Unclear  1.32% 30.26% 31.58% 
 
Respondent statements regarding cash or in-kind incentives, and joint liability were also 
recorded (Table 27). Those statements did not relay any information on cognitive 
effects of different types of incentives, but they do align with typical economic 
arguments. Cash incentives were considered beneficial because they are flexible, but 
respondents also raised the risk of myopic spending. No negative statements of in-kind 
incentives were given, and all of the positive statements referred to materials being what 
was truly needed, at least in part because they were difficult or costly to obtain out in 
the communities. Regarding joint liability, respondents identified the key benefits of 
such arrangements, with some respondents clearly stating the logic for joint liability that 
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academics cite. Similarly, respondents also identified that joint liability would require 
more effort and risk on their part and would be difficult due to individualistic attitudes.  
 
Table 27: Respondent opinions on the pros and cons of incentive attributes. 
Cash Pros 
- Manage how I want 
- I manage cash well 
- Buy what I want 
- Flexible 
- I need cash, more useful 
- It is easier 
Cash Cons 
- Difficult to manage cash 
- Gets spent on other things 
- I would buy beer, meat 
- Cash “goes” 
- Useful in short term only 
In-kind pros 
- Manage materials better 
- Materials are expensive to transport 
- I need materials 
- It is easier 
- Materials are useful 
- With cash I would buy materials 
In-kind cons 
(None stated) 
Joint Liability Pros 
- In few families is best 
- Increase the “conscience of conservation” 
- Families help each other when one is sick or 
has problems 
- Reciprocal and benefits all 
- Social pressure is motivation 
Joint Liability Cons 
- Bad experiences with cooperatives 
- We do not have union here 
- Here it is “me, me, me” 
- We are individualists here 
- We have different ideas 
- I prefer to work alone 
- In a group is more complicated and difficult 
- Too much distance between families 
- Without group is safer 
 
6.4.2. Model results 
The variables used in the MXL models are presented in Table 28 and Table 29 presents 
two MXL models. Model 1 is the basic model and includes only the attributes tested in 
the choice experiment, all modelled as random parameters. Model 2 is where some 
preference heterogeneity is observable through interaction terms between attributes and 
respondent characteristics. Overall, the models confirm that there is a positive and 
statistically significant association with the value of the incentive offered. The higher 
the value, the more likely any respondent is to accept it. 
 
In relation to the effect of joint liability on the utility of the PES to respondent 
households, some explanation of the final model selection is useful. The attributes-only 
model (Model 1) indicates that the mean effect of increased group size is negative and 
significant, but the significant standard deviation of this parameter shows that there is 
heterogeneity in preferences of households for larger group sizes that should be 
accounted for. A number of household and respondent characteristics that could 
potentially interact with group size were tested. The only interaction found to be 
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significant was the number of adults in a household. The interesting result is that this 
interaction reduced the mean effect to not be statistically different from zero, but the 
standard deviation and the interaction are both significant. As such the interaction was 
maintained in the final model with interactions (Table 29), and following appropriate 
practice in modelling, the main effect is also maintained. 
 
A similar result occurred for the squared transformation of group size. The variable for 
(group size)^2 had a p-value of 0.108 in a model without interactions or any other 
transformations. It continued to be tested because it was very nearly significant at 90% 
and there was a theoretical basis for observing it. Throughout the model specification 
process, the transformation continued to be on the edge of significance, with a p-value 
around 0.1 in all models tested. The introduction of the interaction with number of 
adults in the household had a similar result as for the interaction with the mean effect 
for the group size (i.e. not squared): although the mean effect of (group size)^2 is not 
highly significant, the interaction is worth retaining in the model. To ensure this was the 
case, a likelihood ratio test was carried out comparing models with and without (group 
size)^2 plus the interaction with number of adults in the household. The model 
including both coefficients was found to be a better fitting model with a 95% 
confidence threshold. 
 
Table 28: Variables included in the models of incentive preference. Attribute averages are calculated over 
all chosen alternatives and household characteristic averages are calculated across all 152 households in 
the sample. 
Variable 
Type 
Variable Description 
(Unit) 
Mean 
[Min; Max] 
Value In Colombian Pesos (COP) scaled by 
1/100000 
268431 
[150000, 350000] 
Group size Number of households, in addition to 
respondent, in joint liability scenario 
1.81 
[0, 6] C
ho
ic
e 
A
ttr
ib
ut
es
 
In-kind =1 if incentive is in-kind 0.33 
[0, 1] 
Adults Number of adults in household 2.93 
[1, 8] 
Work 
income 
Value of annual cash income from off-farm 
activities (COP/year) 
3.0x106 
[0, 30x106] 
Age Age of respondent (years) 51.3 
[19, 87] 
Drive time Time to drive from respondent’s community 
to market town (minutes) 
178.80 
[108, 340] 
Cows =1 if respondent states livestock support is 
their preferred in-kind incentive 
0.51 
[0, 1] 
R
es
po
nd
en
t C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s 
Trees =1 if respondent states alternatives to trees is 
their preferred in-kind incentive 
0.39 
[0, 1] 
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Table 29: Mixed logit model of incentive choice, based on whole sample and including interactions with 
attributes. Estimated via simulation with mixlogit in Stata using 1000 with normal distributions for group 
size and in-kind attributes, and a lognormal distribution for the value attribute. 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Parameter Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. p p 
Valuea Mean 0.504 0.139 0.000 0.502 0.143 0.000 
 St. Dev. -0.625 0.195 0.001 -0.641 0.193 0.001 
           
Group Size Mean -0.602 0.112 0.000 0.644 0.518 0.214 
 St. Dev. 0.813 0.144 0.000 0.788 0.139 0.000 
 * Adults . . . -0.556 0.187 0.003 
(Group Size)^2 Mean . . . -0.117 0.077 0.129 
 St. Dev. . . . . . . 
 * Adults . . . 0.061 0.027 0.022 
           
In-kind Mean 0.649 0.207 0.002 -3.254 1.277 0.011 
 St. Dev. 1.877 0.291 0.000 1.768 0.284 0.000 
 * Work Incomeb . . . 0.010 0.005 0.051 
 * Age . . . 0.033 0.015 0.030 
 * Cows . . . 1.467 0.697 0.035 
 * Trees . . . 0.715 0.712 0.316 
 * Drive Timec . . . 0.517 0.260 0.047 
LR X2 117.600 0.000 105.550 0.000 
Simulated LL -448.797  -431.988  
Total Choice Sets 1804  1804  
Respondents (N) 152  152  
a Value scaled to 1/100,000 of actual value 
b Work Income scaled to 1/100,000 of actual value 
c Drive Time scaled to 1/100 of actual value 
 
As such, the models indicate two significant results related to joint liability. First, there 
is reasonable evidence for the hypothesized parabolic dynamic of joint liability. The 
second, and highly related, result is that the number of adults in a household interacts 
with the number of households in a group such that the mean effect of group size is not 
statistically different from zero. That indicates a stark and important trade-off in the cost 
of intra- and inter-household coordination that mediates the utility of JL-PES.  
 
The most extensive results relate to the whether the incentive was in-kind or cash. The 
basic model without interactions indicates there is a positive utility associated with in-
kind incentives, but based on observations and preliminary analysis, there was suspicion 
that this is in large part due to the collection of respondents that would prefer livestock 
support as their in-kind incentive. Model 2 demonstrates that there is a set of observable 
characteristics that influence respondents’ utility for in-kind incentives relative to cash 
incentives. The main effect in the full model is negative for in-kind incentives, but there 
are two respondent-specific interactions that must be accounted for: age and off-farm 
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income. The interactions indicate that both older respondents and respondents from 
households with a greater income from off-farm activities have a higher utility for in-
kind incentives. The interaction with off-farm income has a p-value slightly greater than 
0.05, but is retained in the model as it was significant at the 90% or 95% level 
throughout all iterations and tested models.  
 
As noted above, the attribute of in-kind incentive is very broadly defined. Interpretation 
of the attribute by respondents would naturally lead to heterogeneity of the model 
parameters. That is one reason a MXL model was used, and this attribute was modelled 
as a random parameter. To account for some observable heterogeneity, the respondent 
household’s preferred form of the three types of in-kind incentive identified earlier in 
the survey entered the model as categorical dummy variables interacted with the in-kind 
attribute, with preference for crop support as the baseline. That means that the 
probabilities estimated by the MXL model were conditional on the respondent being 
able to receive their preferred in-kind incentive; mimicking a generic and flexible in-
kind incentive. Under these conditions, the model indicates that respondents preferring 
livestock support had a significantly higher preference for in-kind incentives than those 
that demanded crop support. Respondents that demanded alternatives to tree usage did 
not have a significantly different preference from those preferring crop support. 
 
There is also evidence of an increasing preference for in-kind incentives the farther the 
respondents’ community is from a large market town. Under logistic constraints, the 
only feasible measure of distance to market was a simple measure of driving time from 
the social centre of a respondent’s community to La Calera, which was the nearest 
common town with a market and en route to Bogotá. A measure of distance specific to 
the respondent’s household would likely have reduced measurement error, but even 
with a simple community-level measure, there is evidence that the farther from market a 
respondent lives the greater their preference for in-kind incentives. It should also be 
noted that although this measure of distance was the same for all households within a 
community, community-specific dummy variables were tested in the model and found 
to be statistically insignificant. It is only this ratio-scaled measure that is significant in 
the MXL model. 
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6.4.3. Estimated welfare change 
The choice experiment method is consistent with utility maximization and demand 
theory, so when the parameter estimates of the model are obtained, welfare measures 
can be obtained (Bateman et al. 2002). The marginal change in welfare of an attribute is 
usually expressed as a monetary value and found by taking the ratio of the coefficient of 
that attribute over the coefficient of a price attribute (Hoyos 2010). Here, the same basic 
approach is applied to measure the welfare change associated with the attributes of the 
hypothetical incentives offered in the CE. The resulting marginal willingness-to-accept 
(MWTA) can be interpreted as the increase or decrease in the value of incentive that a 
household would require in order to accept a change in the relevant attribute of the 
incentive. Where there was a positive coefficient in the MXL model that will 
correspond to a negative MWTA. 
 
There are a number of specific approaches used to estimate marginal value in an MXL 
model when one or more of the parameters is random (Sillano & Ortúzar 2005). The 
simplest and most common is to use only the mean of the random parameters in any 
associated calculation, but it is preferable to use all of the information associated with 
the random parameters and simulate the MWTA (Hensher et al. 2005). Both of these 
methods were carried out and results presented in Table 30. 
 
Table 30: Mean marginal willingness-to-accept (MWTA) to participate in a PES program estimated by 
either by a) using the population mean of the random parameters, or b) simulating the distribution of the 
random parameters (1000 Halton draws). A positive MWTA indicates respondents have a negative utility 
for the relevant attribute, so need an incentive of higher value to accept an increase in that attribute; a 
negative MWTA indicates the opposite. 
 Population Mean Simulated 
 COPx105 
[95% CIa] 
USD COPx105 
[95% CIb] 
USD 
Group * Adults 0.274 
[0.096, 0.451] 
14.88 
 
0.366 
[0.172, 658] 
19.88 
 
Group^2 * Adults -0.030 
[-0.055, -0.005] 
-1.63 
 
-0.040 
[-0.072, -0.019] 
-2.18 
 
In-kind 1.603 
[0.358, 2.848] 
87.11 
 
2.294 
[-5.664, -0.140] 
124.70 
 
In-kind * Off-farm Income 
(/100000) 
-0.005 
[-0.010, 0.000] 
-0.26 
 
-0.006 
[-0.011, -0.003] 
-0.34 
 
In-kind * Age -0.016 
[-0.031, -0.001] 
-0.89 
 
-0.022 
[-0.040, -0.010] 
-1.19 
 
In-kind * Cow -0.723 
[-1.394, -0.051] 
-39.28 
 
-0.966 
[-1.736, -0.453] 
-52.48 
 
In-kind * Drive (/100) -0.255 
[-0.507, -0.002] 
-13.83 
 
-0.340 
[-0.612, -0.160] 
-18.48 
 
a Estimated via delta method 
b Estimated via Krinsky-Robb method 
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The MWTA estimates must be interpreted relative to an individual household. For 
example, although the main effect of the incentive being in-kind has an estimated 
MWTA of USD 87.11-124.70, the interactions will mediate this, such that without 
considering their preference for type of in-kind incentive, a respondent with the mean 
values of off-farm income, age and drive time have an approximate MWTA for in-kind 
incentives of USD 8.92-20.41. 
 
6.4.3.1. Welfare change associated with joint liability 
We can gain a better understanding of the welfare change associated with joint liability 
by aggregating the mean MWTA for the interaction of adults in a household with group 
size. Figure 13 illustrates the change in mean MWTA joint liability considering the size 
of the group and the size of the responding household, holding all else equal. It 
demonstrates the trade-off between intra- and inter-household coordination indicated in 
the MXL results. Additionally, it illustrates the parabolic dynamic: there is a point at 
which respondents perceive the marginal benefits of working in a group of households 
to be greater in magnitude than the marginal costs. As such, the most costly incentives 
are predicted to be those that require joint liability between the respondent household 
and four or five neighbours. As the group increases to the respondent household and six 
neighbours, the MWTA is approximately equal to that of a group of four households. 
 
6.4.3.2. Welfare change associated with incentive type 
We can also gain a better understanding of the welfare change associated with in-kind 
incentives by aggregating the mean MWTA for the main effect and all interactions with 
the in-kind attribute. Figure 14 illustrates the change in mean MWTA relative to cash 
incentives as a household’s drive time to market increases, for a respondent of mean age 
and with a mean off-farm income. It indicates that for this average respondent, if they 
prefer livestock support they always have a negative MWTA associated with in-kind 
incentives, meaning they would perceive a lower value in-kind incentive as equivalent 
in utility to a higher value cash incentive. Conversely, if they preferred other in-kind 
support to livestock support, they would have a positive MWTA for in-kind, meaning 
they would prefer to receive cash incentives, unless they lived very far from market. 
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Figure 13: Change in mean MWTA (y-axis) as the number of partner households (i.e. additional to the 
respondent household) within a jointly liable group increases (1-6, x-axis). Each curve represents the 
estimated mean MWTA for households with a different number of adults (1-8). 
 
 
Figure 14: Change in mean MWTA for in-kind incentives (y-axis) as drive time to a household’s 
community increases (x-axis). Results are for an average respondent that is 51.3 years old with an off-
farm income of COP 3 million. Bottom curve represents households that prefer and expect to receive 
livestock support; top curve represents households that prefer and expect to receive other in-kind support. 
 
Understanding population moments of welfare changes via mean MWTA is very useful, 
but can disguise underlying complexity in the MWTA distribution within a population. 
With so many interactions with the in-kind attribute it was essential to further explore 
estimates of MWTA. To do so, a MWTA in-kind incentives was simulated that uses the 
information on the mean and distribution of the coefficients for incentive value and the 
in-kind attribute, and all of the interactions with the latter, to estimate each household’s 
MWTA in-kind incentives. A positive MWTA indicates the model predicts they will 
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prefer cash incentives, and a negative WTA means it predicts they will prefer in-kind 
incentives, assuming they have a flexible choice over which type of in-kind incentive 
they receive. 
 
The results reveal notable detail of the MWTA in-kind incentives in this case study 
(Table 31). Approximately 70% of the sample has a preference for in-kind incentives 
over cash incentives. Notably, all respondents that indicated livestock support as their 
preferred type of in-kind incentive fall within this group. Considering that subsample 
has such a strong preference for in-kind incentives, we can segregate it out and in doing 
so identify and characterise three distinct groups within the sample with differing 
preferences for in-kind compared to cash incentives. The group that prefers livestock 
support as their in-kind incentive has a large negative MWTA in-kind incentives and 
comprises 41% of the sample, while the group that prefers other in-kind incentives has a 
smaller MWTA for in-kind incentives and comprises 29% of the sample. The third 
group comprises 30% of the sample and prefers cash incentives. 
 
Table 31: Three groups of potential PES recipients based on simulated MWTA in-kind incentives (1000 
Halton draws). The top half of the table reports the mean value within each group (columns) of a given 
respondent characteristics (rows). The bottom half of the table reports the p-value of student’s t-tests 
comparing those means between groups. N = 150, two of original sample were excluded from these 
simulations because they were not heads of household, who it is assumed would make the final decision 
related to acceptance of PES. 
Incentive Preference è 
Livestock 
Support 
(1) 
Other 
In-Kind 
(2) 
 
Cash 
(3) 
Mean Statistic Unit    
MWTA In-Kind (USD/year) -58.84 -18.29 17.18 
Age (years) 51.64 58.40 46.00 
Adults (people) 2.75 3.16 2.84 
Off-farm Income (COP/year) 2.94x106 4.41x106 1.86 x106 
Cows (binary) 1.00 0.00 0.00 
Drive (minutes) 205.39 193.23 131.09 
Proportion of Sample 41% 29% 30% 
 
T-tests 1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 2 vs. 3 
MWTA In-Kind 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 0.017 0.009 0.000 
Adults 0.109 0.738 0.278 
Off-farm Income 0.152 0.057 0.013 
Cows 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Drive 0.433 0.000 0.000 
 
6.4.4. Predicting participation 
The predicted utility of alternatives with specified attribute levels to each respondent 
can be simulated based on the MXL coefficients, from which the rate of willingness to 
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participate in a hypothetical PES program can be predicted. Doing so permits evaluation 
of the overall effect of introducing joint liability and incentive options into a PES 
program. Figure 15 illustrates the same effect of group liability as Figure 13, where for 
a given incentive value, as the group size in JL-PES increases to a household plus four 
or five neighbours, predicted participation continually decreases, but then it begins to 
increase again as group size continues to increase. Additionally, Figure 16 illustrates 
the expected effect that for a given group size, as the value of the incentive increases, 
predicted participation increases. 
 
An interesting result arises when comparing three different types of PES programs, 
offering either: cash incentives only, the household’s choice of in-kind incentives only, 
or the full choice of cash or in-kind incentives. In both Figure 15 and Figure 16, the 
predicted participation for the first two types of program is roughly equal. A program 
offering a full selection of cash and in-kind incentives, however, has a predicted 
participation in the range of 4-17% greater than either of the other two programs. Under 
incentive structures that are relatively less attractive to households, specifically where 
the price is low relative to the group size, this difference is at the high end of the range: 
for a group of three households and incentives of USD100 down to USD50, the 
difference increases for 8% to 17.5% respectively (Figure 16).  
 
6.5. Discussion 
6.5.1. PES and Chingaza National Park 
Across Colombia, over 55% of forest cover lost in 2005-2010 was due to transition to 
pasture, 30% of which occurred in the Andes region (Cabrera et al. 2011). It may have 
been higher, but livestock rearing has already overstretched the land area that is suited 
for it in Colombia. Colombia’s livestock strategy to 2019 (FEDEGAN, 2006) cites data 
indicating that 19.3 mHa of land in Colombia is suitable for livestock, but livestock was 
using 38.3 mHa of land. Further, the majority of livestock rearing is extensive. The 
strategy included a proposal to return 10mHa of pasture to a more natural state (which 
could include, e.g., reforestation or silvopasture), and intensify production on the 
remaining livestock land. 
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Figure 15: Predicted participation (y-axis) in the PES program offering USD 100 (COP 184,000) per 
family per year, as group size for joint liability increases (x-axis). Three potential programs offer only 
cash incentives, only (flexible) in-kind incentives, or a choice of the two. N = 150, two of original sample 
were excluded from these simulations because they were not heads of household, who it is assumed 
would make the final decision related to acceptance of PES. 
 
 
Figure 16: Predicted participation (y-axis) in PES program with joint liability across groups of three 
households (respondent plus two others), offering USD 50-150 (COP 92,000-276,000) per family per 
year. Three potential programs offer only cash incentives, only (flexible) in-kind incentives, or a choice 
of the two. N = 150, two of original sample were excluded from these simulations because they were not 
heads of household, who it is assumed would make the final decision related to acceptance of PES. 
 
The case of Chingaza National Park and the surrounding area is a case study relevant 
throughout Colombia, as well as in other nearby countries. Dairy production is both the 
dominant economic activity of the area and the most prevalent local anthropogenic 
threat to the valuable páramo and cloud forest ecosystems there. One major aim of Agua 
Somos and conservation efforts for Chingaza is to reduce the environmental impact of 
livestock by switching to intensive rearing practices and re/afforesting critical areas, 
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potentially introducing more silvopasture. All of which aligns with the stated national 
aims. 
 
It is therefore understandable and fortunate that the most popular type of incentive for a 
potential PES program in this area is livestock support. Providing only livestock support 
as the in-kind incentive in a PES program would target the 41% of the sample that 
prefer this type of in-kind incentive. For that group, the cost of the program would be 
reduced significantly as indicated by the relatively large and negative MWTA in-kind 
incentives for this group. It would also inherently target households that carry out 
livestock rearing and are the conservation priority. Further evidence of innately 
targeting the conservation priority is in the fact that the communities of the households 
in this group are on average 205 minutes drive from market, meaning they are close to 
the park and buffer zone.  
 
As such, the self-selection argument for in-kind over cash transfers would be a key 
motivator in this case. The recommendation for a PES program in this area would be to 
initially only offer livestock support as the incentive. Over time as the program 
developed, it could increase the types of incentive it provides and expand to other 
households that are of lower conservation priority. Even then, in-kind incentives may be 
preferred to induce self-selection, since households that prefer in-kind incentives are 
also on average farther from market so closer to Chingaza, and lower costs, since they 
still have a negative MWTA in-kind incentives. 
 
Regarding joint liability, there may be a case for including it in a PES program in this 
area, but that will depend largely on monitoring costs. If the average monitoring cost 
across a group of households is higher than the average MWTA group size increase 
across this group, then joint liability may be beneficial. Since households with fewer 
adults have a lower MWTA associated with joint liability, it may be worth exploring the 
cost effectiveness of creating groups among small households. Indeed, this is the 
scenario in which the benefits of group support, such as support and reciprocity, may be 
best realized. There are additional considerations related to joint liability as discussed in 
Section 6.5.3. 
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6.5.2. Designing PES: Incentive choice 
The discourse on PES has typically asked the dichotomous question of whether cash or 
in-kind incentives are preferred. A better question would be an open one asking what 
type of incentive is best from a broad menu, considering the local context and the 
incentive characteristics preferred in that context. Here the best incentive is support for 
livestock rearing. There are three interrelated reasons for this that all align with the 
theory of in-kind incentives in redistributive policies, and which can inform incentive 
design in other PES programs, particularly in developing countries.  
 
First, in-kind incentives that overcome market constraints are valuable to PES 
recipients. In this case a household’s distance to market increases the transportation 
costs for the inputs to their production practices. That is why the in-kind attribute 
interacts with drive time to markets in the MXL model. If the PES provider can 
leverage economies of scale and provide materials in the community cheaper than each 
household can obtain them, there would be an overall social benefit: the household 
would receive the incentive they value, and so have a lower WTA, making the PES 
cheaper. It is reasonable to think project proponents could lower transportation costs as 
they are likely visiting the area regularly anyway for monitoring or planning PES, or 
other conservation-related activities. Additionally, they may be able to buy materials in 
bulk to get a cheaper price and/or receive concessional prices if they are an NGO or 
public entity eligible for donor financing. 
 
Second, supporting the primary local economic activity is a popular incentive. The 
interaction of the in-kind attribute and preference for livestock support indicates that for 
PES recipients involved in the primary industry in the area, providing incentives to 
bolster their production is a very attractive incentive. It will lower their WTA, so lower 
the costs of the programme. It does mean the recipient receives a smaller value 
incentive in the short term, but it should have the longer-term benefit of supporting their 
production. From the perspective of the PES payer, it could also be attractive. If this is 
an industry the government, for example, is focused on improving as in this case study, 
their may be a paternalistic or political motivation for providing incentives related to it. 
 
Third, the right incentive can induce self-selection. In many contexts that PES is 
introduced, there is a local anthropogenic threat to ecosystems. This is the basis of 
REDD+, AES, and many other conservation or environmental incentives. In the case 
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study, the greatest threat is livestock rearing, as it is in much of the Andes and Latin 
America broadly. Providing incentives related to livestock support leads to self-
selection through two complementary mechanisms. It ensures that only those 
participating in this activity are interested in the incentive. Additionally, providing a 
preferred incentives type lowers WTA, meaning there is price point that can reinforce 
self-selection. Both are strategies noted in the literature on transfers. 
 
Beyond reasons for choosing a specific incentive over others, the results also indicate 
there may be value to providing a menu of incentives, depending on the goals of the 
program. The primary advantage of cash incentives is their flexibility, but the CE 
presented here mimicked flexibility for in-kind incentives by accounting for 
respondents’ observed preferred type of in-kind incentives in the predicted probabilities. 
The predicted probability results indicate that with this difference in flexibility 
neutralized, a cash or generic in-kind incentive would induce approximately equal 
participation. Therefore it is reasonable to extrapolate that a program offering a single 
type of in-kind incentive, thus not offering flexibility, would likely have a lower 
participation rate than one offering cash incentives. Conversely, if PES are implemented 
in a rural context where transportation costs are high and financial services non-existent, 
the flexibility benefit of cash is lower, and that program may have higher participation 
by offering in-kind incentives. 
 
More strikingly, the results indicate that a program offering a full selection of cash or 
in-kind incentives with a reasonably high payment relative to group size, would have at 
least a 4-5% higher participation rate than a program offering only cash incentives or 
only a selection of in-kind incentives. The ability of the recipient to choose their 
preferred incentive is so valuable that under less desirable scenarios for the PES 
recipient, of low payments relative to group size, the predicted participation for a PES 
program that offers a menu of incentive types may be up to 17% higher than one only 
offering cash or (flexible) in-kind incentives. It is intuitive that such selection would 
induce higher participation, but the potential scale of increase is notable. Almost all 
proponents of PES programs are under tight budget constraints. If the proponent offered 
joint liability incentives to reduce their monitoring costs (while hopefully increasing 
success rates, see below), but could only offer a limited value of incentive, they could 
still increase participation significantly by offering the PES recipients their choice of 
incentive type. That would be of interest if either 1) the goal of the program was to be as 
        170 
broad reaching as possible, or 2) there was a good targeting mechanism with the 
program so that the priority households could be identified, then there might be 
situations where a menu of incentives could be used to maximize participation within 
that group.  
 
6.5.3. Designing PES: Joint liability 
The results demonstrate the quadratic dynamic of group size in joint liability, where the 
lowest utility and highest MWTA occurs at an intermediate group size of 5-6 
households. The existence of two opposing effects, leading to this non-linear dynamic is 
corroborated by literature from collective action on common-pool resources and joint 
liability lending as discussed in Section 6.2.2. Evidence from those other literatures is 
from the perspective of the principal attempting to incentivize an agent to monitor and 
enforce conservation or loan repayment. Here we are assessing the agents’ preferences 
directly and find results that align with the principal’s perspective. As group size 
increases initially, potential PES recipients anticipate having to exert more effort to 
monitor and support/enforce contract compliance with other households, so through the 
CE state a higher MWTA for joint liability. In order to induce households to accept JL-
PES, the principal would have to provide a higher value of incentive to each household, 
just as in the Wolong PES program where intermediate group sizes exert more effort, 
are more successful, and ultimately receive higher valued incentives. 
 
As group size continues to increase, it reaches a threshold size at which the MTWA for 
joint liability begins to reduce again. The other literatures interpret this as the point at 
which free riding begins to overwhelm the ability of the group to monitor and 
support/enforce compliance. An analogous interpretation can be applied here. As group 
size continues to increase, the probability that any particular household is monitored 
decreases and any given household may rely on others to do the monitoring and 
necessary support/enforcement. As such, there is concurrently a rise in potential for 
moral hazard and in free riding related to organizational matters. 
 
There is a second, more positive interpretation that may also apply. There were no 
comments from respondents indicating they would succumb to moral hazard or free ride 
in larger groups. The positive comments for joint liability all relate to the group being 
‘reciprocal’, increasing the ‘conscience of conservation’, or generally creating support 
among households. Rather than assuming there is a tipping point at which moral hazard 
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and free riding begin to overwhelm the benefits of cooperation, it may be that 
households see a decreasing marginal cost of coordination, which at some point 
becomes overwhelmed by the marginally increasing social capital or network benefits. 
Due to the nature of this study being stated preference, the evidence identifies this 
alternative, positive hypothesis in the context of PES on de facto private land. It must 
also be recognized, however, it is unlikely likely that respondents would state their 
expectation to succumb to moral hazard or free ride. In the end, the two interpretations 
are not mutually exclusive, and the reality may be a combination of both. 
 
Either way, we have established that the intermediate group size is the least desirable 
for a household, and so would cost the ES buyer the most per household. The decision 
to use joint liability will be dependent on two factors. The first is a basic cost-benefit 
assessment, where assuming joint liability is of equal environmental effectiveness, if the 
costs of joint liability is lower than the cost of monitoring an additional household, it 
would be worth implementing. The second factor is a question of environmental 
effectiveness. In the Wolong PES program, researchers found a measurable increase in 
the effort expended by each household as group size increased from one to the optimal 
of nine. In Chingaza, the evidence indicates a similar dynamic would occur; that 
households are anticipating exerting more effort as group size increases to five or six. 
Although that will cost more for the ES buyer, both the Wolong PES case study and the 
available evidence from joint liability lending give reason to expect that this 
intermediate group size will not only exert more effort per household, but will also as a 
result perform better. If they do not, they should receive a reduced value incentive. 
 
A second result that is unique to this study is that the number of adults within a 
household mediates the effects of group size. That indicates that there is a trade-off 
between intra- and inter-household coordination. The result is intuitive in retrospect: 
joint liability already de facto occurs within a household, meaning larger households 
incur some degree of coordination costs before considering coordination with other 
households. As such, joint liability will be cheapest for and most beneficial to 
households with few adults. 
 
Moving beyond the direct results of this study, a final consideration in implementing 
joint liability PES is the role of social capital. Joint liability generally relies on social 
ties and sanctions, but the full role of social capital has been debated in relation to 
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lending (Armendáriz & Morduch 2005). Recent case study evidence suggests that with 
strong social capital between members of a group there may be implied joint liability, 
where individual lending can benefit from the same social insurance that explicit joint 
liability is intended to induce (de Quidt et al. 2012; Giné & Karlan 2011). Those 
examples are where there is strong leadership within the community and crucially, 
group meetings are maintained to build the needed social capital for implied joint 
liability to work. Most PES programs have such meetings, and where there is also 
strong leadership, these programs have the basic initial conditions to leverage implied 
joint liability. 
 
6.6. Summary 
There is a range of possible reasons why one type of incentive may be preferred over 
another. The PES literature has focused on preferring cash for its flexibility or in-kind 
incentives for cognitive reasons. Here we draw from the literatures on PES and 
redistributive transfers to outline a number of other theoretical reasons that could 
motivate choosing a particular type of incentive. The empirical results from this case 
first and foremost indicate that the majority of potential PES recipients have a negative 
MWTA in-kind incentives, and so prefer them to cash incentives. Complementing the 
cognitive reasons for preferring in-kind incentives, the results highlight three 
overlapping motivations for using in-kind incentives in this case, that they can: 
overcome market constraints, directly support the primary local economic sector, and 
induce self-selection of participants. Cash incentives would still garner a high degree of 
participation, but would be more costly and not support self-selection of participants. 
These motivations for providing in-kind incentives are relevant for PES throughout 
Latin America, and developing countries broadly, and can be used to guide incentive 
choice in other PES programs. Additionally, a menu of cash and multiple types of in-
kind incentives could be offered to maximize participation from the target population in 
a PES program. 
 
We also add evidence to previous findings of two opposing effects of group liability in 
PES: a negative cost of coordination and a positive benefit of support between group 
members. The magnitude of the cost of inter-household coordination, however, is 
mediated by a household’s initial fixed cost of coordination within itself (i.e. intra-
household coordination). Aggregating these two effects indicates that intermediate 
group sizes would be the most costly because households anticipate expending the most 
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effort in these groups. That aligns with evidence from elsewhere, which in turn gives 
some indication that although more costly, intermediate group sizes may also be most 
effective. In that case the ES buyer should prefer joint liability. The ES buyer should 
also consider how joint liability could lower their monitoring needs when deciding 
whether to use it in PES. 
 
Overall, the broadest conclusion that this study leads to is that optimal PES design is 
heavily context dependent. The thorough evaluations of PES to date have been for 
national-level programmes, and provided some initial evidence of heterogeneity in the 
environmental impact of PES. One likely reason is that these programs inherently take a 
one-size-fits-all-households strategy to incentive design. They do offer different 
incentives for different types of land use, but do not consider how best to incentivize the 
different types of households and communities—the actual agents—that will affect the 
desired provision of positive environmental externalities. In contrast, for example, here 
we have shown that if ES buyers consider local economic conditions, they could choose 
and design incentives that promote self-selection of the target households into their PES 
program. With the continued proliferation of PES in a diversity of contexts around the 
world, programme proponents and policy-makers should give more proactive 
consideration to optimal incentive design based on the local context. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Conclusions 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Significant discussion has been provided within each analytical chapter of this Ph.D. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on providing a synthesis of key results across chapters 
and in relation to the three research questions listed in Chapter 1: 
1. What is the state of knowledge on PES as incentives? 
2. What types of incentives are used as PES? 
3. How can PES be designed to overcome some of the issues related to incentives 
highlighted in the literature? 
 
Each research question will be addressed, but in reverse order. As noted in Chapter 1, 
this PhD gives slightly more weight to Research Question 3, discussion of which 
comprises the largest portion of this chapter in the following Section 7.2. Following that 
discussion, Section 7.3. highlights interesting results related to Research Question 2, 
Section 7.4. then discusses Research Question 1 and the overarching fundamental 
conclusion for this Ph.D. Finally, Section 7.5. briefly suggests useful future research.  
 
7.2. PES Design Elements 
The three unresolved issues in PES design that have been highlighted are the existence 
of market constraints, information asymmetries, and behavioural considerations. An 
analysis of the current stance in the relevant literature on these issues was completed in 
Chapter 3, while the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 undertook a more in-depth view of 
the same issues in specific locations. The main conclusion from the research presented 
in those chapters is that there are a number of ways incentives can be designed to 
overcome these issues. Multiple examples are discussed in the following three sub-
sections.  
 
7.2.1. Market constraints 
In the case study in Chapter 6, the choice of incentive is related to market constraints. 
The econometric results demonstrate that in-kind incentives have higher utility for 
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households living in communities located farther away from a central market town. 
Qualitative results support this. For example, some households stated that materials 
were expensive in the community because of travel costs, which was corroborated by 
local extension workers’ and the researcher’s observations. Households also made 
related statements, such as materials were more desirable than cash. If the ES buyer or 
PES intermediary can provide in-kind incentives, that helps mitigate the negative effects 
of markets constraints faced by the households. Households living farther away from 
markets indicate their preference for this type of incentive through a lower WTA. A 
classical interpretation is that the lower WTA accounts for the increased cost of 
transport. If the ES buyer or intermediary can use economies of scale or receive 
concessional prices for those materials, however, they could not only overcome market 
constraints from the households’ perspective, but also reduce the total costs of the PES 
programme. 
 
That result aligns neatly with Chapter 4. The typology of payments for watershed 
services identifies reciprocity as the type of incentive most prevalent in low-income 
countries. The name ‘reciprocity’ is derived from the fact that this class of incentives 
appears to be only loosely conditional, defined in part by an ongoing agreement of 
undefined length, and the observed cases predicted to be in this class used reciprocity or 
related terms to describe the incentive and/or arrangement. What is notable in relation to 
market constraints, and also defines this class of incentives, is that this class always 
includes in-kind incentives. It is reasonable to extrapolate, particularly in light of 
evidence from the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, that the link between the use of in-
kind incentives and low-income countries is at least in part due to market constraints in 
those countries. Further evidence is found in the literature review in Chapter 3. Other 
studies identified that explicitly explore the use of in-kind incentives are all based on 
experiences in developing countries and generally promote the use of in-kind incentives 
over direct cash payments. 
 
More evidence of the value of incentives that overcome market constraints is found in 
Chapter 5. The case study explores the novel incentive of credit-based PES (CB-PES). 
Multiple strands of evidence demonstrate the value of overcoming credit constraints to 
households in the case study area. First, there is latent demand for credit. Second, 
households state they are willing to accept the large majority of debt burden, even for 
loans with an environmental conditionality attached to them. Third, and most important, 
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the portion of the CB-PES that represents compensation for an on average negative 
change in welfare associated with that condition, represents a small fraction of the value 
of CB-PES. As such, from the perspective of the household that would be participating 
in the programme, the buy-down of loan repayments that is a CB-PES, is primarily a 
reward that helps overcome market constraints. The case study goes on to estimate that 
for a payment approximately equal in value to PES in other well-known programmes in 
Latin America, over 50% of the sample would demand conditional loans. 
 
Overall, Chapters 4-6 present a number of specific results that are useful for actors 
developing PES programmes and deciding what types of incentive to provide as PES. 
Collectively though, all three chapters provide their own evidence that, in general, ES 
providers living with incomplete markets are likely to have a high utility for incentives 
that help reduce market constraints. 
 
Additionally, previous PES discourse has often presented a dichotomy of direct and 
indirect incentives, the latter aligning with in-kind incentives or incentives that 
overcome market constraints. Research presented here, particularly the case studies, 
were designed to demonstrate that this dichotomy can be overcome. Specifically, that 
reducing market constraints, which would previously have been considered an indirect 
incentive, can be incorporated as a relatively direct incentive. In the case of in-kind 
incentives in Chapter 6, the choice experiment made clear that the incentive would be 
provided on a household basis only if the households were adhering to the condition of 
maintaining increased tree cover on their productive area. The condition ensured that 
their productive activity was more sustainable, while the incentive provided the inputs 
to continue supporting that activity. In that way, the incentive reduced market 
constraints, but was provided as a direct incentive. The case of CB-PES in Chapter 5 is 
similar. The provision of credit is in itself reducing market constraints. The incentive of 
reducing repayment is a direct incentive, but also helps reduce market constraints 
because once credit is available it still needs to be affordable. 
 
Integrating PES and overcoming market constraints permits ES providers to carry out 
desired or needed productive activities to support their households. So, where ES 
providers face market constraints and the PES is designed to help reduce such 
constraints, the incentive inherently fits the model of a supportive incentive. That is the 
        177 
key criterion for a good incentive provided by the behavioural economic literature, and 
the topic discussed in Section 7.2.3. 
 
7.2.2. Information asymmetries 
Of the three unresolved issues of incentive design for PES identified in the literature 
review, overcoming information asymmetries received relatively less attention in this 
Ph.D. Nonetheless, it is present throughout the two case studies, with some important 
results. 
 
First, the most direct result is the testing of jointly liable PES (JL-PES) in Chapter 6. 
The literature review (Chapter 3) highlights that minimal research on group size in PES 
has occurred, and aside from the case study in Wolong, China (Yang et al. 2013), no 
other research on joint liability in PES was identified. These are separate, but related 
concepts that should receive more attention. The results in Chapter 6 indicate that it is a 
topic worth researching more, and specifically highlights three useful results for joint 
liability.  
 
The maximum WTA of potential ES providers in the case study occurred at an 
intermediate group size of 5 or 6 households (i.e. the respondent household plus 4 or 5 
more). That indicates that respondents expect to expend more effort at such group sizes, 
and is in line with other research from microfinance (Ghatak & Guinnane 1999) and 
PES for common-pool resources (Yang et al. 2013). The general conclusion is that the 
benefits of group size increase until some optimum intermediate group size, the specific 
size of which is dependent on the context. After that optimum, other free riding within 
the group lowers the level of effectiveness, and that group will in turn receive lower 
benefits from the programme, which means lower payments in the case of PES. 
 
Chapter 6 provides evidence to support that dynamic, but the second result is that the 
qualitative evidence also indicates that a more positive dynamic could be occurring that 
has not yet been identified in the literature. That second dynamic may be that there is a 
decreasing marginal cost of coordination between households that at some point 
becomes overruled by an increasing marginal benefit of cooperation. That interpretation 
would show the same dynamic in relation to the parabolic utility function indentified 
here, and in other related literature, but would align with the qualitative statements 
made by respondents to the survey in Chapter 6. The positive and negative 
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interpretations of the dynamics driving the parabolic function may not be mutually 
exclusive. Further research could be helpful to tease these out, but it is likely that these 
will be highly context-dependent and that some mix of them is occurring in reality.  
 
The third result is also unique and critical to the dynamics of JL-PES in this case study. 
There is evidence of a trade-off between inter- and intra-household coordination that 
largely mediates a household’s preference for joint liability. That result is intuitive in 
retrospect. It is highly relevant for PES design, and if practitioners are interested in 
applying joint liability, they should be aware of it during the design phase. The result, 
however, is also interesting beyond PES and for the economic concept of joint liability 
broadly. In any context where meeting the conditions of a joint liability contract 
depends on a household to be successful, there is potential for a trade-off between inter- 
and intra-household coordination. The result also lends additional support to the 
positive interpretation of the existence of the parabolic dynamic witnessed in JL-PES. 
Smaller households experience the benefits of joint liability more acutely, and as such, 
they have a lower disutility/WTA for higher group sizes. Additional research would be 
useful to clarify this further.  
 
In addition to testing JL-PES, another key result emerged related to information 
asymmetries that builds on a concept learned in development economics and relates to 
reducing adverse selection. One of the reasons to provide in-kind incentives instead of 
cash under redistributive policies is to support self-selection of participants. Many PES 
programmes occur in contexts where there is a local, dominant anthropogenic threat to 
ecosystems and the provision of ES. For example, in Chapter 6, the threat is livestock 
rearing, which needs to become less extensive, incorporate best-management practices, 
and transition to silvopasture to support the provision of ES. The results indicate that 
although the mean main effect of in-kind incentives was to increase the WTA of 
potential ES providers, if able to choose from a menu of incentives, those that chose 
livestock support would actually have a lower WTA compared to cash incentives. 
 
Two reinforcing mechanisms are occurring: the choice of incentives and the value of the 
incentive would both mean that the PES of livestock support would only be attractive to 
households with significant livestock activities, which are in fact the initial target 
population. Although spatial targeting would refine the targeting to specific livestock 
rearing households with the most potential to provide ES, the choice of incentive could 
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already do a lot of the work, and with less effort. In a voluntary programme where 
households choose to opt-in, the choice and price point of the incentive offered can 
make opting-in only attractive to households that implement the key ES-degrading 
activity(ies). That provides a first-level of targeting that is blunt, but has the potential to 
be cheaper and more feasible, particularly in a developing country context. In doing so, 
it helps reduce the problem of adverse selection in PES programmes. 
 
These results are not intended to necessarily promote a particular method of overcoming 
information asymmetries, although the two presented above are worth exploring further. 
The overarching conclusion is that there are innovative ways of overcoming information 
asymmetries that are relevant to developing country contexts and have the potential to 
improve PES implementation. Actors designing PES could incorporate these results, as 
well as explore more innovations for overcoming information asymmetries. 
 
7.2.3. Behavioural considerations 
The final issue addressed by research in this Ph.D., particularly in the case studies, is 
concern over how incentives may be perceived and so how ES providers may react to 
them. As noted throughout the preceding chapters, an extrinsic incentive is more likely 
to induce an increase in the provision of ES if it is supportive, rather than coercive. 
Results from both case studies demonstrate how an incentive can be designed to be 
supportive and still relatively direct, particularly if the incentive is linked to overcoming 
market constraints. 
 
Chapter 5 has the strongest focus in this regard. The key result is that on average only a 
small fraction of CB-PES would be compensation for a negative welfare change 
associated with meeting the environmental condition. That indicates that the incentive 
would be a supportive, rather than coercive incentive. This results intuitively makes 
sense: a household will only borrow if it wants to carry out an activity or project for 
which it needs more capital, so lowering their repayment as CB-PES does, supports 
them in carrying out that activity or project. On another level, simply the introduction of 
credit into the case study region, which is initially credit constrained, could be viewed 
as supportive. That is upheld by further analysis related to the welfare change associated 
with the environmental condition, indicating that the incentive is in effect mainly acting 
to reduce market constraints. A similar result is found in Chapter 6, where households 
engaged in agricultural activities and living farther away from market preferred support 
        180 
for those activities to other types of incentives. The qualitative evidence highlights a 
primary reasons these households preferred in-kind incentives: materials are what they 
need most, but materials are expensive to transport. 
 
Both chapters also provide other interesting results in relation to behavioural 
considerations in PES design. Chapter 5 presents a time constrained incentive, that 
because it is supportive in nature, is less likely to lead to an endogenous shift in 
preferences, and so less likely to lead to entitlement. Chapter 6 illustrates that the 
respondents themselves identified one of the key risks of cash incentives noted in PES 
literature: that it is spent on short-term indulgences rather than goods with longer-term 
welfare benefits. Additionally, respondents identified the key benefit of cash is its 
flexibility. Providing flexibility in incentives inherently fits the idea of a supportive 
incentive. Another key attribute tested in that study is providing a menu of incentives, 
which is analogous to providing flexible incentives. The predicted participation results 
indicate that a menu of in-kind incentives (i.e. a ‘flexible’ in-kind incentive) would 
induce a level of participation equal to a cash incentive. Strikingly, a full menu of in-
kind and cash incentives, which was the most flexible option, was the scenario predicted 
to induce the highest level of participation, particularly under PES scenarios that are 
less desirable for the ES providers. It indicates that ES providers perceive value in the 
ability to choose the incentive they want to receive. 
 
Some less direct, but nonetheless interesting results arise from the typology presented in 
Chapter 4. Although that chapter did not discuss the effectiveness of different types of 
incentives, it does indicate which types are most prevalent and where. The most 
prevalent type of incentive overall is a cost-share incentive. That type naturally fits the 
framing of a supportive incentive, or a PES programme as reciprocal or co-investment. 
Cost-share incentives are much more prevalent in high-income countries than low-
income countries. The most prevalent incentive in low-income countries, reciprocity, 
has a similar dynamic in that it is supportive, but fits the context of low-income 
countries where ES providers are better supported by a) receiving in-kind incentives, 
and b) receiving incentives related to improving welfare. 
 
7.3. Types and Attributes of PES 
The typology (Chapter 4) and literature review (Chapter 3) advance knowledge on the 
types of PES in use or being considered by research and practitioners. The knowledge 
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developed in these chapters is useful on its own, but can also help interpret more direct 
research on PES design as presented in the case studies. A strong understanding of the 
types and attributes of PES that are in use, or that could be used, illuminates design 
elements to make PES more effective. 
 
For example, by understanding the types and attributes of incentives, credit-based PES 
(CB-PES) were identified as a type of incentive that fits multiple criteria of a goods 
incentive, so was worthwhile to research. The results of the Chapter 5 confirm this, and 
make clear it would also be worthwhile to implement. CB-PES best fit the class of 
regular payments: financial incentives (possibly cash, depending on how the CB-PES is 
delivered) are provided on an interval basis, for a change in practice, and do not include 
an upfront payment. Regular payments appear to be the class of PES that fits the most 
efficient form of incentive as defined by environmental economists: a relatively direct, 
cash incentive, with fairly strong conditionality. It also appears to be the class most 
likely to be viewed as a coercive rather than supportive incentive, at least compared to 
cost-share incentives and reciprocity. That is not the case with CB-PES though. It aligns 
with the criteria related to economic efficiency, particularly it is direct and with strong 
conditionality, but it is also a supportive incentive. Additionally, although no CB-PES is 
provided upfront, the provision of a loan is similar in nature to an upfront incentive. The 
review in Chapter 3 discusses that upfront payments are desirable to ES providers. 
Receipt of a loan that is only feasible because of CB-PES is effectively a key 
component of the incentive structure, which is similar in nature to receiving an upfront 
incentive.  
 
Similarly, understanding the types and possible attributes of PES informed the design of 
the case study in Chapter 6. That case study explores a reciprocal incentive. Based on 
the typology and prevalence of this class of incentives in low-income countries, it is 
suspected that their value is to overcome market constraints and support sustainable 
development. The case study provides quantitative evidence of this. Additionally, the 
greatest concern with reciprocity is that this type of PES may not be strongly 
conditional. The CE presented in the case study clarifies that incentives are strongly 
conditional on maintenance of replanted areas. It demonstrates that strong conditionality 
can be incorporated into this class of incentives, while still maintaining the key benefits. 
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Those examples focus more on understanding the types of incentives broadly. 
Understanding the attributes that characterise them is also helpful for PES design. A 
couple examples within this Ph.D. illustrate that point. 
 
First, the review in Chapter 3 indicated that ES providers generally prefer agreements of 
shorter length, so have a higher willingness-to-accept for longer agreements. That is 
problematic, since ES buyers generally prefer provision of ES to occur over the long 
term. Results testing preferences for CB-PES, however, indicate that ES providers 
prefer longer agreements in that case. That illustrates that it is possible to design an 
incentive structure where both ES providers and buyers prefer longer incentives. 
 
Second, the review also identified that in-kind incentives are desirable to ES providers, 
but the reviewed studies mostly researched in-kind incentives transferred alongside cash 
incentives. Chapter 6 is one of the few, if not only, case studies to quantitatively 
compare cash and in-kind incentives as different options, rather than part of the same 
incentive package. It demonstrates that within a case study area there are households 
that will prefer in-kind incentives and others that will prefer cash. Rather than provide a 
combination to all households, which will likely increase transaction costs, an option of 
one or the other can be offered. In fact, providing choice in incentive type, even if just a 
single type is provided to each household, has the potential to significantly increase 
programme participation. 
 
7.4. PES as Incentives 
The above discussion is not aimed at touting the benefits of any particular type of 
incentive or incentive attribute. Its primary aim is to demonstrate: 
1. That understanding the types and attributes of PES (Research Question 2) is 
useful to inform PES research and design; and that 
2. Research informed by this knowledge base (e.g. Chapters 5 and 6) can identify 
design elements to help PES overcome the three key issues for PES in 
developing countries (Research Question 3). 
 
All of the above results, however, arise from the fact that this Ph.D. takes what might be 
called the incentives approach to PES. That is the most general contribution of this 
Ph.D. to academic knowledge: to demonstrate the value of this approach. 
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In exploring the knowledge base of PES as incentives (Research Question 1), it was 
found that 1) the discourse on PES has evolved to view PES as a class of positives 
incentives, and 2) consumer theory, particularly work by the likes of Hanemann (1984) 
and Lancaster (1966), is emerging as an important intellectual basis for viewing and 
researching this class of incentives. Those are the two key elements of this ‘incentives 
approach’ to PES. 
 
Following this approach leads to many interesting results related to specific incentive 
attributes or types of incentive (packages)—i.e. different bundles of incentive 
attributes—throughout this Ph.D. All of them are relevant to researchers and 
practitioners involved in the detail of designing and implementing PES. 
 
At a more fundamental level, the results demonstrate that treating PES as a bundle of 
incentive attributes is a successful approach to creating incentive designs that can meet 
1) the demands for effective and efficient incentives from buyers, and 2) the preferences 
of ES providers. Further, it demonstrates that ingenuity can be employed to incorporate 
incentive attributes in previously unexpected ways. For example, as found in the case 
study on CB-PES, a cash or other financial incentive can be valuable not for 
compensating for opportunity costs, but for its support in overcoming market 
constraints. Or, as found in the case study comparing cash and in-kind incentives, the 
attribute of flexibility can be obtained by providing a menu of incentives. 
 
As this Ph.D. has been extensively informed from other sub-disciplines of economics, 
perhaps its contribution to the study of environmental policy can be shared back and 
applied more widely for policies with an incentive element. Focusing squarely on the 
incentive structure within a policy mechanism, and viewing that structure as a bundle of 
attributes, could provide unique insights that improve policy design in a number of 
areas. 
 
7.5. Future Research 
A broad range of future research can build off of this Ph.D. Focussing on PES, the 
incentives tested in the case studies could be implemented and tested for effectiveness. 
More generally, choice or field experiments explicitly comparing different, unique 
combinations of incentive attributes would also be valuable. That could include 
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comparing incentives across different classes of PES and different contexts to better 
understand the motivation for their use and their comparable effectiveness. 
 
More broadly, it would be worthwhile to follow the incentive approach for research in 
other topic areas. Within environmental policy, for example, the design of 
environmental levies could be researched by focusing squarely on the negative incentive 
structure and treating it as a bundle of attributes. Moving outside of environmental 
policy, the review of literature on redistributive policies in Chapter 6 highlights that 
there is a need for more research on how to design such policies, which could be carried 
out through the approach demonstrated in this Ph.D. Related to that, some research has 
begun to compare conditional cash transfers and PES, but still focuses on institutional 
attributes more than incentive attributes (Persson & Alpízar 2013). Following the 
incentives approach could provide a more accurate and realistic view of ES providers’ 
preferences and the relevant incentives. Essentially, this approach is an effective and 
useful way to examine all types of policy in which incentives are used.   
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